T-1411-98
Ernst Zündel (Applicant)
v.
Sabrina Citron, Toronto Mayor's Committee on Community and Race Relations, The Attorney General of Canada, The Canadian Human Rights Commission, Canadian Holocaust Remembrance Association, Simon Wiesnthal Centre, Canadian Jewish Congress, League for Human Rights of B'Nai Brith, Canadian Association for Free Expression (Respondents)
Indexed as: Zündelv. Citron (T.D.)
Trial Division, Campbell J."Toronto, April 12 and 13, 1999.
Administrative law — Judicial review — CHRT rejecting applicant's complaint reasonable apprehension tribunal member biased — In 1988, Ontario Human Rights Commission Chair issuing press release applauding jury verdict in criminal case finding applicant guilty of publishing false statements denying Holocaust — Ms. Devins sitting member of Ontario Commission at that time — Now sitting member of CHRT hearing complaint alleging applicant's Web site exposing Jews to hatred, contempt — Test for bias whether reasonably informed bystander could reasonably perceive bias — Concern about actual bias can be eradicated by evidence produced to contrary, but apprehension, appearance of bias not extinguished by evidence actual bias not existing — Press release making damning statement against applicant — Institution with adjudicative responsibilities having no legitimate purpose in engaging in such public condemnation — Undermining tribunal's independence, neutrality, causing bias concerns — Press release providing window through which bias against applicant could be seen on part of Ontario Commission's members sitting at time — Reasonable to conclude at time statement made Chair having strong actual bias against applicant — Wording of press release indicating Chair purporting to speak for all members of Ontario Commission — Reasonable conclusion at time statement made members of Ontario Commission holding strong actual bias against applicant — Although insufficient evidence to find present actual bias by Ms. Devins, denial of bias at this time not admissible to correct appearance of bias — To do so denial should have been made at time press release issued — As unaware of press release until June 1998, no waiver of right to bring bias complaint — Ms. Devins' prohibited from continuing as member of Tribunal.
Human Rights — CHRC hearing complaint alleging discrimination against applicant regarding Web site exposing Jews to hatred, contempt — Member of CHRC sitting as member of Ontario HRC in 1988 when Chair issuing press release, apparently on behalf of all members, commending applicant's conviction for publishing false statements denying Holocaust — Reasonable conclusion members of Ontario HRC held strong actual bias against applicant — Not erased by passage of time, but as not made by present CHRC member and as denying bias, insufficient evidence of actual bias — Denial of bias not admissible to correct appearance of bias — Under CHRA one Tribunal member having jurisdiction to complete hearing if other members unable to continue — Member prohibited from continuing as Tribunal member for reasonable apprehension of bias.
This was an application for judicial review of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal's decision rejecting the applicant's complaint with respect to a reasonable apprehension of bias against him.
On May 13, 1988 the Chair of the Ontario Human Rights Commission issued a press release respecting the outcome of a criminal trial involving the applicant, wherein he stated that "The Ontario Human Rights Commission commends the recent court ruling that found Ernst Zündel guilty of publishing false information denying the Holocaust" and "We applaud the jury's decision since it calls for sanctions against a man responsible for contradicting the truth of the suffering experienced by the Jewish people . . . ." At the time that the statement was made, Ms. Devins was a sitting member of the Ontario Human Rights Commission. She is now a sitting member of the Canadian Human Rights Commission Tribunal hearing a complaint against the applicant that his World Wide Web site exposes persons of the Jewish faith and ethnic origin to hatred and contempt, thereby constituting discrimination. After the CHRC's case was completed, the applicant became aware of the press release and raised his concern about bias. In response, the Tribunal members affirmed their lack of bias.
The issue was whether there was a reasonable apprehension of bias warranting the removal of Ms. Devins from the Tribunal.
Held, the application should be allowed.
The test for bias is whether a reasonably informed bystander could reasonably perceive bias on the part of Ms. Devins. A concern about actual bias can be eradicated by evidence produced to the contrary, but an apprehension or appearance of bias cannot be extinguished with evidence that actual bias does not exist. The appearance of the matter speaks for itself. The Tribunal members' affirmation of their lack of bias was relevant only to the question of actual bias, but irrelevant to the question of apprehension of bias.
The press release made a specific damning statement against the applicant. An institution with adjudicative responsibilities has no legitimate purpose in engaging in such public condemnation. To do so undermines the independence and neutrality required of such a body, causes bias concerns, and tests the ability of the justice system to correct such a wrong in order to maintain the essential principle of fair and equal justice delivery.
The press release provided a window through which bias against the applicant herein on the part of the then sitting members of the Ontario Commission could be seen. The applicant had a legitimate complaint. As the apparent promulgator of the press release, it was reasonable to conclude that at the time the statement was made, the Chair of the Ontario Commission held a strong actual bias against the applicant. The wording of the press release made it appear that the Chair purported to speak for all members of the Ontario Commission. Accordingly, it was reasonable to conclude that at the time the statement was made, the members of the Ontario Commission held a strong actual bias against the applicant as well. The taint caused by the press release extended to the present hearing before the Tribunal. The passage of time did not eradicate the fact that Ms. Devins was reasonably attributed with strong actual bias. But as the May 13, 1988 statement was not made by her, and taking the present denial into consideration, there was insufficient evidence upon which to find present actual bias on the part of Ms. Devins against the applicant. The denial made at this time was not, however, admissible to correct the appearance of bias on her part created by the press release. If the denial had been made at the time the press release was issued, it would have been evidence that the press release was not made with her agreement and did not reflect her views. As there was no such evidence, the press release stood unmitigated. A reasonably informed bystander would have an apprehension of bias by Ms. Devins against the applicant.
As the applicant did not become aware of the May 13, 1988 press release until June 10, 1998, he did not waive his right to bring his bias complaint in the present application.
Because of the apprehension of bias, Ms. Devins must be prohibited, pursuant to Federal Court Act, paragraph 18.1(3)(b) from continuing as a member of the Tribunal from the date of this judgment forward. The neutrality of the remaining Tribunal member not having been impugned, the Tribunal may exercise its jurisdiction to complete the hearing with one member only.
| statutes and regulations judicially considered |
| Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6, s. 13(1). |
| Federal Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7, s. 18.1(3)(b) (as enacted by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 5). |
| cases judicially considered |
| applied: |
| Newfoundland Telephone Co. v. Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 623; (1992), 95 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 271; 4 Admin. L.R. (2d) 121; 134 N.R. 241; Ringrose v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (Alberta), [1977] 1 S.C.R. 814; (1977), 1 A.R. 1; 67 D.L.R. (3d) 559; [1976] 4 W.W.R. 712; 9 N.R. 383; Ringrose and College of Physicians & Surgeons of Alberta, Re (1975), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 584; [1975] 4 W.W.R. 43 (Alta. C.A.). |
| considered: |
| Beno v. Canada (Commissioner and Chairperson, Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia), [1997] 1 F.C. 911; (1997), 144 D.L.R. (4th) 493; 126 F.T.R. 241 (T.D.). |
| referred to: |
| Beno v. Canada (Commissioner and Chairperson, Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia), [1997] 2 F.C. 527; (1997), 146 D.L.R. (4th) 708; 47 Admin. L.R. (2d) 244; 212 N.R. 357 (C.A.). |
APPLICATION for judicial review of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal's decision rejecting the applicant's complaint that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of one of the Tribunal members hearing an allegation that his Web site exposes Jews to hatred and contempt. Application allowed.
| appearances: |
| Douglas H. Christie and Barbara Kulaszka for applicant. |
| Jane S. Bailey for respondents Sabrina Citron and Canadian Holocaust Remembrance Association. |
| Andrew A. Weretelnyk for respondent Toronto Mayor's Committee on Race Relations. |
| Richard A. Kramer for respondent The Attorney General of Canada. |
| René Duval for respondent Canadian Human Rights Commission. |
| Robyn M. Bell for respondent Simon Wiesenthal Centre. |
| Judy Chan and Joel Richler for respondent Canadian Jewish Congress. |
| Marvin Kurz for respondent League for Human Rights of B'Nai Brith. |
| Paul Fromm for respondent Canadian Association for Free Expression. |
| solicitors of record: |
| Douglas H. Christie, Victoria, and Barbara Kulaszka, Brighton, Ontario, for applicant. |
| Tory Tory DesLauriers & Binnington, Toronto, for respondents Sabrina Citron and the Canadian Holocaust Remembrance Association. |
| Office of the City Solicitor, City of Toronto, Toronto, for respondent Toronto Mayor's Committee on Race Relations. |
| Deputy Attorney General of Canada for the Attorney General of Canada. |
| René Duval, Canadian Human Rights Commission, for respondent Canadian Human Rights Commission. |
| Bennett Jones, Toronto, for respondent Simon Wiesenthal Centre. |
| Blake, Cassels & Graydon, Toronto, for respondent Canadian Jewish Congress. |
| Dale, Streiman & Kurz, Brampton, Ontario, for respondent League for Human Rights of B'Nai Brith. |
The following are the reasons for order rendered in English by
[1]Campbell J.: On May 13, 1988 the Chair of the Ontario Human Rights Commission (the Ontario Commission) made the following statement respecting the outcome of a criminal trial involving Mr. Zündel, the applicant in the present application:
| TIME/DATE: 10:32 Eastern Time May 13, 1988 |
| SOURCE: Ontario Human Rights Commission |
| HEADLINE: *** HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION COMMENDS RECENT ZÜNDEL RULING *** |
| PLACELINE: TORONTO |
The Ontario Human Rights Commission commends the recent court ruling that found Ernst Zundel guilty of publishing false statements denying the Holocaust.
"This decision lays to rest, once and for all, the position that is resurrected from time to time that the Holocaust did not happen and is, in fact, a hoax," said Chief Commissioner, Raj Anand. "We applaud the jury's decision since it calls for sanctions against a man responsible for contradicting the truth of the suffering experienced by the Jewish people, which was visited upon them solely because of their religion and ethnicity."
Mr. Anand also stated that the decision is of broader significance in that it affirms not only the rights of Jews, but also of and other religious and ethnocultural groups to be free from the dissemination of false information that maligns them.
[2]At the time that the statement was made, Ms. Devins was a sitting member of the Ontario Commission. Ms. Devins is now a sitting member of the Canadian Human Rights Commission (the CHRC) tribunal (the Tribunal) hearing a complaint against the applicant pursuant to subsection 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act.1 This section prohibits telephonic communications which are likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or contempt on the basis of several enumerated prohibited grounds of discrimination.
[3]The issue to be determined is whether the statement made by the Chair of the Ontario Commission creates a reasonable apprehension of bias warranting Ms. Devins' removal from the Tribunal.2
A. Essential factual context
[4]Since October 1997, and some 40 days since, the Tribunal has been hearing a complaint against the applicant that his World Wide Web site known as "Zundelsite" exposes persons of the Jewish faith and ethnic origin to hatred and contempt, and thereby constitutes discrimination.
[5]Respecting the outstanding complaint before the Tribunal, the applicant's argument provides the following factual details which are uncontested:3
7. As a major part of its case against the applicant, the CHRC entered "Did Six Million Really Die?" as an exhibit before the Tribunal. This 30,000 word historical essay disputes that the German government under Adolf Hitler ever had a policy of exterminating the Jews, disputes the commonly cited number of six million Jewish casualties during the war, and disputes many of the atrocity allegations leveled at the German people during and since World War II, by citing numerous sources, historians, writers and documents.
. . .
11. The applicant had been previously charged under the Criminal Code, section 177, of spreading false news for publishing "Did Six Million Really Die?". He was charged privately in 1983 by the respondent Sabrina Citron, one of the two complainants against him before the Tribunal. The charges were taken over by the Crown and he underwent two criminal trials in 1985 and 1988. The charge alleged that the applicant "did publish a statement or tale, namely, —Did Six Million Really Die?— that he knows is false and that is likely to cause mischief to the public interest in social and racial tolerance, contrary to the Criminal Code.— He was originally found guilty by two juries but was finally acquitted by the Supreme Court of Canada which held in 1992 that section 177 was a violation of the guarantees to freedom of expression under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms .
12. The first trial in 1985 was massively covered in the media, both print and electronic, during the entire two month period of the trial. The second trial received little media attention until the applicant was found guilty on May 11, 1988, at which time there was again massive coverage of his conviction and sentence which was handed down on Friday, May 13, 1988.
. . .
14. On May 27, 1998, the case for the CHRC was completed. No other party supporting the position of the CHRC elected to call evidence. The complainants called no evidence.
15. On or about June 1, 1998, the applicant requested, through counsel, that the Human Rights Tribunal offices in Ottawa fax the biographies of the three Tribunal members to him. The biographies were sent to the applicant by fax on June 2, 1998.
16. The biography of Member Reva E. Devins indicated that from 1987 to 1993 she had sat as a Commissioner on the Ontario Human Rights Commission and served as the Acting Vice Chair of the Commission in her final year of appointment.
17. Prior to receiving the biography, the applicant had no knowledge that Ms. Devins had been a member of the Ontario Human Rights Commission.
18. On June 10, 1998, a press release came to the applicant's knowledge which had been issued by the Ontario Human Rights Commission on May 13, 1988. The press release was found by his lawyer, Barbara Kulaszka, while she was searching the QL Systems Limited database "Canada Newswire, 1984-1998". Prior to his lawyer showing him the press release on June 10,998, the applicant had no knowledge of it.
. . .
20. The press release was issued on the same day, May 13, 1988, that the applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for nine months after being found guilty by a jury on May 11, 1988 on the charge of spreading false news that was likely to cause mischief to the public interest in social and racial tolerance contrary to section 177 of the Criminal Code for publishing "Did Six Million Really Die?", the same essay which is the subject of the complaints before the Tribunal and which has been entered into evidence as a major part of the case of the CHRC against the applicant.
B. The test for bias
[6]It is common ground that the test for bias is as expressed by Cory J. in Newfoundland Telephone Co. v. Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities)4 where, at page 636 he says the following:
The duty to act fairly includes the duty to provide procedural fairness to the parties. That simply cannot exist if an adjudicator is biased. It is, of course, impossible to determine the precise state of mind of an adjudicator who has made an administrative board decision. As a result, the courts have taken the position that an unbiased appearance is, in itself, an essential component of procedural fairness. To ensure fairness the conduct of members of administrative tribunals has been measured against a standard of reasonable apprehension of bias. The test is whether a reasonably informed bystander could reasonably perceive bias on the part of an adjudicator. [Emphasis added.]
[7]It is common ground that as the Tribunal is adjudicative in its function, it is expected to comply with the standard applicable to courts. Therefore, the test to be applied is whether a reasonably informed bystander could reasonably perceive bias on the part of Ms. Devins.
C. The process to be used for deciding if bias exists
[8]In the present case, the applicant requests a judicial review of the Tribunal's decision rejecting the applicant's complaint. In my opinion, it is not the Tribunal's decision that is at issue in this application, but the bias complaint itself. That is, it is not whether the Tribunal came to the right conclusion, the issue is whether a reasonable apprehension of bias has been proved.
[9]In Beno v. Canada (Commissioner and Chairperson, Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia)5 I had the opportunity to consider how a bias complaint should be brought. In that case at pages 926-927 I found as follows:
Clearly, if any person involved in an adjudicative process feels that the decision maker holds a bias against him or her, that person should bring the concern to the decision maker's attention. In the usual course of trial work, this does not occur in a formal way, but is done by merely stating the bias concern to the decision maker and asking the decision maker to stand aside. As can be easily imagined, common reasons for a bias concern being raised are that the decision maker is personally familiar with one of the litigants or key witnesses, has dealt with one of the litigants in previous litigation or has said or done something which causes one of the litigants to feel that he or she will not get a fair hearing.
Upon hearing the bias concern, it is for the decision maker to decide whether to stand aside as requested. Mr. Justice Locke had no difficulty in making his decision on the most tenuous argument possible to protect the integrity of the process. I believe trial practice shows that when faced with a bias concern that is not unsupported or frivolous, and therefore, is capable of placing a cloud of doubt over the case, a decision maker will usually opt to do the same as Mr. Justice Locke. It might very well be that reluctance to do so arises from concern for disruption to the expeditious movement of the case through the system. But this concern is usually resolved by focussing on the larger potential damage that will be done to the case, and to the image of the administration of justice, by a decision being overturned on a bias concern which was known from the outset.
I also do not consider the position adopted by a decision maker to be a "decision" which is subject to challenge on judicial review. It is merely a statement of opinion which allows the parties in the case to determine if some further action is needed to test whether the decision maker has reached the right conclusion.
That is, if the decision maker decides not to stand down, common sense dictates that the litigant must have a right to take the bias concern to a superior authority to have an independent objective evaluation of the merits of the complaint. If the superior authority decides that the bias concern has merit, the decision maker can be prohibited from proceeding with the case.
D. Proof of actual bias v. apprehension of bias
[10]It is clear that a concern about actual bias can be eradicated by evidence produced to the contrary. When, as here, the person against whom such a concern is expressed makes a statement in a decision, the statement is evidence to be weighed.6
[11]However, while evidence can be tendered to counter a complaint of actual bias, the same cannot be said for the appearance of bias.
[12]An apprehension or appearance of bias cannot be extinguished with evidence that actual bias does not exist. On this issue, in Ringrose v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (Alberta)7 de Grandpré J. cites Prowse J.A.8 at pages 821-822 as follows:
In my view these cases merely support the conclusion that when circumstances exist from which a reasonable apprehension of bias arises evidence is not admissible for the purpose of establishing that a person the law presumes to be biased was not in fact biased. They do not purport to deal with the question of the admissibility of evidence for the purpose of having the relevant circumstances before the court so that it may consider whether in those circumstances a reasonable apprehension of bias arises.
[13]Therefore, upon an apprehension of bias concern being presented to a decision maker, and the concern not being accepted, the concern can be taken directly to a superior authority. Since the issue is one of apprehension that bias exists, no expectation is placed on the person against whom the application is brought to try to defend his or her neutrality. The appearance of the matter speaks for itself.
E. The merits of the bias concern in the present case
[14]The applicant's bias concern is the appearance of bias on the part of Ms. Devins arising directly from the May 13, 1988 press release considered in the context of the present hearing before the Tribunal.
[15]In response to the applicant's bias concern, the following statement was made in the Tribunal's decision of June 18, 1998:
On any occasion wherein the issue of bias has been raised, the members of the Tribunal have affirmed that we intend to deal with the serious issues in these proceedings according to the evidence and the applicable law. We have affirmed our lack of bias and the importance of our coming to a decision with an open mind. Members have searched their conscience over much time and are convinced of their lack of bias.9
[16]I find that this statement is only relevant to the question of actual bias, but irrelevant to the question of apprehension of bias.
[17]As Cory J. said in Newfoundland Telephone as quoted above, an unbiased appearance of an adjudicative officer is, in itself, an essential component of procedural fairness. Therefore, concerning the question of the appearance of bias raised by the May 13, 1988 press release, the issue is not whether the applicant's criminal conviction was correct, popular, or deserved. The issue is whether by issuing the press release the Chair of the Ontario Commission created the appearance of bias against the applicant on his part, and on the part of the members sitting at the time.
[18]The press release does more than just make a comment on a current fact being the criminal conviction. With the use of the words "we applaud the jury's decision since it calls for sanctions against a man responsible for contradicting the truth", the Chair of the Ontario Commission makes a specific damning statement against the applicant.
[19]As it is a gratuitous political statement made against the applicant, in my opinion it was thoroughly inappropriate for the Chair of the Ontario Commission to give the May 13, 1988 press release. An institution with adjudicative responsibilities has no legitimate purpose in engaging in such public condemnation. To do so undermines the independence and neutrality required of such a body, and predictably causes bias concerns such as the one raised in the present application. To do so also tests the ability of the justice system to correct such a wrong to maintain the essential principle of fair and equal justice delivery.
[20]No matter how inappropriate, the May 13, 1988 press release did provide a window through which bias against the applicant could be seen on the part of the Ontario Commission's members sitting at the time. For this reason, I believe that the applicant now has a legitimate complaint.
[21]As the apparent promulgator of the press release, it is a reasonable conclusion to reach that at the time the statement was made the Chair of the Ontario Commission held a strong actual bias against the applicant. By stating in the press release that "The Ontario Human Rights Commission commends the recent court ruling" and "We applaud the jury's decision" [emphasis added], the Chair purports to speak for all members of the Ontario Commission. Accordingly, it is also a reasonable conclusion to reach that at the time the statement was made, the members of the Ontario Commission held a strong actual bias against the applicant as well.
[22]Were the applicant to be subject to decision making by the Ontario Commission on a complaint after the statement was made, there is no doubt that no member of the Ontario Commission sitting at the time the statement was made could deliberate and decide. This is so because it would be impossible for a reasonably informed bystander to believe that the applicant would get fair treatment.
[23]In my opinion, the taint caused by the press release extends to the present hearing before the Tribunal. In my opinion, the passage of time does not eradicate the fact that Ms. Devins is reasonably attributed with strong actual bias. It is true that, through the June 18, 1998 decision of the Tribunal, Ms. Devins has denied that such is the case today.
[24]As the May 13, 1988 statement was not made by her, and taking the present denial into consideration, I find that there is insufficient evidence to find present actual bias by Ms. Devins against the applicant. But, on the law, the denial made at this time is not admissible to correct the appearance of bias on her part created by the press release.
[25]Were the denial made at the time the press release was issued, the present state of affairs might be different. Made at that time, the denial would be evidence that the press release was not made with her agreement and did not reflect her views. There is no such evidence for me to consider, so the press release stands unmitigated.
[26]I find that a reasonably informed bystander, knowing of the May 13, 1988 press release would have an apprehension of bias by Ms. Devins against the applicant. I believe the observer would conclude that, given the extreme impropriety of the May 13, 1988 statement and its apparent undermining effect on the neutrality of the then members of the Ontario Commission, including Ms. Devins, to guarantee a fair hearing of the present complaint before the Tribunal, she should be made to withdraw from the ultimate decision making on the complaint itself.
F. Waiver
[27]I accept the applicant's evidence that he did not become aware of the May 13, 1988 press release until June 10, 1998, and I have no reason to find that by design this knowledge was not acquired sooner. Therefore, I find that the applicant has not waived his right to bring his bias complaint in the present application.
G. The result
[28]Until the hearing is concluded before the Tribunal, no weighing of evidence necessary to reach an ultimate decision can occur. At the moment there are two persons constituting the Tribunal. The only bias concern that has been raised on the evidence is with respect to Ms. Devins. I understand that under the Canadian Human Rights Act one Tribunal member only does have jurisdiction to complete a hearing already commenced if the other members initially appointed are for any reason unable to continue. That is, if Ms. Devins is found to be incapacitated due to apprehension of bias, the sole remaining member can, nevertheless, continue to decide the complaint on the evidence called to date and before the conclusion of the hearing.
[29]I find that the question of bias is limited to Ms. Devins' capacity to continue as a member of the Tribunal from this day forward. Accordingly, because of the apprehension of bias found, pursuant to paragraph 18.1(3)(b) of the Federal Court Act [R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7 (as enacted by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 5)], I hereby prohibit Ms. Devins from being a member of the Tribunal from this day forward.
[30]I do not consider that the neutrality of the remaining Tribunal member has in any way been impugned so as to impair his ability to continue to fairly conclude the hearing and decide on the complaint. Accordingly, I will not interfere with him doing so.
[31]Respecting any interlocutory rulings made to date, the applicant has access to judicial review.
[32]As he is successful in this application, I award costs to the applicant to be paid by the respondents jointly, excluding the Canadian Association for Free Expression.
1 R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6.
2 During the course of argument, counsel for the applicant confirmed that actual bias on the part of Ms. Devins was not being placed in issue. Nevertheless, because on the evidence actual bias and the appearance of bias are closely intertwined, I feel I must reach conclusions on both.
3 Applicant's memorandum of fact and law, at pp. 52-56.
4 ;Newfoundland Telephone Co. v. Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 623.
5 ;Beno v. Canada (Commissioner and Chairperson, Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia), [1997] 1 F.C. 911 (T.D.).
6 ;Beno v. Canada (Commissioner and Chairperson, Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia), [1997] 2 F.C. 527 (C.A.), at p. 538.
7 ;Ringrose v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (Alberta), [1977] 1 S.C.R. 814.
8 Ringrose and College of Physicians & Surgeons of Alberta, Re (1975), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 584 (Alta. C.A.).
9 Tribunal's decision, June 18, 1998, applicant's application record, at p. 10.