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Armand Guay Inc. (Plaintiff)
v.
The Queen (Defendant)
Trial Division, Pratte J.—Quebec, December 3; Ottawa, December 11, 1973.
Income tax—Capital cost allowance—Classification of machinery—Income Tax Regulations, Schedule B, classes 10, 22.
A crane used for lifting was classified by the Minister of National Revenue as being in class 10 of Schedule B of the Income Tax Regulations and accordingly plaintiff was en titled to deduct only 30 per cent of the capital cost of these items from its income. The plaintiff claimed to be entitled to have the crane classified under class 22 of Schedule B in that the crane was designed to perform other tasks such as excavation, referred to in class 22.
Held, the appeal is allowed. A piece of machinery may be intended for several uses, and as long as the wording of Schedule B does not require that the crane be used exclu sively for the purposes mentioned in class 22, it can be placed in this class.
APPEAL. COUNSEL:
Jean Marier and Pierre Boulanger for plaintiff.
Réal Favreau and Louise Lamarre-Proulx for defendant.
SOLICITORS:
Létourneau, Stein, Marseille, Delisle and LaRue, Quebec, for plaintiff.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for defendant.
PRATTE J.—Plaintiff is appealing from an assessment, dated May 9, 1972, determining the amount of income tax payable by it for the year 1970.
In making this assessment the Minister of National Revenue considered that the mobile cranes owned by plaintiff should be placed in class 10 of Schedule B of the Income Tax Regulations, and accordingly that plaintiff was entitled to deduct 30 per cent of the capital cost of these items from its income. Plaintiff claims to be entitled to deduct from its income 50 per
cent of the cost of this machinery, which it submits should be placed in class 22 of Schedule B.
The appeal therefore raises one question only, as to whether these mobile cranes should be placed in class 10 or class 22 of Schedule B.
At the hearing plaintiff submitted as Exhibit P-2 a list of the mobile cranes owned by it in 1970. It admitted that the three cranes men tioned at the beginning of this list should be placed in class 10. The case is therefore con cerned only with the manner in which the other cranes mentioned in Exhibit P-2 should be classified.
Under Schedule B the items falling within class 10 are:
[a] contractor's movable equipment (including portable camp buildings), other than a property included in class 22.
Class 22 includes:
Property acquired after March 16, 1964, that is power- operated movable equipment designed for the purpose of excavating, moving, placing or compacting earth, rock, con crete or asphalt, but not including a property that is included in class 7.
It is established that plaintiff's cranes are mobile, that they are power-operated and that they were acquired after March 16, 1964. Defendant contends, however, that they were not intended for the uses referred to in class 22.
The evidence indicated that although plain tiff's mobile cranes are primarily lifting ma chinery, they were sold with accessories ena bling them to be used for other purposes, including excavation.
Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff uses its cranes regularly for the purposes mentioned in class 22. However, she argues that the cranes were designed for lifting, and the fact that they might be used for other work does not change their intended use.
Plaintiff does not deny that its cranes are lifting machinery, but maintains that they were also designed to perform many of the tasks referred to in class 22. As the wording of Schedule B does not require that property in class 22 be intended exclusively for the pur poses mentioned, plaintiff concludes that its cranes should be placed in this class.
In my view plaintiff is correct. A piece of machinery may be intended for several uses. This is true of plaintiff's cranes, which are sold with accessories enabling them to be used inter changeably as excavators and as lifting and han dling machinery. When one of plaintiff's cranes has on it the required accessory equipment to be used for excavation, I think it must be regarded as machinery "designed for the purpose of excavating ..."; and the fact that with other accessory equipment the machine can perform other tasks in no way changes this.
It is my opinion, therefore, that plaintiff's mobile cranes should have been placed in class 22, not in class 10.
The appeal is allowed with costs and the assessment referred back to the Minister of National Revenue for a new assessment to be made based on the assumption that the mobile cranes of plaintiff mentioned in Exhibit P-2 are, with the exception of the first three, to be placed in class 22 of Schedule B of the Income Tax Regulations.
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