A-1038-96
Huor Chieu (Appellant) (Applicant)
v.
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Respondent) (Respondent)
Indexed as: Chieuv. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (C.A.)
Court of Appeal, Isaac C.J., Strayer and Linden JJ.A."Winnipeg, November 2; Ottawa, December 3, 1998.
Citizenship and Immigration — Exclusion and removal — Removal of permanent residents — In exercise of jurisdiction to have regard to all circumstances of case under Immigration Act, s. 70(1)(b), IRB(AD) may not consider country (and conditions thereof) to which non-refugee appellant likely to be removed when assessing whether person should not be removed from Canada.
In March 1994, the appellant was discovered to have been landed by reason of material misrepresentation and was ordered deported by an immigration adjudicator. His appeal to the Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB(AD)) was unsuccessful, as was his application for judicial review in the Trial Division. The Motions Judge applied Hoang v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1990), 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 35 (F.C.A.), a refugee case, to this non-refugee case. The Hoang case stands for the proposition that, in cases of refugees appealing deportation orders, it is premature for the Appeal Division to take into account the conditions of the person's country of origin, as the determination of to which country the deported person will be sent rests with the Minister of Immigration. That determination cannot be made by the Minister until the issue of the deportation order is decided. The Motions Judge accordingly found that the Board had no jurisdiction to consider the country conditions in a potential destination pursuant to the mandate as set out in paragraph 70(1)(b) of the Act. This was an appeal from that decision. The question certified for consideration was whether the IRB(AD), in the exercise of its jurisdiction to have "regard to all the circumstances of the case", under paragraph 70(1)(b ) of the Immigration Act, can consider the country (and its conditions) to which the non-refugee appellant would, on the balance of probabilities, be removed when assessing whether "the person should not be removed from Canada"; or not, in accordance with the decision of MacGuigan J.A. in Hoang .
Held, the appeal should be dismissed; the IRB(AD) may not, under paragraph 70(1)(b) of the Act, consider the country (and its conditions) to which the non-refugee appellant might be removed.
The principle espoused in Hoang was applicable in cases of non-refugees seeking the review of a deportation order in the same way as it was in refugee cases. The case of Ribic v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] I.A.D.D. No. 4 (QL), where the Immigration Appeal Board indicated that it was entitled, under paragraph 72(1)(b) (now 70(1)(b)), to consider several factors, including the degree of hardship that would be caused to the appellant by his return to his country of nationality, was decided prior to Hoang and should no longer be followed on this point. The Board's jurisdiction under paragraph 70(1)(b) was only to determine whether a person should be removed from Canada, not to consider the merits or demerits of any potential destination. For the IRB(AD) to consider such a matter would extend the jurisdiction of the Board to engage in premature speculation about hypothetical matters concerning the situation in the possible countries to which someone might be deported.
Furthermore, this view was more consistent with the overall scheme of the Act to leave consideration of the country conditions of the potential destination until that destination is definitively decided upon by the Minister under section 52 of the Act. The circumstances which the Board must consider in order to determine whether the deportation order was properly and equitably made include the following matters: the seriousness of the offence leading to the deportation; the possibility of rehabilitation; the impact of the crime on the victim; the remorsefulness of the applicant; the length of time spent in Canada and the degree to which the appellant is established here; the presence of family in Canada and the impact on it that deportation would cause; efforts of the applicant to establish himself or herself in Canada, including employment and education; support available to the applicant, not only within the family but also within the community. Permitting consideration of country conditions at potential destinations by the Appeal Division would prolong hearings in these cases. The Board would be required to deal with questions for which it is neither designed nor equipped. The person whose application to the equitable jurisdiction of the IRB(AD) is denied has, where that person has concerns about the country to which he or she might be deported, as many as four possible avenues of recourse.
While the Board and the Motions Judge did mention one possible country of destination, it was a cursory reference and of no consequence in arriving at their respective decisions in this case. Evidence of country conditions in countries of destination was not relevant or admissible in this case; it should have been neither admitted nor considered by the Board or the Court.
statutes and regulations judicially considered
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II, No. 44], s. 7.
Immigration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-2, ss. 44(1) (as am. by S.C. 1992, c. 49, s. 35), 46.01 (as enacted by R.S.C., 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, s. 14; S.C. 1992, c. 49, s. 36; 1995, c. 15, s. 9), 52 (as am. by R.S.C., 1985 (3rd Supp.), c. 30, s. 7; S.C. 1992, c. 49, s. 42), 69.2 (as enacted by R.S.C., 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, s. 18; S.C. 1992, c. 49, s. 61), 70(1) (as am. by S.C. 1995, c. 15, s. 13), (b) (as am. by R.S.C., 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, s. 18), 82.1(1) (as enacted idem, s. 19; S.C. 1992, c. 49, s. 73), 114 (as am. by R.S.C., 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, s. 29; c. 29, s. 14; S.C. 1990, c. 38, s. 1; 1992, c. 49, s. 102; 1994, c. 26, s. 36).
Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, s. 72(1)(b).
cases judicially considered
applied:
Hoang v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1990), 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 35; 120 N.R. 193 (F.C.A.).
distinguished:
Ribic v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] I.A.D.D. No. 4 (I.A.B.) (QL); Canepa v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 3 F.C. 270; (1992), 93 D.L.R. (4th) 589; 10 C.R.R. (2d) 348; 145 N.R. 121 (C.A.).
referred to:
Markl v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, V81-6127, judgment dated 27/5/85, I.A.B., not reported; Al Sagban v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 F.C. 501; (1997), 137 F.T.R. 283 (T.D.); Al Sagban v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] F.C.J. No. 1775 (C.A.) (QL); Farhadi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 3 F.C. 315; (1998), 144 F.T.R. 76 (T.D.).
APPEAL from a Trial Division decision ((1996), 125 F.T.R. 76) dismissing an application for judicial review of the Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board decision that it had no jurisdiction to consider the country conditions in a potential destination pursuant to the mandate set out in paragraph 70(1)(b) of the Immigration Act. Appeal dismissed.
appearances:
David Matas for appellant (applicant).
Sharlene Telles-Langdon for respondent (respondent).
solicitors of record:
David Matas, Winnipeg, for appellant (applicant).
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondent (respondent).
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
Linden J.A.:
Introduction
The issue on this appeal is whether the Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (the IRB(AD)) may consider, while "having regard to all the circumstances of the case,"1 the country conditions at a potential destination to where a non-refugee may be removed.
The Motions Judge [(1996), 125 F.T.R. 76] following the Hoang decision of this Court,2 decided that it was beyond the Board's jurisdiction to do so and affirmed the Board's decision refusing to intervene. The Motions Judge [at page 80], nevertheless, certified a question for the consideration of this Court as follows:
Can the Appeal Division of the IRB, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to have "regard to all the circumstances of the case", under the Immigration Act 's s. 70(1)(b), consider the country (and its conditions) to which the non-refugee appellant would, on the balance of probabilities, be removed when assessing whether "the person should not be removed from Canada"; or not, in accordance with the decision of Mr. Justice MacGuigan in a refugee case, Hoang v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1990), 120 N.R. 193 at 195; 13 Imm.L.R. (2d) 35 (F.C.A.) quoted above herein?
In my view, the Motions Judge was correct in deciding that the Hoang case applied to the facts in this case and that the Board had no jurisdiction to consider the country conditions in a potential destination pursuant to the mandate as set out in paragraph 70(1)(b) of the Act [s. 70(1) (as am. by S.C. 1995, c. 15, s. 13)]. That section reads:
70. (1) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), where a removal order or conditional removal order is made against a permanent resident or against a person lawfully in possession of a valid returning resident permit issued to that person pursuant to the regulations, that person may appeal to the Appeal Division on either or both of the following grounds, namely,
. . .
(b) on the ground that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the person should not be removed from Canada. [Emphasis mine.]
The facts and decision below
The appellant was born in Cambodia, but, at the age of eight, went with his family to Vietnam, where he lived from 1975 to 1993. In October of 1993, he was landed in Vancouver as an accompanying family member of his father. At that time, he reported to immigration officials that he had no dependants. This turned out to be false. In fact, he was married at the time and had a wife and child living in Vietnam. This was discovered and reported in March of 1994 by an immigration officer, who concluded that the appellant had been landed by reason of a material misrepresentation.
The appellant conceded the misrepresentation before the immigration adjudicator, who ordered the appellant deported.
An appeal to the IRB(AD) was unsuccessful, as was an application for judicial review in the Trial Division of this Court. In that decision, the Motions Judge held that Hoang applied in this non-refugee case even though that case dealt with a refugee situation. According to the Motions Judge, there was no rational basis for distinguishing between refugees and non-refugees in the application of Hoang, which he felt was of "universal application". As no determination had yet been made by the Minister about where the appellant would be sent, the Motions Judge concluded that it would have been premature for the Board to have considered the situation in the country of destination.
The Motions Judge explained:
The applicant's case hinges on whether Hoang applies to his circumstances. While Hoang concerned a convention refugee, it is a general statement interpreting this subsection. Counsel for the applicant strenuously argued that Hoang is not applicable in this situation because the applicant is not a Convention refugee. There is no rational basis for distinguishing Hoang on this ground. Nor for the fact that in Hoang the board did not know where the applicant would be deported to, and that in the case at bar the board did know that he would be deported to Cambodia because of the operation of the statutory presumption. With respect to the presumption, it is clear that the applicant had no right to re-enter Vietnam. But no determination has yet been made regarding the country to which applicant will be deported. . . .
This is why the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Hoang applies in this case. There is uncertainty where the applicant would be returned to, and this fits squarely into the same circumstances which were before the IAD in Hoang. This said, it is this court's view that the appellate court's reasons are of a universal application with respect to s. 52(2) in any event.3
Submissions of the parties
In this Court, Mr. Matas argued that Hoang should be distinguished on the ground that it dealt with Convention refugee determination and with the power of the Minister to decide where to send an applicant. As well, he contended that the legal context had changed, since Hoang was decided, there having been amendments to the legislation altering the power of the Minister. In the appellant's view, the Board was confused regarding the scope of Hoang, there being many conflicting decisions on this issue, some considering the destination and some refusing to do so. The appellant made specific reference to the decision in the Al Sagban case.4 He further relied on this Court's decision in the Canepa5 case, the spirit of which would, in his submission, permit consideration of the country conditions in the potential destination of the appellant as an "extenuating circumstance." Mr. Matas also offered some practical reasons for departing from Hoang : the Board often examines the country conditions in potential destinations and, if this practice were stopped, it would be a "radical revolution." Further, Mr. Matas pointed to subsection 114(2) [as am. by S.C. 1992, c. 49, s. 102] of the Act, which reads that
114. . . .
(2) The Governor in Council may, by regulation, authorize the Minister to exempt any person from any regulation made under subsection (1) or otherwise facilitate the admission of any person where the Minister is satisfied that the person should be exempted from that regulation or that the person's admission should be facilitated owing to the existence of compassionate or humanitarian considerations.
Mr. Matas opined that if these issues were left to be explored only after a deportation order to a particular country is made by the Minister, then there would be a flood of hurried applications under subsection 114(2) and stay applications consequent thereon.
For the Crown, Ms. Telles-Langdon argued simply that the reasoning in Hoang covered the situation at bar. She argued that Canepa was limited to its own facts and was not applicable in this situation. She also raised the spectre of an "alternative refugee determination system" developing in the context of these applications. In her view, the changes in the legislation alluded to by Mr. Matas do not affect the treatment of this issue. She urged that the appeal be dismissed.
Analysis
1. The principle in Hoang applies to refugee and non-refugee situations.
In my view, the principle espoused in Hoang is applicable in cases of non-refugees seeking review of deportation orders in the same way as it is in refugee cases. If the Board cannot consider potential destinations in refugee cases, neither can it do so in non-refugee cases. Despite some new amendments to the Act, this principle is equally relevant today. Consistency is a virtue.
Mr. Justice MacGuigan outlined this principle in Hoang. Discussing the Markl [Markl v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, V81-6127, judgment dated 27/5/85, I.A.B., not reported] case, he stated:
With respect to its non-consideration of the country of destination, we believe the Board properly followed its earlier decision in Markl v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) (27 May 1985), Doc. V81-6127 (Imm. App. Bd.), at 5, viz., that the Board's jurisdiction is only over whether a person should be removed from Canada, not as to the country of removal:
The Board is seized with an appeal from a deportation order. It has to rule on the validity of this order. Should the appeal fail, the issue of to where the appellant may be deported is a separate one; one over which the Board has no jurisdiction.
In fact, until the issue of deportation is settled, the Minister cannot make a decision as to the country of removal. Hence the statement at one point in the proceedings by the Minister's representative as to the Minister's disposition to deport the appellant to Vietnam cannot be taken as a formal expression of the Minister's decision since he is not yet empowered to make that decision.6 [Emphasis mine.]
In this case, the Board followed the Hoang decision, saying:
While the hardship of the removal from Canada is one of the circumstances to consider when the Appeal Division is making the determination of whether or not to exercise its equitable jurisdiction, the Federal Court of Canada has held in Hoang that it is premature for the Appeal Division to take into account the conditions of the person's country of origin, as the determination of to which country the deported person will be sent rests with the Minister of Immigration.7
The Motions Judge in this case also felt bound by Hoang, as indicated in the quotation above.
Much of the alleged confusion in this and other cases arises from the decision in Ribic,8 a widely cited decision of the Board in which the Board indicated [at page 13 (QL)] that it was entitled, under paragraph 72(l)(b) [of the Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52] (now 70(l)(b)), to consider several factors, including "the degree of hardship that would be caused to the appellant by his return to his country of nationality." That case was decided prior to Hoang and, in my view, should no longer be followed on this point.
Let there be no confusion about it"this Court affirms its adherence to Hoang and to its application in non-refugee cases such as this. The Board cannot, in exercising its equitable jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph 70(1)(b), consider, as a circumstance, country conditions in potential destinations of deportees. Moreover, evidence relating to these countries is irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible. The Board's jurisdiction under paragraph 70(l)(b) is only to determine whether a person should be removed from Canada. The Board has no business considering the merits or demerits of any potential destination. For the IRB(AD) to consider such a matter would extend the jurisdiction of the Board to engage in premature speculation about hypothetical matters concerning the situation in the possible countries to which someone might be deported.
In my view, not only is this view based on legal authority, it is more consistent with the overall scheme of the Act to leave consideration of the country conditions of the potential destination until that destination is definitively decided upon by the Minister under section 52 [as am. by R.S.C., 1985 (3rd Supp.), c. 30, s. 7; S.C. 1992, c. 49, s. 42] of the Act. To do otherwise would usurp the function of the Minister.
The wording of paragraph 70(1)(b), viewed in total context, must be interpreted in this way. That section permits the Board to consider whether a removal order or conditional removal order made against a permanent resident should be quashed or stayed on the ground that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the person should not be removed from Canada. The Board is instructed to consider the validity and equity of the removal order. The question is: Should this person be removed or not? It is whether he or she should be removed, not to where he or she should go. The Board is not directed to consider questions extraneous to whether the removal order was properly and equitably made, such as the nature of the place where he or she may be sent.
Even though this Court finds that the IRB(AD) may not consider the country conditions in a country to which a person may be deported, decisions made under the equitable jurisdiction of the IRB(AD) may, indeed must, consider broadly all the circumstances of the case in order to determine whether the deportation order was properly and equitably made. These considerations may include but would not be limited to such matters as:9
" the seriousness of the offence leading to deportation;
" the possibility of rehabilitation (if a crime is involved);
" the impact of the crime (if crime is involved) on the victim;
" the remorsefulness of the applicant (if crime is involved);
" the length of time spent in Canada and the degree to which the appellant is established here;
" the presence of family in Canada and the impact on it that deportation would cause;
" efforts of the applicant to establish himself or herself in Canada, including employment and education; and,
" support available to the applicant, not only within the family but also within the community.
2. Other considerations
Permitting consideration of country conditions at potential destinations by the Appeal Division would prolong hearings in these cases. The Board would be required to deal with questions for which it is neither designed nor equipped. It might also create, as counsel for the Crown argues, an "alternative refugee determination system" in the context of these cases. Counsel for the Crown pointed out that a successful application under paragraph 70(1)(b ) of the Act based on country conditions in a country to which the prospective deportee might be sent back would not be subject to the checks and balances created by section 69.2 [as enacted by R.S.C., 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, s. 18; S.C. 1992, c. 49, s. 61] and subsection 44(1) [as am. by S.C. 1992, c. 49, s. 35] of the Act. Finally, despite a possible increase in the number of judicial review applications and applications pursuant to section 114 [as am. by R.S.C., 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, s. 29; c. 29, s. 14; S.C. 1990, c. 38, s. 1; 1992, c. 49, s. 102; 1994, c. 26, s. 36] of the Act following the Minister's decisions, there is no reason to think that they cannot be properly handled by the Court.
Under the current regime, a person whose application to the equitable jurisdiction of the IRB(AD) is denied is not without other potential options. If that person has concerns about the country to which he or she might be deported, there may be as many as four possible avenues of recourse: first, one may use subsection 52(2) of the Act to make a voluntary departure to a country about which the person has no fear. Second, one may make an application under subsection 114(2) of the Act, asking the Minister to consider the conditions in the country to which the person is about to be sent. Third, one may apply for judicial review of the Minister's decision under subsection 52(2) pursuant to subsection 82.1(1) [as enacted by R.S.C., 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, s. 19; S.C. 1992, c. 49, s. 73] of the Act. Fourth, a person, who fears that deportation to a particular country might endanger the life or the security of the person, might arguably challenge a ministerial decision under the Charter [Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act, 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II, No. 44]] or even under international obligations. Whether any of these avenues are actually open in a particular case and whether or not they might succeed is not for this Court to decide here.
3. Canepa does not apply to this case.
Counsel for the appellant relied heavily on this Court's decision in Canepa, with reasons written by MacGuigan J.A. in which I concurred. That decision states in part:
I cannot accept that the phrase "having regard to all the circumstances of the case" means that a tribunal should, to make such a judgment, abstract the appellant from the society in which he lives. The statutory language does not refer only to the circumstances of the person , but rather to the circumstances of the case. That must surely be taken to include the person in his total context, and to bring into play the good of society as well as that of the individual person. I cannot accept that the social considerations had been taken account of once and for all by the order of deportation itself. In my view paragraph 70(1)(b) of the Act requires that they be considered again, but this time along with every extenuating circumstance that can be adduced in favour of the deportee.10 (Emphasis [partly] mine.)
In my view, the Canepa case is of little assistance to the appellant here. In that case, there was no discussion of the conditions in the country to which the appellant would be deported. The main issue before the Court in that case was whether section 7 of the Charter applied to forbid deportation of permanent residents convicted of crimes. The Court decided that it did not. The Court also decided that such a person, upon being deported, had the right to appeal to the IRB(AD) pursuant to paragraph 70(1)(b), and to the consideration of "every extenuating circumstance that can be addressed in favour of the deportee." In that case, consideration of "all the circumstances of the case" was given by the Board and their decision not to intervene was affirmed. More importantly, Justice MacGuigan, writing only two years after the Hoang decision, did not resile in any way from what he had written in Hoang. Indeed, in the course of his reasons, he cited Hoang twice,11 albeit as authority on a point different than the one being considered here.
4. The Al Sagban and Farhadi matters.
Counsel for the appellant relies on a very thoughtful decision of the Trial Division of this Court in Al Sagban,12 which we are dealing with in a separate decision released this day. I would therefore refrain from directly dealing with it here.
Counsel for the appellant also made brief reference to the Farhadi13 case which is pending on appeal before this Court. That case deals with an opinion that a person is a danger to the public made under paragraph 46.01 [as enacted by R.S.C., 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, s. 14; S.C. 1992, c. 49, s. 36; 1995, c. 15, s. 9] of the Act, in which the "danger to the public" assessment was made without reference to the country conditions in the country to which the applicant might be sent. Gibson J. has certified two questions of general importance regarding whether an assessment of the risk attendant on removal is a pre-requisite to a "valid determination to remove the individual to that country."14
I am of the view that we should not comment on this case, which should be left for this Court to deal with at the appropriate time I must point out, however, that Farhadi raises issues of torture, fundamental justice, and Charter application which were not raised before this Court.
5. The Board's consideration of country conditions in Vietnam.
Counsel for the appellant contends that, whichever way this Court decides the jurisdiction question, the appellant must succeed. This is because, in his view, the Board and the Motions Judge did consider country conditions in Vietnam, one of the possible destinations, in deciding as it did, while refusing to consider country conditions in Cambodia, another possible destination. If it is forbidden to consider the country conditions at one destination, then it is similarly forbidden for all possible destinations, he argues. While this logic may appear to have some superficial merit, it is not persuasive. Evidence of the country conditions in both of those countries was not relevant or admissible in the case at bar; it should not, as these reasons explain, have been admitted nor considered by the Board or the Court. While Board and the Motions Judge did mention Vietnam, it was a cursory reference of no consequence in arriving at their respective decisions in this case.
Conclusion and disposition
For all of the foregoing reasons, I would answer the certified question as follows:
The Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to have regard to all the circumstances of the case, under paragraph 70(1)(b) of the Immigration Act, may not consider the country (and its conditions) to which the non-refugee appellant would, on the balance of probabilities, be removed when assessing whether "the person should not be removed from Canada."
In the result, I would dismiss the appeal.
Isaac C.J.: I agree.
Strayer J.A.: I agree.
1 Pursuant to art. 70(1)(b) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-2, as amended [by R.S.C., 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, s. 18] (the Act).
2 Hoang v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1990), 13 Imm. L.R. (2d) 35 (F.C.A.). The Hoang decision dealt with a refugee situation.
3 See (1996), 125 F.T.R. 76 (F.C.T.D.), at p. 79.
4 ;Al Sagban v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 F.C. 501 (T.D.). This Court heard the Chieu and Al Sagban [[1998] F.C.J. No, 1775 (C.A.) (QL)] matters separately in November 1998, and the decisions in this and the Al Sagban case are being released simultaneously.
5 ;Canepa v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 3 F.C. 270 (C.A.).
6 Hoang, supra, note 2, at p. 38.
7 Cited in the Court below (1996), 125 F.T.R. 76 (F.C.T.D.), at p. 79.
8 Ribic v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] I.A.D.D. No. 4 (I.A.B.) (QL), deportation order for failure to marry within 90 days of landing was quashed based on assessment of the factors listed on p. 8 [QL], infra.
9 See Ribic, supra, note 8, outlining these factors, which are, among others, still relevant.
10 Canepa, supra, note 5, at p. 286.
11 Ibid., at pp. 277 and 279.
12 Supra, note 4.
13 ;Farhadi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 3 F.C. 315 (T.D.).
14 Ibid., at p. 345.