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A-69-74
Minister of Transportation and Communications for the Province of Ontario (Applicant)
v.
The Canadian Transport Commission, Reimer Express Lines Ltd. and Imperial Roadways Ltd. (Respondents)
Court of Appeal, Jackett C.J., Pratte J. and Hyde DJ.—Ottawa, December 10, 11 and 12, 1974.
Judicial review—Orders of Canadian Transport Commis sion permitting long-distance trucking operations on Sun- day—Discretion where undue delay freight traffic—Federal Court Act, s. 28—National Transportation Act, s. 64(2).
The decision of the Canadian Transport Commission in granting two orders permitting two cartage companies to carry on certain long-distance transportation operations by truck on the Lord's Day was made under the exercise of its administrative discretion under section 11(x) of the Lord's Day Act. It was a decision made to prevent undue delay in the freight traffic of a transportation undertaking and the Committee did not err in law in making that decision. The section 28 applications for judicial review and the appeals under section 64(2) of the National Transportation Act were, therefore, dismissed.
Memorial Gardens Association (Canada) Ltd. v. Col- wood Cemetery Co. [1958] S.C.R. 353, followed.
APPLICATION. COUNSEL:
D. W. Burtnick for applicant.
P. Deniger for respondent, Canadian Trans
port Commission.
C. D. MacLeod for respondent, Reimer
Express Lines Ltd.
W. G. Ryall for respondent, Imperial Road
ways Ltd.
SOLICITORS:
Goodwin & De Blois, Quebec, for applicant.
C. D. MacLeod, Toronto, for respondent, Reimer Express Lines Ltd.
Fillmore and Riley, Winnipeg, for respond ent, Imperial Roadways Ltd.
J. M. Fortier, Q.C., Ottawa, for respondent, Canadian Transport Commission.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada, for respondent, Crown in right of Canada.
D. W. Burtnick, Downsview, Ont., for respondent, Minister of Transportation & Communications for the Province of Ontario.
Gowling & Henderson, Ottawa, for respondent, Canadian Trucking Associa tion.
Hewitt, Hewitt & Co., Ottawa, for respond ent, Canadian Automobile Association. Pharand, Kuyek & Lebel, Sudbury, for respondent, Local 598 of the Mine Mill and Smelter Workers Union.
J. Burns, Sudbury, for respondent, Regional Municipality of Sudbury, intervenors before Canadian Transport Commission.
The following are the reasons for judgment of the Court delivered in English by
PRATTE J.: These proceedings involve section 28 applications and appeals under section 64(2) of the National Transportation Act, by the Min ister of Transportation and Communications for Ontario and the Attorney General for the Prov ince of Quebec, against two orders of The Motor Vehicle Transport Committee of the Canadian Transport Commission. By those two orders, made under section 11(x) of the Lord's Day Act, the Committee permitted two cartage companies, Reimer Express Lines Ltd. and Imperial Roadways Ltd. to carry on certain long-distance transportation operations by truck on the Lord's Day.
Section 11(x) of the Lord's Day Act reads as follows:
11. Notwithstanding anything herein contained, any person may on the Lord's Day do any work of necessity or mercy, and for greater certainty, but not so as to restrict the ordinary meaning of the expression "work of necessity or mercy", it is hereby declared that it shall be deemed to include the following classes of work:
(x) any work that the Canadian Transport Commission, having regard to the object of this Act, and with the
object of preventing undue delay, deems necessary to permit in connection with the freight traffic of any trans portation undertaking.
This provision, as we understand it, gives to the Commission the power to permit work on Sunday in connection with the freight traffic of any transportation undertaking whenever the Commission is of the opinion that, having regard to the object of the Lord's Day Act, such work on Sunday is- necessary in order to prevent a delay in the freight traffic, which delay the Commission considers to be undue. The deci sion that the Commission is empowered to make under section 11(x) is the result of the formula tion of an opinion by the Commission as to the necessity, having regard to the object of the Lord's Day Act, to prevent undue delay in the freight traffic of a transportation undertaking. Such a decision is of the same kind as the decision that the Supreme Court of Canada had to consider in Memorial Gardens Association (Canada) Ltd. v. Colwood Cemetery Co. ([1958] S.C.R. 353) and, as Abbott J. said [at page 357] in that case,
... that decision is one which cannot be made without a substantial exercise of administrative discretion.
Parliament has given to the Commission, not the Courts, the responsibility of determining wheth er the delay resulting from the interruption of freight traffic is, in any given case, undue and whether it is necessary to prevent it by permit ting some work to be done on Sunday. On those points, the Courts cannot substitute their opin ion for that of the Commission.
Counsel for Ontario and Quebec argued that the Committee had erred in law in deciding to make the two orders under attack. In support of that contention, counsel for Ontario put forward three arguments:
(a) the Committee erred when it stated that the object of the Lord's Day Act was to provide a holiday;
(b) the Committee acted on irrelevant con siderations in determining that the strict observance of °?,e r.,ord's Day Act by the two applicants would result in undue delay;
(c) the Committee erred in law when it excluded, as irrelevant, evidence concerning the effect of granting the applications upon the safety and the congestion of certain high ways in Ontario.
Dealing with the argument that the Committee misconstrued the object of the Lord's Day Act, it should be borne in mind that the Committee did not have to determine that object for the purpose of deciding the constitutional validity of that statute. It had to deal with a much more limited question. In those circumstances, it is our view that the Committee did not err in law when it proceeded to deal with the two applica tions in the light of its understanding that the Lord's Day Act has been enacted "to provide that as many Canadians as possible should hold Sunday as a holiday".
As to the contention that the decision of the Committee to make the two orders here in ques tion was bad because it was based on irrelevant considerations, it, also, must, in our view, be rejected. To determine whether the delay result ing from the observance of the Lord's Day Act, unalleviated by orders under section 11(x), would, in the case of the two applicants be "undue delay", the Committee had to consider all the consequences of that delay. It appears to us that this is precisely what the Committee did. If one of the members of the Committee dis sented from the majority it is because, it seems to us, some of the consequences of the delay, that appeared important to other members, were judged by him not to have the same importance.
As to the decision of the Committee to exclude evidence concerning the safety and the congestion of certain highways in Ontario, it appears to us, as we intimated during the hear ing, to be clearly well-founded.
Counsel for the Attorney General for the Province of Quebec argued, as we understood him, that the decision of the Committee to grant
the two orders here under attack was based on an erroneous interpretation of section 11(x). He submitted that, under section 11(x), the Com mission may not permit work to be done on Sunday in connection with the transportation of goods unless it be satisfied that such transporta tion is a "work of necessity". If that interpreta tion were to prevail, section 11(x), in our view, would be rendered meaningless since the only work that the Commission would be empowered to authorize would be work that could lawfully be done under the introductory words of
section 11. ,
For these reasons, the section 28 applications and the appeals will be dismissed.
* * *
HYDE D.J. concurred.
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