IMM-1683-01
2002 FCT 471
AB (Applicant)
v.
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Respondent)
Indexed as: AB v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (T.D.)
Trial Division, O'Keefe J.--Toronto, January 24; Ottawa, April 26, 2002.
Citizenship and Immigration -- Immigration Practice -- Convention refugee's Personal Information Form containing confidential information -- Board cannot use applicant's PIF in seemingly similar Convention refugee claim without applicant's consent -- Release of applicant's personal information to another refugee claimant, under circumstances of case, not permitted under Privacy Act.
Privacy -- Privacy Act, s. 8 prohibiting disclosure of personal information except in accordance with section -- Convention refugee's Personal Information Form containing confidential information -- Board cannot use applicant's PIF in seemingly similar Convention refugee claim without applicant's consent -- Release of applicant's personal information to another refugee claimant, under circumstances of case, not permitted under Privacy Act.
Practice -- Confidentiality Orders -- Federal Court Rules,1998, r. 151 confidentiality order may be granted with respect to material "to be filed", not with respect to material already filed.
The applicant, a high-profile athlete from Peru (member of the Peruvian wrestling team), obtained Convention refugee status in Canada. When another member of the Peruvian wrestling team made a refugee claim, the Immigration and Refugee Board, Convention Refugee Determination Division (the Board) informed the applicant that it intended to disclose material from his case, including his Personal Information Form (PIF), transcript, reasons and exhibits, and submit them into evidence at the hearing of the other member of the wrestling team. The applicant objected, claiming that disclosure would violate his right to privacy and would put his family, still in Peru, at risk. The Board released the information nevertheless. This was an application for judicial review of the Board's decision.
The issues were whether the Board's decision to disclose the applicant's personal information was unlawful in that the disclosure was for a purpose and to an extent not permitted under the Privacy Act, and whether the procedure followed by the Board in deciding whether the applicant's evidence would be used at another refugee hearing was in accordance with the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.
Held, the application for judicial review should be allowed.
As a preliminary matter, the request for a confidentiality order pursuant to rule 151 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998 was dismissed as the rule provides that the order may be granted with respect to material "to be filed", and the motion for a confidentiality order herein was made well after the material was filed. The Court did not have jurisdiction to issue such an order. Even if there was jurisdiction, the order should not be issued: the material has been on the public record for months, and the information has been revealed to the applicant in the other case.
The Board's decision to disclose the applicant's personal information was unlawful, in that the disclosure was for a purpose and to an extent not permitted under the Privacy Act. While the PIF contains a statement that the information therein may be used as evidence at hearings of related claims, the applicant wrote therein that requests for disclosure would be considered on a case-by-case basis, but that otherwise, consent was denied.
The record of the applicant's refugee claim qualifies as personal information under the control of a government institution within the meaning of subsection 8(2) of the Privacy Act. As such, unless the consent of the individual concerned is granted, one of the paragraphs in subsection 8(2) must be invoked to justify the disclosure. As to consistent use (paragraph 8(2)(a)), the determination of the refugee claim of another applicant was not consistent with the purpose of determining the applicant's claim for Convention refugee status. None of the other paragraphs applied to justify the disclosure.
While it was not necessary to make a finding on this issue, the Board complied with rule 28 of the Convention Refugee Determination Division Rules and in so doing, complied with the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.
statutes and regulations judicially
considered
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II, No. 44], s. 7.
| Convention Refugee Determination Division Rules, SOR/93-45, rr. 10(1), 22, 28. |
| Federal Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7, s. 18.1 (as enacted by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 5). |
| Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, r. 151. |
| Immigration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-2, s. 69(2) (as am. by S.C. 1992, c. 49, s. 59), (3) (as am. idem), (3.1) (as enacted idem), 82.1(1) (as enacted by R.S.C., 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, s. 19; S.C. 1992, c. 49, s. 73). |
| Privacy Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-21, ss. 2, 3 "head", "personal information", 7, 8(1),(2)(a),(b),(j),(m). |
| Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 A (III), UN GAOR, December 10, 1948, Art. 12. |
cases judicially considered
applied:
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Fazalbhoy (1999), 162 F.T.R. 57; 48 Imm. L.R. (2d) 222 (F.C.T.D.).
referred to:
Igbinosun v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1994), 87 F.T.R. 131 (F.C.T.D.); Rahman v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No. 2041 (T.D.) (QL).
APPLICATION for judicial review of the decision of the Convention Refugee Determination Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board, to release the applicant's Personal Information Form and other information from the applicant's refugee hearing and submit them into evidence at the hearing of another refugee claimant. Application allowed.
appearances:
Patricia Wells for applicant.
Stephen H. Gold for respondent.
solicitors of record:
Patricia Wells, Toronto, for applicant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondent.
The following are the reasons for order and order rendered in English by
[1]O'Keefe J.: This is an application for judicial review pursuant to subsection 18.1 [as enacted by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 5] of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7, as amended, in respect of the decision of the Immigration and Refugee Board, Convention Refugee Determination Division (the Board), (date of decision not given), communicated to the applicant by telephone on March 22, 2001, wherein the Board decided to release the applicant's Personal Information Form, as well as the transcript, reasons and exhibits from the applicant's refugee hearing and submit them into evidence at the hearing of another refugee claimant.
[2]The applicant seeks:
1. An order setting aside the decision of the Board;
2. A declaration that the Board's decision to release the applicant's confidential information as intended is unlawful;
3. An order to prohibit or restrain the Board from releasing the applicant's confidential information without the applicant's consent;
4. In the alternative, an order prohibiting the Board from releasing the applicant's confidential information except in accordance with such directions as the Court considers to be appropriate, as to the procedure to be followed to protect the confidentiality of the applicant's information in accordance with fairness and natural justice.
Background
[3]The applicant, AB, is a citizen of Peru.
[4]The applicant is a high-profile athlete who has competed on behalf of Peru in many international sporting events, including the Olympics. The applicant came to Canada in 1999 to compete in the Pan-American Games in Winnipeg as a member of Peru's wrestling team. The applicant made a refugee claim, based on his fear of persecution by the Government of Peru.
[5]The applicant was determined by the Board to be a Convention refugee on January 28, 2001. Reasons were issued for the Board's decision.
[6]Another member of the Peruvian wrestling team at the same Pan-American Games, Luis Enrique Bazan Sale (Luis Bazan), also made a refugee claim. At the time of application, Luis Bazan's claim had not been determined.
[7]The applicant claims not to know Luis Bazan well.
[8]The applicant was informed by letter dated February 19, 2001, that the Board intended to disclose material from his case, including the Personal Information Form, transcript, reasons and exhibits, into evidence at the hearing of Luis Bazan. The applicant was invited to submit to the Board any objections in writing.
[9]By way of letters dated March 6, 2001 and March 16, 2001, the applicant submitted objections to the disclosure of his refugee file.
[10]The letter dated March 6, 2001 includes the following objections:
I submit that my client's and his family's security will be put at risk if all the information proposed to be disclosed to Mr. Bazan is disclosed to him. I also submit that it will result in an injustice if that information is disclosed.
On the question of security, the same Board has already found that my client has a well-founded fear of being persecuted in his country, which is Mr. Bazan's country too. It has also found that my client enjoys a high profile in their common country, and the evidence showed that the press has taken a great deal of interest in my client's situation in Canada. The Board has found that his government views my client as a possible leftist sympathizer and that the same government tolerates human rights abuses when it comes to such persons, and for that reason he is at risk in Peru.
The evidence shows that my client's common-law wife and children remain in Peru, and that they have already been approached by the media in an attempt to find out more information about my client.
I submit that disclosing confidential information relating to the basis of my client's refugee claim will open the door to that same information's being made available to the press and the government of his own country, and will therefore place my client's family at risk for the same reasons the Board has found my client to be at risk.
In addition to the risk of physical harm or harassment, I submit it will result in an injustice to release information of a personal nature to someone unrelated to my client, and who has no obligation himself to keep that information confidential. The right to privacy and the right not to have that privacy interfered with is considered a "second level" right in refugee law (on the same level as the right to be free from arbitrary detention).
[11]Despite the applicant's stated objections, the Board decided to release the applicant's Personal Information Form, as well as the transcript, reasons and exhibits from the applicant's refugee hearing and submitted them into evidence at the hearing of refugee claimant Luis Bazan. This decision was communicated to the applicant by telephone on March 22, 2001.
[12]By letter to the Board dated April 4, 2001, the applicant's counsel wrote:
I have twice asked the Board for its reasons for its decision, with no response as yet. If the Board intends to proceed to disclose my client's information to Mr. Bazan before I have received reasons, I ask that I be notified so that I may apply to the Court for the appropriate injunction.
[13]It appears that the Board has already disclosed the information to Luis Bazan.
[14]By letter to the Court dated April 20, 2001, the Board indicated that since there was no statutory requirement, no formal reasons were given for the decision denying the request that confidential material from the file of the applicant should not be submitted into evidence at the hearing of the refugee claim of Luis Bazan. The letter further stated that the following endorsement appears in the file:
Both claimants: (1) are wrestlers from the same team (2) are from the same school from `95-`99 (3) defected at the same time & place (4) claimants fearing because of their alleged involvement with Shining Path (5) trained at the same training centre (6) travelled all over on same dates, same places, same teams (7) their claims both refer to attendance at student meetings. Therefore claims "appear clearly linked".
Applicant's Submission
[15]The applicant submits that the type of disclosure at issue in this case has not been judicially reviewed and decided before.
[16]The applicant submits that the Board seeks to disclose the applicant's personal information, without consent, to a third party (a refugee claimant) who is neither a government department or official, nor bound by any undertaking or obligation to keep the applicant's information confidential.
[17]The applicant submits that disclosing the personal information of one refugee to others not only violates the claimant's rights to privacy, but also could put that claimant and family members at risk should sensitive personal information be communicated to third parties, including the media, in the country of origin.
[18]The applicant submits that the applicant is not related to Luis Bazan and has limited knowledge of his personal life. The applicant has not been asked by Luis Bazan to give evidence at the hearing of his claim.
[19]The applicant submits that the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy for the information that he submitted in connection with his refugee claim. The applicant submits that as a rule, refugee claimant personal information is kept confidential, and that the disclosure of confidential information will be the exception.
[20]The applicant submits that the Board erred in law in making the decision to release the applicant's personal information, and specifically the Board erred in interpreting the Privacy Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P -21.
[21]The applicant submits that the applicant's rights to privacy are engaged under Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations, Resolution 217 A (III), 10 December 1948. For ease of reference, Article 12 is reproduced below.
Article 12
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
[22]The applicant submits that the applicant's rights under section 7 of the Charter are being compromised. For ease of reference, section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II, No. 44], is reproduced below.
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
[23]The applicant submits that the provision in paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act, supra must be interpreted so as to protect the confidentiality of an individual's personal information to the greatest extent possible.
[24]The applicant submits that paragraphs 8(2)(c) to (k) limit disclosure to specified third parties, almost all of whom are government institutions who are bound by rules to protect the individual's privacy.
[25]The applicant submits that the Privacy Act, supra does not place the onus on the individual to show that there might be harm or injustice caused by the proposed disclosure. Rather, the individual's privacy interest must be safeguarded.
[26]The applicant submits that in Igbinosun v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1994), 87 F.T.R. 131 (F.C.T.D.), Madam Justice McGillis found that disclosure of the refugee claimant's name to a foreign police force in order to ascertain whether he had a criminal record, was for a use consistent with the purpose for which the information was collected. The applicant submits that it was significant that no personal information aside from the claimant's name was disclosed to the police force. The applicant submits that had the claimant's entire Personal Information Form been disclosed to the police force, the Court's response would have been different.
[27]The applicant submits that even if the Board were of the opinion that some information contained in the applicant's refugee claim was relevant to Luis Bazan's claim, the Board must still follow a procedure which protects to the greatest extent possible, the confidentiality of the applicant.
Respondent's Submissions
[28]The respondent submits that the personal circumstances and background of the applicant and Luis Bazan, his teammate, were strikingly similar. The Board has a responsibility to ensure that decisions are consistent and that all relevant evidence is considered. The respondent submits that the use of the applicant's evidence at the refugee hearing of his teammate was a "consistent use" under paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act, supra. The respondent submits that as such, consent from the applicant was not required before the disclosure could be made.
[29]The respondent submits that paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act, supragives a tribunal the statutory authority to disclose personal information for a use consistent with the purpose for which the information was obtained. The respondent submits that the use of the applicant's evidence at the refugee hearing of his teammate was a "consistent use" under paragraph 8(2)(a).
[30]The respondent submits that the Personal Information Form instructed the applicant that the information provided is not absolutely confidential and that the applicant was required to list any objections to the disclosure on the form. The respondent submits that the applicant failed to make any objections based on the stated criteria relating to endangerment or injustice.
[31]The respondent submits that jurisprudence supports a broad and inclusive interpretation of "consistent use" in paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act, supra. The applicant submits that in Rahman v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No. 2041 (T.D.) (QL), at paragraph 10, this Court held that "[t]he purpose for which the information was collected may be expressed as general immigration purposes, or more specifically, as admissibility and refugee determination purposes."
[32]The respondent submits that in Igbinosun, supra, at paragraph 6, this Court held that disclosure to a third party was in accordance with paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act, supra because the applicant provided information generally for "immigration purposes".
[33]The respondent submits that applying this broad interpretation, it is a "consistent use" when the Refugee Division uses information obtained for the applicant's refugee hearing during the subsequent hearing of the applicant's teammate. The respondent submits that injustice could result if each refugee claim were to be considered in isolation. The respondent submits that it is appropriate that disclosure is made only where two or more refugee claims are closely linked.
[34]The respondent submits that two claims as similar as the applicant's and his teammate's would ideally be joined pursuant to subrule 10(1) of the Convention Refugee Determination Division Rules, SOR/93-45. The respondent submits that the presence of this subsection in the Rules supports the authority and the propriety of the Board, under paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act, supra to consider evidence from other refugee claims where two or more claims are closely linked.
[35]The respondent submits that the Privacy Commissioner concluded that using the personal information from one refugee claim to determine the refugee claim of another concerned individual is a consistent use of the information in appropriate circumstances.
[36]The respondent submits that subsection 69(3) [as am. by S.C. 1992, c. 49, s. 59] of the Immigration Act, [R.S.C., 1985, c. I-2] gives the Board the statutory authority to consider and implement any measures to ensure the confidentiality of proceedings. The respondent submits that the fact the Board chose not to restrict disclosure of any personal information in this particular case does not demonstrate that the procedure is flawed.
[37]The respondent submits that the applicant was allowed to make submissions in accordance with the principles of procedural fairness. The respondent submits that by way of written submissions to the Board, the applicant did not demonstrate that the use of his personal information at another refugee hearing would endanger any person or cause an injustice. Accordingly, the respondent submits that the applicant's materials have already been disclosed to Luis Bazan.
[38]The respondent submits that the hearing of Luis Bazan will be in camera, and therefore any evidence used at the teammate's refugee hearing which refers to the applicant would not be made public.
[39]The respondent notes that the applicant has made his personal information public by filing this judicial review without bringing a motion to treat the applicant's refugee record as confidential.
[40]Issues
I propose to deal with the issues as framed by the applicant:
1. Is the Board's decision to disclose the applicant's personal information unlawful, in that the disclosure was for a purpose and to an extent not permitted under the Privacy Act, supra?
2. Was the procedure followed by the Board in deciding whether the applicant's evidence would be used at another refugee hearing in accordance with the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness?
Relevant Statutory Provisions, Regulations and Rules
[41]The relevant sections of the Privacy Act, supra state:
2. The purpose of this Act is to extend the present laws of Canada that protect the privacy of individuals with respect to personal information about themselves held by a government institution and that provide individuals with a right of access to that information.
3. In this Act,
. . .
"personal information" means information about an identifiable individual that is recorded in any form including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing,
(a) information relating to the race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age or marital status of the individual,
(b) information relating to the education or the medical, criminal or employment history of the individual or information relating to financial transactions in which the individual has been involved,
(c) any identifying number, symbol or other particular assigned to the individual,
(d) the address, fingerprints or blood type of the individual,
(e) the personal opinions or views of the individual except where they are about another individual or about a proposal for a grant, an award or a prize to be made to another individual by a government institution or a part of a government institution specified in the regulations,
(f) correspondence sent to a government institution by the individual that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or confidential nature, and replies to such correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original correspondence,
(g) the views or opinions of another individual about the individual,
(h) the views or opinions of another individual about a proposal for a grant, an award or a prize to be made to the individual by an institution or a part of an institution referred to in paragraph (e), but excluding the name of the other individual where it appears with the views or opinions of the other individual, and
(i) the name of the individual where it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name itself would reveal information about the individual,
but, for the purposes of sections 7, 8 and 26 and section 19 of the Access to Information Act, does not include
(j) information about an individual who is or was an officer or employee of a government institution that relates to the position or functions of the individual including,
(i) the fact that the individual is or was an officer or employee of the government institution,
(ii) the title, business address and telephone number of the individual,
(iii) the classification, salary range and responsibilities of the position held by the individual,
(iv) the name of the individual on a document prepared by the individual in the course of employment, and
(v) the personal opinions or views of the individual given in the course of employment,
(k) information about an individual who is or was performing services under contract for a government institution that relates to the services performed, including the terms of the contract, the name of the individual and the opinions or views of the individual given in the course of the performance of those services,
(l) information relating to any discretionary benefit of a financial nature, including the granting of a licence or permit, conferred on an individual, including the name of the individual and the exact nature of the benefit, and
(m) information about an individual who has been dead for more than twenty years;
. . .
"head", in respect of a government institution, means
(a) in the case of a department or ministry of state, the member of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada presiding over that institution, or
(b) in any other case, the person designated by order in council pursuant to this paragraph and for the purposes of this Act to be the head of that institution;
7. Personal information under the control of a government institution shall not, without the consent of the individual to whom it relates, be used by the institution except
(a) for the purpose for which the information was obtained or compiled by the institution or for a use consistent with that purpose; or
(b) for a purpose for which the information may be disclosed to the institution under subsection 8(2).
8. (1) Personal information under the control of a government institution shall not, without the consent of the individual to whom it relates, be disclosed by the institution except in accordance with this section.
(2) Subject to any other Act of Parliament, personal information under the control of a government institution may be disclosed
(a) for the purpose for which the information was obtained or compiled by the institution or for a use consistent with that purpose;
(b) for any purpose in accordance with any Act of Parliament or any regulation made thereunder that authorizes its disclosure;
. . .
(j) to any person or body for research or statistical purposes if the head of the government institution
(i) is satisfied that the purpose for which the information is disclosed cannot reasonably be accomplished unless the information is provided in a form that would identify the individual to whom it relates, and
(ii) obtains from the person or body a written undertaking that no subsequent disclosure of the information will be made in a form that could reasonably be expected to identify the individual to whom it relates;
. . .
(m) for any purpose where, in the opinion of the head of the institution,
(i) the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy that could result from the disclosure, or
(ii) disclosure would clearly benefit the individual to whom the information relates.
[42]The relevant sections of the Immigration Act, supra states as follows [s. 69(2) (as am. by S.C. 1992, c. 49, s. 59), (3.1) (as enacted idem), 82.1 (as enacted by R.S.C., 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, s. 19; S.C. 1992, c. 49, s. 73)]:
69. (1) . . .
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (3.1), proceedings before the Refugee Division shall be held in the presence of the person who is the subject of the proceedings, wherever practicable, and be conducted in camera or, if an application therefor is made, in public.
(3) Where the Refugee Division is satisfied that there is a serious possibility that the life, liberty or security of any person would be endangered by reason of any of its proceedings being held in public, it may, on application therefor, take such measures and make such order as it considers necessary to ensure the confidentiality of the proceedings.
(3.1) Where the Refugee Division considers it appropriate to do so, it may take such measures and make such order as it considers necessary to ensure the confidentiality of any hearing held in respect of any application referred to in subsection (3).
. . .
82.1 (1) An application for judicial review under the Federal Court Act with respect to any decision or order made, or any matter arising, under this Act or the rules or regulations thereunder may be commenced only with leave of a judge of the Federal Court--Trial Division.
[43]The relevant sections of the Convention Refugee Determination Divisions Rules, supra state:
10. (1) An Assistant Deputy Chairperson or coordinating member may order that two or more claims or applications be processed jointly where the Assistant Deputy Chairperson or coordinating member believes that no injustice is thereby likely to be caused to any party.
. . .
22. (1) A person who makes an application pursuant to subsection 69(2) of the Act shall do so in writing to the Refugee Division and shall file it at the registry.
(2) The Refugee Division shall notify the parties forthwith of the application referred to in subrule (1).
(3) An application that is made pursuant to subsection 69(3) of the Act in response to an application referred to in subrule (1) shall be made to the Refugee Division in writing and filed at the registry.
(4) Subject to any measure taken or any order made pursuant to subsection 69(3.1) of the Act, the Refugee Division shall notify the person referred to in subrule (1) and every party forthwith of the application referred to in subrule (3).
. . .
28. (1) Every application that is not provided for in these Rules shall be made by a party to the Refugee Division by motion, unless, where the application is made during a hearing, the members decide that, in the interests of justice, the application should be dealt with in some other manner.
Analysis and Decision
[44]The applicant raised a preliminary issue at the commencement of the hearing of this matter. That issue was his request for a confidentiality order pursuant to rule 151 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998 [SOR/98-106], which reads:
151. (1) On motion, the Court may order that material to be filed shall be treated as confidential.
(2) Before making an order under subsection (1), the Court must be satisfied that the material should be treated as confidential, notwithstanding the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.
[45]The applicant seeks an order that the Court records be sealed in this judicial review application and that access to the Court records be prohibited without leave of the Court. In addition, the applicant requests an order that the style of case be amended so that the applicant's name reads as "AB" when the decision is rendered.
[46]The application for judicial review was filed on April 3, 2001. The respondent raised the fact that the applicant himself made the information public by filing the application for judicial review which in turn, resulted in the Board filing its record in the Court. This record contains the very information that the applicant wishes to have made confidential. The record was filed in the Court on November 23, 2001. The respondent has raised in its memorandum of fact and law filed on June 21, 2001 that the applicant had made his personal information public by filing the application for leave and for judicial review. The applicant filed his affidavit in support of the application for leave and for judicial review on May 22, 2001. That affidavit had attached to it as exhibits, the applicant's Personal Information Form, a copy of the transcript of the Board hearing and a copy of the Board's decision which is the majority of the information sought to be made confidential.
[47]I am of the opinion that I am unable to grant an order pursuant to rule 151 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998 as by the wording of the rule, I only have jurisdiction to grant an order of confidentiality with respect to material "to be filed". The material that I am being asked to order to be treated as confidential was filed in May 2001 and November 2001. The motion for a confidentiality order was not made until the date of the hearing which was January 24, 2002. The motion for a confidentiality order is therefore dismissed.
[48]In the alternative, if I have the jurisdiction to issue the confidentiality order, I am not prepared to issue the order. The material sought to be made confidential has been on the public record since May 2001 as well, the information has also been revealed to the applicant in the other case. I am of the opinion that in the circumstances of this case, a confidentiality order should not issue. I adopt the reasoning of Gibson, J. of this Court in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Fazalbhoy (1999), 162 F.T.R. 57 which he stated at paragraph 11 of the decision:
To justify a derogation from the principle of open and accessible court proceedings, and I am satisfied that that principle extends to open and accessible court records, Rule 151(2) requires that the Court must be satisfied that the material sought to be protected from access should be treated as confidential. The extract from Pacific Press (supra), makes it clear that the onus on an applicant such as the respondent here to so satisfy the Court is a heavy one. I simply am not satisfied that the respondent has met that onus on the facts before me. Any undertaking of confidentiality given by the Minister is not binding on this Court. The respondent has provided no special reasons to justify protection of his personal information on the records of this Court. His reliance on the words on the form provided for his use, the desire to which he attests to keep his affairs private and the fact that his personal information is before this Court not by reason of his own initiative provide a basis for sympathy for the respondent's position. But those considerations do not discharge the onus on him to justify a confidentiality order.
[49]I am prepared however, to issue an order amending the style of cause so that the applicant's name reads as "AB".
[50]Issue No. 1
Is the Board's decision to disclose the applicant's personal information unlawful, in that the disclosure was for a purpose and to an extent not permitted under the Privacy Act, supra?
The respondent entered an affidavit of David Tyndale, which included a letter from the Privacy Commission as Exhibit A. The letter from the Privacy Commissioner states, in part:
It was pointed out to the complainants that this as [sic] only a recognition that there may be some circumstances where the use of the personal information from one refugee might be appropriate. This was definitely not intended as a blanket endorsement for all refugee hearings. As you know, each and every Privacy Act complaint received by this office is dealt with on its own merits.
For instance, in a previous specific complaint investigated by this office, the Privacy Commissioner found that the Immigration and Refugee Board's introduction of one individual's personal information into the refugee hearing of another individual was a "consistent use" under section 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act [omitted s. 8(2)(a) citation]. In that particular case, a refugee claimant gave evidence at his own refugee claim hearing, but gave contradictory evidence about his curriculum vitae when he agreed to be called as a witness in a subsequent hearing for another individual. The Immigration and Refugee Board introduced his file into the second hearing to challenge the credibility of the witness.
[51]The example cited by the Privacy Commissioner demonstrates that a "consistent use" under paragraph 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act, supra includes demonstrating that an individual is providing contradictory evidence as a witness in a second refugee hearing than he provided during his own refugee hearing. In that case, the individual concerned brought his own personal information into question at the second refugee hearing by testifying about the same information provided at his hearing (although in a contradictory manner). That situation is clearly distinguishable from the present case where the applicant claims to hardly know the other refugee claimant and has no intention of participating in that claimant's hearing.
[52]As the Privacy Commissioner recognized, paragraphs 8(2)(a) and (b) are definitely not intended as a blanket endorsement for personal information of refugees to be shared at all refugee hearings. Moreover, each case must be dealt with on its own merits.
[53]The applicant's Personal Information Form contains the following standard wording on the front page:
The confidentiality of the information contained in this form is protected by federal legislation and can be released only under the terms of that legislation.
The Refugee Division may make inquiries concerning information provided in this form.
Moreover, this form and the information it contains may be used as evidence at the hearings of other claimants who are related to you or whose claims appear to be closely linked to yours. Should you have a reasonable objection to this use please state it below. The Refugee Division will consider your objection based on whether the use of your form and information would endanger the life, liberty or security of any person or would be likely to cause an injustice.
In the space provided under the above wording, the applicant wrote:
Requests for disclosure will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Otherwise, consent is denied.
[54]According to the wording on the Personal Information Form and according to the notice sent to the applicant, the Board will consider objections to the release of personal information based on whether the use of the information:
1. Would endanger the life, liberty or security of any person; or
2. Would be likely to cause an injustice.
[55]Is this an appropriate test for the Board to use in the context of a rule 28 [Convention Refugee Determination Division Rules] motion to determine whether the Board can use personal information of a previous refugee claimant without that claimant's permission?
[56]Part (b) of the Board's test uses similar wording to the test described in subrule 28(9). Rule 28 does not specifically mention privacy or confidentiality of proceedings, but it is the catch-all provision of the Rules which may be interpreted as appropriate to be applied in this situation. Part (a) of the Board's test uses similar wording to the test described in subsection 69(3) of the Immigration Act, supra. Subsection 69(3) states:
69. . . .
(3) Where the Refugee Division is satisfied that there is a serious possibility that the life, liberty or security of any person would be endangered by reason of any of its proceedings being held in public, it may, on application therefor, take such measures and make such order as it considers necessary to ensure the confidentiality of the proceedings.
[57]Although the test provided in subsection 69(3) can be helpful and instructive to the Board in determining whether to release personal information from a refugee claimant's record, subsection 69(3) is not directly applicable to the situation at hand. Subsection 69(3) provides a mechanism to ensure confidentiality of proceedings where the Board's proceedings are being held in public. In the instant case, at issue is the confidentiality of the record of a refugee claimant after the Board has concluded proceedings and made a final determination with respect to that refugee claimant. I do not find that subsection 69(3) provides any authority in this situation.
[58]Under rule 28, the Board has been given broad discretion to make decisions relating to the determination of Convention refugees. However, in my view, it is not clear that this broad discretion was intended to authorize the disclosure of personal information that would otherwise be protected under the Privacy Act, supra.
[59]The preamble to subsection 8(2) of the Privacy Act, supra states:
8. (1) . . .
(2) Subject to any other Act of Parliament, personal information under the control of a government institution may be disclosed . . . .
[60]I am of the view that the record of the applicant's refugee claim qualifies as personal information under the control of a government institution. As such, unless the consent of the individual concerned is granted (as required under subsection 8(1)), one of the paragraphs in subsection 8(2) must be invoked to justify the disclosure. Paragraph 8(2)(a) continues as follows:
8. (2) . . .
(a) for the purpose for which the information was obtained or compiled by the institution or for a use consistent with that purpose;
[61]In this case, the purpose for which the information was obtained was the determination of the applicant's claim for Convention refugee status. In order for the disclosure of the applicant's personal information to be justified under this section, the use of that information must be a use consistent with the purpose for which the information was collected. I do not find that the determination of the refugee claim of the other applicant is consistent with the purpose of determining the applicant's claim for Convention refugee status.
[62]Paragraph 8(2)(b) continues as follows:
8. (2) . . .
(b) for any purpose in accordance with any Act of Parliament or any regulation made thereunder that authorizes its disclosure;
[63]Counsel has not directed me to any Act of Parliament or any regulation made thereunder that authorizes the disclosure of the applicant's personal information contained in his refugee record, therefore paragraph 8(2)(b) does not apply. As described above, provisions from the Convention Refugee Determination Division Rules and the Immigration Act, supra have been considered but do not provide satisfactory authority for the disclosure of this personal information.
[64]Paragraphs 8(2)(c) through (i) are not applicable to the situation at hand. Paragraph (j) continues as follows:
8. (2) . . .
(j) to any person or body for research or statistical purposes if the head of the government institution
(i) is satisfied that the purpose for which the information is disclosed cannot reasonably be accomplished unless the information is provided in a form that would identify the individual to whom it relates, and
(ii) obtains from the person or body a written undertaking that no subsequent disclosure of the information will be made in a form that could reasonably be expected to identify the individual to whom it relates;
[65]Paragraph 8(2)(j) is not applicable as the disclosure concerned is not to a person for research or statistical purposes. Subparagraph 8(2)(j)(ii) is useful to the extent that it indicates that personal information is sufficiently prized under the Privacy Act, supra to warrant protection that includes obtaining a written undertaking to prevent subsequent disclosure.
[66]Paragraph 8(2)(m) continues as follows:
8. (2) . . .
(m) for any purpose where, in the opinion of the head of the institution,
(i) the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy that could result from the disclosure, or
(ii) disclosure would clearly benefit the individual to whom the information relates.
[67]Subparagraph 8(2)(m)(ii) does not apply in the case at hand since the disclosure of the applicant's refugee record to a subsequent refugee claimant would not clearly benefit the applicant. Subparagraph 8(2)(m)(i) would only apply if the head of the institution provides an opinion that the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy that could result from the disclosure. The head of the institution is a defined term in the Privacy Act, supra, and in this situation, it refers to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. There is no indication that the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration has engaged in weighing the interests in subparagraph 8(2)(m)(i), so this provision does not apply to authorize the disclosure of the applicant's personal information.
[68]In conclusion on this issue, I find that the Board's decision to release the applicant's personal information to another refugee claimant, under the circumstances of this case, is not permitted under the Privacy Act, supra.
[69]Issue No. 2
Was the procedure followed by the Board in deciding whether the applicant's evidence would be used at another refugee hearing in accordance with the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness?
Because of my finding on Issue No. 1, it is not necessary to make a finding with respect to Issue No. 2 but I will make a few brief comments with respect to the procedure followed by the Board. No procedure is set out by the Convention Refugee Determination Division Rules for the disclosure of personal information. Consequently, rule 28 applies. For ease of reference, subrules 28(1) and (9) are reproduced:
28. (1) Every application that is not provided for in these Rules shall be made by a party to the Refugee Division by motion, unless, where the application is made during a hearing, the members decide that, in the interests of justice, the application should be dealt with in some other manner.
. . .
(9) The Refugee Division, on being satisfied that no injustice is likely to be caused, may dispose of a motion without a hearing.
[70]To me, it appears that the Board has complied with rule 28 of the Convention Refugee Determination Division Rules and in so doing, the Board complied with the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.
[71]The application for judicial review is allowed and the decision of the Board to release the applicant's confidential information is set aside. It is declared that the Board's decision to release the applicant's confidential information is unlawful and the Board is prohibited from further releasing the applicant's confidential information without the applicant's consent.
ORDER
[72]IT IS ORDERED that:
1. The decision of the Board to release the applicant's confidential information is set aside.
2. It is declared that the Board's decision to release the applicant's confidential information as described is unlawful.
3. The Board is prohibited and restrained from further releasing the applicant's confidential information without the applicant's consent.
4. The style of cause is amended so that the applicant's name reads as "AB".
5. The application for judicial review is allowed.