[2000] 3 F.C. 282
A-365-98
Stelco Inc. (Applicant)
v.
British Steel Canada Inc., Aciers Francosteel Canada Inc., A.G. Der Dillinger Huttenwerke, Charleroi (USA) Inc., Thyssen Canada Limited, Metalexportimport, S.A., Usiminas, Vitkovice, a.s. and Attorney General of Canada (Respondents)
and
Algoma Steel Inc., Ipsco Inc. and Canadian International Trade Tribunal (Interveners)
Indexed as: Stelco Inc. v. British Steel Canada Inc. (C.A.)
Court of Appeal, Desjardins, Rothstein and Evans JJ.A.—Ottawa, January 25, 2000.
Administrative law — Judicial review — Certiorari — Judicial review of 1998 CITT decision rescinding 1993 decision dumping in Canada of steel plates from eight named countries causing, likely to cause material injury to production of like goods in Canada — Where federal administrative tribunal’s decision impugned on ground findings of fact not supported by evidence, question whether finding made in perverse, capricious manner or without regard for material before it under Federal Court Act, s. 18.1(4)(d) — Unimportant whether “patently unreasonable” or “unreasonable simpliciter” — To establish reviewable error, must be shown, on balance of probabilities, CITT’s decision not supported by any material before it.
Anti-dumping — Judicial review of 1998 CITT decision rescinding 1993 decision dumping in Canada of steel plates from eight named countries causing, likely to cause material injury to production of like goods in Canada — Court reluctant to intervene in CITT’s decision because (i) made in exercise of discretion under Special Import Measures Act, s. 76(4) to make order as circumstances require; (ii) facts in dispute manifestly within CITT’s expertise; (iii) important role played by CITT research, extensive submissions in response thereto in fact-finding — Burden on applicant to demonstrate on balance of probabilities Tribunal’s finding not rationally supported by any material — As some of Tribunal’s findings not challenged, could not say no rational basis for decision — Discretionary nature of decision, relevance of Tribunal’s expertise reducing detail with which Tribunal required to deal in its reasons with every factor raised — Not discussing factor on which evidence heard in reasons not meaning not considered — Tribunal must decide significance of any given factor — Applicant not demonstrating any factor on which reasoned finding not made of such manifest importance that Tribunal bound in law to deal with it expressly.
This was an application for judicial review of a 1998 decision of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal rescinding its 1993 decision that the dumping in Canada of certain steel plates from eight named countries had caused and was likely to cause material injury to the production of like goods in Canada. In concluding that, if the duties imposed in 1993 were lifted, the respondents were not likely to resume dumping, the Tribunal particularly relied on the existence of buoyant home markets for the subject goods. The Tribunal also found that there had been an overall reduction in steel production in the European Union in accordance with its policy. The Tribunal concluded that these factors had resulted in a high capacity utilization rate for steel mills in the relevant countries, which made it unlikely that they would resume dumping in Canada.
The Tribunal’s power to review a decision is found in Special Import Measures Act, subsection 76(2). Subsection 76(4) provides that the Tribunal may continue or rescind a previous finding “as the circumstances require”. The applicant relied upon Federal Court Act, subsection 18.1(4)(d), alleging that the Tribunal’s decision was based on findings of fact that were insupportable on the evidence before it. In particular, the applicant and the interveners challenged the Tribunal’s findings about the reduction in steel production capacity in the named countries of the European Union. They also submitted that the Tribunal’s reasons did not refer to facts on which the applicant and interveners relied to support their position, particularly the respondents’ propensity to export the subject goods to Canada.
The issues were: (1) what was the standard of review to be applied to the Tribunal’s findings; and (2) whether the Tribunal erred in fact or law by not considering certain evidence.
Held, the application should be dismissed.
Where a federal administrative tribunal’s decision is impugned on the ground that it is based on findings of fact that are not supported by the evidence, the starting point of the analysis is the standard of review prescribed in Federal Court Act, paragraph 18.1(4)(d). That is, the question is whether the Tribunal’s finding was “made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it”. It does not advance matters to try to determine whether this equates to a “patently unreasonable” or an “unreasonable simpliciter” standard.
The Court was reluctant to intervene in the Tribunal’s decision because it was made in the exercise of the subjective discretion conferred by subsection 76(4), which permits the Tribunal to make an order “as the circumstances require”. When a tribunal bases a discretionary decision on findings of fact, a reviewing court must examine those findings to ensure that they are rationally based on the material before the tribunal. But the tribunal’s underlying discretion inevitably increases its authority to determine what weight to assign to the various factors and may make it easier to satisfy a reviewing court that, even if one or other of its specific findings of fact were vulnerable, the Tribunal’s ultimate decision would still be supportable on the basis of other material before it. Also, as the facts in dispute are manifestly within the expertise of the CITT, the Court risks second-guessing the conclusions reached by the specialized Tribunal. Finally, the Court should be deferential towards the Tribunal’s findings because of the important role played in the fact-finding process by staff research and by the extensive written submissions made in response thereto. Finding facts on issues of a specialist nature, or making predictions, inevitably involves the exercise of judgment or discretion.
In order to establish that the Tribunal committed a reviewable error, the applicant and the interveners had to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that the Tribunal’s finding was not rationally supported by any material before it. Thus, even if the Tribunal committed a reviewable error on some of its findings of fact, its decision would still be upheld if there were other facts on which it could reasonably base its ultimate conclusion. Moreover, the discretionary nature of the decision and the relevance of the Tribunal’s expertise reduce the detail with which the Tribunal is required to deal in its reasons with each and every factor on which the domestic industry relied in its representations. The Tribunal is neither legally obliged to be satisfied on each of the factors that it typically considers when making a finding on the likelihood of dumping, nor to explain the reasons for its conclusion on a given factor simply because the parties have presented evidence on it. It could not be inferred from the fact that the reasons do not discuss a factor on which the Tribunal heard evidence that it did not consider it. A tribunal that is subject to a duty to give reasons, as is the CITT by virtue of subsection 76(4), must provide adequate reasons, but does not have to deal with every issue raised. Given the discretionary nature of the Tribunal’s decision-making power, no one factor typically considered by the Tribunal is so intrinsically important that it must always be dealt with in the Tribunal’s reasons. The Tribunal must decide the significance of any given factor. The burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that any factor on which the Tribunal did not make a reasoned finding was of such manifest importance that the Tribunal was bound in law to deal with it expressly in its reasons for decision. The applicant did not satisfy the Court that the Tribunal had committed such an error.
It could not be concluded that the Tribunal’s decision regarding reduction of steel production capacity had no rational basis on the evidence since the Tribunal’s findings as to increased demand for the goods, high capacity utilization and decreased competition were not challenged. In any event, the Tribunal’s findings on reductions of production capacity were not so clearly contrary to the evidence or contradictory as to constitute reviewable error, given the very high measure of deference that must be afforded to findings of fact within the Tribunal’s expertise.
In light of the Tribunal’s finding that dumping was unlikely, the Tribunal could properly have regarded other factors raised, but not dealt with in its reasons, in all the circumstances, as of marginal importance.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
Federal Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7, s. 18.1(4)(c) (as enacted by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 5), (d) (as enacted idem).
Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-15, ss. 42 (as am. by S.C. 1994, c. 47, s. 169), 76(2) (as am. by S.C. 1999, c. 17, s. 183), (4) (as am. by S.C. 1988, c. 65, s. 41).
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
APPLIED:
Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817; (1999), 174 D.L.R. (4th) 193; 14 Admin. L.R. (3d) 173; 1 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1; 243 N.R. 22; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 159; (1994), 112 D.L.R. (4th) 129; 20 Admin. L.R. (2d) 79; 14 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 1; 3 C.N.L.R. 49; 163 N.R. 241.
CONSIDERED:
Canadian Pasta Manufacturers’ Assn. v. Aurora Importing & Distributing Ltd., [1997] F.C.J. No. 115 (C.A.) (QL).
REFERRED TO:
Re Rohm & Haas Canada Ltd. and Anti-dumping Tribunal (1978), 91 D.L.R. (3d) 212; 22 N.R. 175 (F.C.A.); National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324; (1990), 74 D.L.R. (4th) 449; 45 Admin. L.R. 161; 114 N.R. 81; 3 T.C.T. 5303; 4 T.T.R. 267.
APPLICATION for judicial review of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal’s decision (Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate (Re), [1998] C.I.T.T. No. 29 (QL)) rescinding a previous decision (Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate (Re), [1993] C.I.T.T. No. 70 (QL)) that the dumping in Canada of steel plates from eight named countries had caused and was likely to cause material injury to the production of like goods in Canada. Application dismissed.
APPEARANCES:
Lawrence L. Herman for applicant.
Paul M. Lalonde for respondents British Steel Canada Inc. and Unisimas.
Denis Gascon for respondents Aciers Francosteel Canada Inc. and A.G. Der Dillinger Huttenwerke.
Jesse I. Goldman for respondent Vitkovice.
Ronald C. Cheng and Paul D. Conlin for intervener Algoma Steel Inc.
Dalton J. Albrecht for intervener Ipsco Inc.
Gilles B. Legault and Marie-France Dagenais for intervener Canadian International Trade Tribunal.
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Cassels Brock & Blackwell, Toronto, for applicant.
Flavell Kubrick & Lalonde, Ottawa, for respondents British Steel Canada Inc. and Unisimas.
Ogilvy Renault, Montréal, for respondents Aciers Francosteel Canada Inc. and A.G. Der Dillinger Huttenwerke.
Gottlieb & Pearson, Montréal for respondent Vitkovice.
Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt, Ottawa for intervener Algoma Steel Inc.
McMillan Binch, Toronto, for intervener Ipsco Inc.
Canadian International Trade Tribunal, Ottawa, for intervener Canadian International Trade Tribunal.
The following are the reasons for judgment of the Court delivered orally in English by
Evans J.A.:
A. INTRODUCTION
[1] In this application for judicial review the applicant, Stelco Inc., and the interveners, Ipsco Inc. and Algoma Steel Ltd., domestic producers of steel, request the Court to set aside a decision by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal, dated May 5, 1998 [Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate (Re), [1998] C.I.T.T. No. 29 (QL)], which rescinded a previous decision by the Tribunal, dated May 6, 1993 [Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Plate (Re), [1993] C.I.T.T. No. 70 (QL)]. The respondents are steel exporters in the named countries and Canadian-based importers of the subject goods. The Tribunal participated in this application for judicial review as an intervener to defend its jurisdiction.
[2] In its first decision, made after conducting an inquiry under section 42 of the Special Import Measures Act [hereinafter SIMA], R.S.C., 1985, c. S-15 as amended [by S.C. 1994, c. 47, s. 169], the Tribunal had found that the dumping in Canada of certain hot-rolled carbon steel plate and high-strength low-alloy plate from eight named countries had caused and was likely to cause material injury to the production of like goods in Canada.
[3] The Tribunal has a power under subsection 76(2) [as am. by S.C. 1999, c. 17, s. 183] of the SIMA to review a decision that it has made as a result of a section 42 inquiry. Subsection 76(4) [as am. by S.C. 1988, c. 65, s. 41] provides that, when it has completed the review, the Tribunal shall make an order to continue or to rescind a previous finding, with or without amendment, “as the circumstances require, and give reasons for the decision”.
[4] The domestic producers primarily rely on the Federal Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7, paragraph 18.1(4)(d) [as enacted by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 5] for their ground of review, alleging that the Tribunal’s decision was based on findings of fact that were insupportable on the evidence before it. In particular, the applicant and the interveners challenge the Tribunal’s findings about the reduction in steel production capacity in the named countries of the European Union.
[5] Second, they also submit that the Tribunal’s reasons do not refer to facts on which the applicant and interveners relied to support their position that the Tribunal’s 1993 finding should be continued. In particular, they contend that the Tribunal’s reasons do not consider the propensity of the respondents to export the subject goods to Canada that is suggested directly by evidence of the respondents’ witnesses and inferentially by anti-dumping findings against some of the respondents in other jurisdictions, the growth in the volume of exports of the subject goods from the named countries, the close connections between exporters and importers, and past trading patterns.
[6] In so far as the applicant’s challenge to the Tribunal’s decision rests on omissions from its reasons, the Tribunal can be said to have committed an error of law reviewable under paragraph 18.1(4)(c) [as enacted idem], on the ground that it had failed to discharge the duty imposed by subsection 76(4) to provide reasons for its decisions and had not taken into account facts that it was required to consider.
B. THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION
[7] Subsection 76(4) does not specify the facts that must be proved before the Tribunal renders a decision to continue or rescind an earlier finding. Its direction to the Tribunal to make an order “as the circumstances require” clearly leaves it a substantial measure of discretion. Nonetheless, following its previous decisions the Tribunal stated in this case that, in exercising its discretion it had had regard to two questions: first, was it likely that, if its earlier order were rescinded, dumping would resume; second, if it was, was it likely to cause material injury to domestic producers of like goods?
[8] In the instant case the Tribunal was not satisfied that, if the duties imposed in 1993 were lifted, the respondents were likely to resume dumping, thus making it unnecessary to proceed to the second question. In reaching this conclusion the Tribunal particularly relied on the existence of buoyant home markets for the subject goods. Thus, it found that in both the European Union, of which four of the named exporting countries were members, and in South America, where one exporter was located, economic growth had strengthened demand for the subject goods and pushed up prices. Further, the European Union exporters faced diminished low-price competition from Eastern European producers as a result of bilateral agreements negotiated by the European Union.
[9] In addition, the Tribunal made findings that there had been an overall reduction in steel production in the European Union in accordance with its policy. As far as the four named countries and producers were concerned, some had reduced their capacity, others’ capacity had remained stable, while in one instance there was an increased capacity.
[10] On the basis of global and country specific analyses, the Tribunal concluded that all of these factors had resulted in a high capacity utilization rate for steel mills in the relevant countries, which made it unlikely that they would resume dumping in Canada.
[11] In contrast to these conditions, during the economic recession in the early 1990s there had been an oversupply of the subject goods on the world market and falling prices, which must have been important factors in the Tribunal’s 1993 finding that dumping had caused injury to the domestic producers.
C. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
[12] An initial issue is the standard of review to be applied by the Court to the findings made by the Tribunal. The applicant, and the other domestic producers who have intervened in support of the applicant’s position, submit that the standard applicable here requires closer scrutiny by the Court than “patent unreasonableness”, because the SIMA no longer contains the finality clause that protected the decisions of the Tribunal’s predecessor when the Supreme Court of Canada in National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324 pronounced this to be the standard.
[13] On the other hand, the respondents allege that the existence of a finality, or any other kind of preclusive clause, is but one of the factors to be considered in conducting a pragmatic or functional analysis. Thus, in Canadian Pasta Manufacturers’ Assn. v. Aurora Importing & Distributing Ltd., [1997] F.C.J. No. 115 (C.A.) (QL), paragraphs 5 and 6, this Court applied the standard of patent unreasonableness to a decision made by the Tribunal after amendments to the SIMA had removed the finality clause, on the ground that other elements of the pragmatic or functional analysis (the statutory scheme, the subject-matter of the inquiry and the specialized nature of the Tribunal) were still in place.
[14] In our opinion where, as here, a federal administrative tribunal’s decision is impugned on the ground that it is based on findings of fact that are not supported by the evidence, the starting point of the analysis must be the standard of review prescribed in paragraph 18.1(4)(d) of the Federal Court Act. That is, the question is whether the Tribunal’s finding was “made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it”: see, for example, Re Rohm & Haas Canada Ltd. and Anti-dumping Tribunal (1978), 91 D.L.R. (3d) 212 (F.C.A.).
[15] It does not seem to us to advance matters appreciably to try to determine whether this equates to a “patently unreasonable” or an “unreasonable simpliciter” standard. Indeed, there is a danger that an inquiry of that kind may serve to divert the Court’s attention from a careful consideration of the words in which Parliament has formulated the standard of review for the factual findings on which federal administrative tribunals base their decisions.
[16] However, this is not to say that the words of paragraph 18.1(4)(d) are self-applying. Far from it. It is certainly useful to approach the question of giving more specific content to the statutory language by considering the common law standard for reviewing findings of fact and the factors that are included in a pragmatic or functional analysis. In our view, three factors suggest that in this case the Court should be particularly reluctant to intervene in the Tribunal’s decision.
[17] First, the Tribunal’s decision was made in the exercise of the subjective discretion conferred by subsection 76(4), which permits it to make an order “as the circumstances require”. Of course, when a tribunal bases a discretionary decision on findings of fact, a reviewing court must examine those findings to ensure that they are rationally based on the material before the tribunal: Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 159, at page 178. Nonetheless, the Tribunal’s underlying discretion inevitably increases its authority to determine what weight to assign to the various factors, and may make it easier to satisfy a reviewing court that, even if one or other of its specific findings of fact were vulnerable, the Tribunal’s ultimate decision would still be supportable on the basis of the other material before it.
[18] Second, as should be apparent from the nature of the domestic producers’ challenge, the facts in dispute in this case are manifestly within the expertise of the CITT, and unless the Court exercises a very high degree of restraint and resists the domestic producers’ invitation to subject the findings to close scrutiny by scouring through the record, it runs the risk of second-guessing the conclusions reached by the specialized Tribunal.
[19] Third, the Court should be particularly deferential towards the findings made by the Tribunal that are in dispute here because of the important part played in the fact-finding process of the CITT by staff research and by the extensive written submissions made in response to it, often on facts of a general nature such as market conditions in foreign countries as they affect subject goods.
[20] In short, the observation in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at pages 853-854, paragraphs 53-54, that there is not always a bright line to be drawn between questions of statutory interpretation and discretion is equally true of the distinction between fact and discretion. Finding facts on issues of a specialist nature, or making predictions, inevitably involves the exercise of judgment or discretion.
[21] Hence, the Court should be very reluctant to set aside a decision by virtue of the inferences drawn by the Tribunal from the material before it or to insist that the Tribunal’s reasons canvass all the material on which the applicant and the interveners relied, when that which the Tribunal regarded as particularly important, and on which it evidently based its decision, was sufficient to provide a rational basis for it.
[22] Accordingly, in order to establish that the Tribunal committed a reviewable error the applicant and the interveners must demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that the Tribunal’s finding that dumping was likely to resume if the original finding were rescinded was not rationally supported by any material before it. Thus, even if the Tribunal committed a reviewable error on some of its findings of fact, its decision to rescind will still be upheld if there were other facts on which it could reasonably base its ultimate conclusion.
[23] Moreover, the discretionary nature of the decision and the relevance of the Tribunal’s expertise reduce the detail with which the Tribunal is required to deal in its reasons with each and every factor on which the domestic industry relied in its representations. The Tribunal is neither legally obliged to be satisfied on each of the factors that it typically considers when making a finding on the likelihood of dumping, nor to explain the reasons for its conclusion on a given factor simply because the parties have presented evidence on it.
[24] Accordingly, it cannot be inferred from the fact that the reasons do not discuss a factor on which the Tribunal heard evidence that it must therefore have failed to consider it. A tribunal that is subject to a duty to give reasons, as is the CITT by virtue of subsection 76(4), must, of course, provide adequate reasons, but this does not mean that it must deal with every issue raised before it. Rather, it must explain its conclusion on those issues that are of central importance to the decision.
[25] Given the discretionary nature of the Tribunal’s decision-making power under subsection 76(4), it is impossible in the abstract to say that any one of the factors typically considered by the Tribunal in these cases is so intrinsically important that it must always be dealt with in the Tribunal’s reasons, whenever it is put in issue by the parties. It is for the Tribunal to determine the significance of any given factor in light of its conclusions on other factors.
[26] The burden is on the applicant to demonstrate that any factor on which the Tribunal did not make a reasoned finding was, on the facts of this case, of such manifest importance that the Tribunal was bound in law to deal with it expressly in its reasons for decision. We are not persuaded by counsel’s submissions that the Tribunal committed an error that justifies our intervention by setting the decision aside and remitting the matter to the Tribunal for either redetermination or a clarification of its reasons.
[27] Of the errors of fact allegedly made by the Tribunal in this case, counsel appeared to attach most significance to the Tribunal’s findings on the reduction of steel production capacity, especially by British Steel and other producers within the European Union. It was suggested that the Tribunal itself regarded this as a very important factor because it characterized it as one that “transcends country borders” and had an impact on all four of the countries within the European Union that were named in the original finding. Accordingly, it was argued, an error by the Tribunal on its most important finding tainted the rest.
[28] This is not what we understand the Tribunal to have meant. In our view, the Tribunal attached at least as much importance, and probably more, to the strengthened demand for the subject goods in a period of economic upswing and rising prices, high capacity utilization and decreased competition from eastern Europe. And, since the Tribunal’s findings on these issues were not challenged, we cannot conclude that the Tribunal’s decision had no rational basis on the evidence when it is considered as a whole.
[29] In any event, we are not satisfied that the Tribunal’s findings on reductions of production capacity are either so clearly contrary to the evidence or contradictory as to constitute reviewable error, especially bearing in mind the very high measure of deference that must be afforded to findings of facts within the Tribunal’s expertise.
[30] For example, we can see that some of the answers given by Mr. Heller, a witness called on behalf of the German exporters, were somewhat ambiguous and that he appeared rather late. Nonetheless, it was not unreasonable for the Tribunal to have concluded from his evidence that the European Union had had a policy of reducing production capacity, which was to be achieved in part by privatization of the industry, and that the implementation of these policies, while not complete, had resulted in a reduction of steel production capacity within the European Union of some 19 million tonnes, including a reduction by British Steel.
[31] Nor do we agree that there is any necessary inconsistency in the statements made by the Tribunal in its reasons to the effect that there had been a reduction in carbon steel capacity since 1988, and that since 1994 capacity had been stable. The figures deal with somewhat different time periods and goods.
[32] It was also argued that the Tribunal erred in law when it took into account British Steel’s reduction in capacity, because this had not occurred in the years immediately preceding the Tribunal’s decision in 1998. Any reduction had occurred prior to the 1993 decision when the Tribunal had found that there had been injurious dumping.
[33] In our view this does not amount to reviewable error since the Tribunal has substantial discretion in the weight that it gives to the material before it and the inferences that it draws from it. It was surely open to the Tribunal to take into account market conditions as they were when it made its original decision, as compared to the different conditions prevailing immediately prior to 1998, especially the high percentage of capacity utilization, buoyant markets and the changes that had occurred in the ownership structure of parts of the industry.
[34] Counsel also challenged the Tribunal’s finding that dumping was unlikely from Brazil, because the major Brazilian producer, Usiminas, had a full order book for the rest of 1998 and expected to be fully booked for some time after that. Counsel submitted that the evidence was that a major project was due to be finished in September 1998, and that the other contracts on which Usiminas was relying to use its capacity without exporting to Canada had not yet been finalized. For the following reasons we cannot regard this finding as justifying quashing the Tribunal’s decision in respect of Brazil.
[35] First, the Tribunal said no more than that Usiminas expected to have a full order book after 1998. Second, if the evidence did not support the Tribunal’s finding that the Usiminas’s order book was already full, only the last three or four months of the year were not already accounted for. Third, there was ample evidence of a strong demand and buoyant market in South America for the subject goods, and hence a rational basis for the Tribunal’s conclusion that dumping was unlikely to be resumed if the 1993 finding were rescinded.
[36] We turn now to the complaints that the Tribunal had erred in law by failing to consider the evidence and submissions concerning the connections between the exporters and the importers and their commercial practices, the willingness on the part of British Steel to set its export prices into Canada, if the duties were lifted, without regard to whether they were dumped prices, other allegations and findings of the dumping of steel, and the absence from Canada of exports from the named countries since 1993 when the duties came into effect.
[37] As we have already indicated, the Tribunal was under no legal obligation to deal with these issues in its reasons, despite the evidence adduced on them by the domestic producers, unless it is clear that they were of such importance to the disposition of this case that the Tribunal was obliged to set out its conclusions and, having failed to do so, it could be inferred that they had been overlooked.
[38] In light of the other finding made by the Tribunal indicating that dumping was unlikely (strong demand in the home markets, including the European Union as a whole, high capacity utilization and rising prices), we are of the view that the Tribunal could properly have regarded these other factors, in all the circumstances of this case, as of marginal importance.
[39] For these reasons the application for judicial review is dismissed with costs.