T-775-73
Eberhard Schmitz (Plaintiff)
v.
The Queen (Defendant)
Trial Division, Walsh J.—Montreal, November
25; Ottawa, December 4, 1974.
Crown—Collision of army vehicle with civilian vehicle—
Army driver found 80 per cent at fault—Not in performance
of his duty—Responsibility of Crown as owner—National
Defence Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-4, s. 102—Crown Liability
Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-38, ss. 3, 4—Canada Evidence Act,
R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10—Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34,
ss. 283, 295—Highway Code, R.S.Q. 1964, c. 231, s. 46—
Highway Victims Indemnity Act, R.S.Q. 1964, c. 232, s.
3(b)—Quebec Civil Code, art. 1054.
Following a collision between the plaintiff's van and a
staff car belonging to the Department of National Defence
and in use at the army base, Longue Pointe, P.Q., the
plaintiff sued the Crown for negligence and his damages
were admitted at $1,000. The Crown denied negligence and
also its liability as owner, on the ground that the driver had
obtained possession of the vehicle by theft or that he was
acting outside the scope of his duties. Evidence of the
driver's conviction under section 102 of the National
Defence Act for driving the vehicle without authority was
rejected at the trial as inadmissible. Other evidence indicat
ed that the driver (who was absent from the trial) was using
the car for entertainment, for which purpose use of the
vehicle could not have been permitted. He either had papers
permitting him to take it from the base for some permitted
use, with which he failed to comply; or the negligence of
those in control at the base allowed him to take the vehicle
without papers indicating a permitted use.
Held, allowing the action, in part, the collision was caused
by the failure of the drivers concerned to drive their vehi
cles through an intersection in accordance with section 46 of
the Quebec Highway Code. The Crown's driver was 80 per
cent at fault and the plaintiff was 20 per cent at fault. An
action lay against the driver of the Crown under section 4(3)
of the Crown Liability Act, and the Crown was liable, under
section 3(2) of the Act, as if it were "a private person of full
age and capacity". Under section 3(b) of the Quebec High
way Victims Indemnity Act, the owner was liable, unless he
proved that at the time of the accident, the vehicle was
being driven by a third person who obtained possession of it
by theft. The Crown had failed to prove "theft" within the
rule laid down by the Quebec Court of Appeal, equating
"theft" with the offence defined in section 283 of the
Criminal Code. Even if the action was to have been tried
under the laws of a province permitting the defendant owner
to allege a taking without consent, as in section 295 of the
Criminal Code, it was doubtful if the defendant in this
instance had met the requirement of proving absence of
negligence in connection with the driver's taking possession
of the vehicle. The plaintiff was entitled to 80 per cent of his
damages which was $800.
Martel v. LaForest, es -qualité and Highway Victims
Indemnity Fund (Que. C.A., No. 13,569, December 13,
1973) agreed with.
ACTION.
COUNSEL:
B. Kravitz for plaintiff.
Y. Brisson for defendant.
SOLICITORS:
Kravitz & Kravitz, Montreal, for plaintiff.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
defendant.
The following are the reasons for judgment
delivered in English by:
WALSH J: Plaintiff claims from defendant the
sum of $1,001.05 representing damages caused
to his vehicle and loss of use of same during
repairs as a result of an accident which took
place in the City of Montreal on or about Sep-
tember 22, 1971 at about 12.20 a.m. when plain
tiff's Econoline van, driven by him, proceeding
from south to north came into collision at the
intersection of Park Avenue and Sherbrooke
Street with a vehicle being a staff car belonging
to the Department of National Defence and
driven by one Miles Kirkwood, which was pro
ceeding from west to east along Sherbrooke
Street. Plaintiff claims that defendant's vehicle
had illegally and negligently entered the inter
section while the traffic lights were red against
it and green in favour of plaintiff, that it was
proceeding at an illegal, dangerous and exces
sive rate of speed, and that the driver thereof
admitted his fault and liability following the
accident.
Defendant pleads that its vehicle was hit by
the vehicle owned and operated by plaintiff,
that at the time of the accident its vehicle was
being driven by Miles Kirkwood who obtained
possession of it by theft, that he was not acting
in the performance of his duties, and that he
was summarily tried on a charge under section
102 of the National Defence Act' and found
guilty, so that defendant is not liable to plaintiff
for the damages sustained.
Initially defendant had also brought a cross-
demand claiming damages in the amount of
$959 to its vehicle but later discontinued this
counter-claim with plaintiff's consent. As
explained by counsel during argument, defend
ant has, in fact, instituted other proceedings in
this Court against the said Miles Kirkwood and
plaintiff claiming these damages and the discon
tinuance of the counter-claim was merely to
avoid duplication, which said discontinuance is
not to be construed as an admission that the
driver of its vehicle was at fault, causing the
accident. The parties are agreed that the amount
of plaintiff's damages is correctly stated at
$1,001.05.
With respect to the facts, plaintiff testified
that on the night in question after passing the
intersection of deMaisonneuve Boulevard with
Park Avenue, which is one block south of Sher-
brooke Street, he saw that the Sherbrooke
Street traffic light was red against him so he
proceeded slowly up the hill, shifting into
second gear. When he was about halfway up the
hill, the light turned green for him and he
entered the intersection. Suddenly he saw a
vehicle coming from his left and although he
applied his brakes a collision occurred. His
vehicle was thrown three or four feet to the
right and the other vehicle came to a stop on
Sherbrooke Street beyond the intersection. He
was not going more than 15 mph at the time of
impact. Following same, he heard the driver of
the other vehicle say to the policeman who was
' R.S.C. 1970,c. N-4.
called that he was from Ontario and had con
tinued across the intersection on the amber light
as he understood this was the custom in
Quebec. The plaintiff insisted that the light had
been green for him for three or four seconds
before the collision which took place perhaps 8
feet into the intersection with Sherbrooke
Street. He was in the middle lane proceeding up
Park Avenue. Photographs of the two vehicles
were produced by consent which showed that
the damages to the Crown's vehicle are all on
the right side, starting at about the middle of the
car, while it is the left front portion of plaintiff's
car which is damaged. The plaintiff insisted that
he did not commence accelerating because of
the hill when the light went green for him and
that he was intending to go straight through the
intersection and was watching the lights ahead
and not the amber light beside him for the
east-west traffic on Sherbrooke Street.
Constable Jacques Dubé, who was called,
gave details of the accident giving the driver of
defendant's vehicle as Miles Kirkwood from the
Longue Pointe Army Base in the east end of
Montreal. In his opinion on the report he stated
that the accident was caused by Kirkwood driv
ing on the yellow light and he believes that this
is what Kirkwood told him although he cannot
now be sure of this. Plaintiff's vehicle was regis
tered in the name of S. & W. Die Company.
Plaintiff, then recalled, stated that this was a
sole proprietorship which he had registered in
1971.
A witness, Nicholas Skafidas, stated that he
had seen the accident. He had just come out of
a restaurant on the west side of Park Avenue,
which he indicated on a plan as being north of
Sherbrooke Street although he had testified that
it was to the south. He heard the collision and
saw the two cars skidding and immediately
looked at the light on Sherbrooke Street which
he saw to be red to stop Sherbrooke traffic. He
gave his card to plaintiff. He has had some
business dealings with plaintiff from time to
time. He was about to cross Park Avenue at the
time of the accident so he only had to look to
the right when he heard the collision.
Defendant's counsel stated that he had been
unable to locate Miles Kirkwood, the driver of
the army vehicle. He called as a witness Donald
Gozzola, an army cook, who testified that he
was in the car with Miles Kirkwood and Jack
Fudge at the time of the accident. He was sitting
on the right-hand side of the front seat with
Fudge in the centre and Kirkwood driving. He
saw the light ahead of them on Sherbrooke
Street, which was green, turn to orange and the
next thing he recalled was the collision which
knocked him out temporarily. He did not know
Kirkwood personally but he and Fudge had
been sitting in the canteen in the Longue Pointe
barracks around 8 or 9 p.m. in the preceding
evening when he mentioned that he had never
seen a professional baseball game. Kirkwood
had offered to drive them to see the Expos play.
He is very confused as to what happened there
after. Apparently, they made the rounds of
several drinking places in Montreal although he
stated that they had not had a great deal to
drink. He is not familiar with Montreal and did
not know just where they had gone but they had
been driving steadily for about half an hour
before the accident and were heading back to
the barracks at the time as they had to leave
there at 5 a.m. the next morning to return to
Petawawa. He does not know if it was raining or
not, or if their speed had been reduced before
entering the intersection. He stated that it was
only after the accident that he found out that it
was a staff car.
Joseph Rousseau, dispatcher from Longue
Pointe barracks was called and explained the
system. If a member of the armed forces wishes
to take out a vehicle he has to ask the dispatch
er who releases the vehicle to be used for the
function indicated. The use has to be a permit
ted one, however. Forms have to be completed
and the driver has to carry his work sheet with
him. No work order was ever located for Miles
Kirkwood for September 21, 1971. The keys
are always left in the ignition of the cars but
there is control at the base gates where the
papers of the driver are supposed to be
checked. The garage doors are also kept locked
and supposed to be opened only if the driver
has the proper papers. The car in question had
been assigned to H.M.C.S. Fraser which was in
port but he does not know if Kirkwood was the
authorized driver of it or not.
Captain Gordon Duncan, an officer in the
armed forces in Ottawa, testified that he has
access to National Defence files and had exam
ined the file of Miles Kirkwood and ascertained
that he was charged under section 102 of the
National Defence Act on September 23, 1971
and pleaded guilty, being fined $150 and given a
30 day stoppage of leave. He was released from
the armed forces in November 1971 and they
have tried to locate him since for the trial
through the R.C.M.P. but have failed. He never
filed any redress of grievance. The said section
102 reads as follows:
102. Every person who
(a) uses a vehicle of the Canadian Forces for an unau
thorized purpose;
(b) without authority uses a vehicle of the Canadian
Forces for any purpose; or
(c) uses a vehicle of the Canadian Forces contrary to any
regulation, order or instruction;
is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to impris
onment for less than two years or to less punishment.
This evidence was objected to by counsel for
plaintiff on the ground that the file is not a court
record and that reference to the information in
it constitutes hearsay. The objection was taken
under advisement. Certainly, in criminal pro
ceedings, it would not be permissible to estab
lish an accused's criminal record merely by the
evidence of someone from the records depart
ment who has seen it without the production of
a certified copy of same and establishing the
identity of the accused as the person whose
record is being produced. We are not dealing
with criminal proceedings here, however, but
with a civil case and, furthermore, with military
procedure with respect to the evidence sought
to be introduced. Kirkwood was not tried by a
court in the normal sense, involving a charge,
conviction and sentence, copies of which could
be certified and produced as a court record, but
may merely have been brought before his com
manding officer, and in view of his plea of
guilty the matter did not proceed any further but
was recorded in his military record. Defendant's
attempt to prove that Kirkwood was on the
night in question using the vehicle for an unau
thorized purpose, or without authority, and con
trary to any regulation or order or instruction
and that he had pleaded guilty to this by calling
Captain Duncan who had access to his military
records, had examined them and testified that
this was the case, is not acceptable proof. His
evidence should have been accompanied by a
certified extract from the portion of his record
dealing with this conviction in order to make it
admissible in evidence under the provisions of
the Canada Evidence Act. The objection to this
proof is therefore sustained.
This does not mean, however, that the Court
cannot conclude, on the basis of other evidence,
that Kirkwood was in fact not using the vehicle
for authorized purposes or with proper author
ity on the night in question. It is evident from
the testimony from Gozzola that he and his
companions, including Kirkwood, had been
making a round of local drinking establishments
in the staff car on the night in question. They
had allegedly left the barracks at 8 or 9 p.m. to
attend an Expos baseball game but were certain
ly not on their way there after midnight. It is
also clear from the evidence of Mr. Rousseau
that military vehicles can only be released for
permitted uses and that proper documentation
has to be provided. It is evident that the use
being made of the staff car in question would
not have been a permitted use and that Kirk-
wood, therefore, either had papers permitting
him to take it from the base for some permitted
use, which he did not comply with, or what is
more likely, that due to negligence of other
persons supposed to exercise control at the
base, he was permitted to take it out without
proper papers indicating a permitted use. I have
no difficulty in concluding, therefore, that he
was not acting in the performance of his duty at
the time of the accident.
Certain sections of the Crown Liability Act 2
should be referred to. Section 3(1)(a) reads as
follows:
3. (1) The Crown is liable in tort for the damages for
which, if it were a private person of full age and capacity, it
would be liable
(a) in respect of a tort committed by a servant of the
Crown, ...
Section 3(2) states:
3. (2) The Crown is liable for the damage sustained by
any person by reason of a motor vehicle, owned by the
Crown, upon a highway, for which the Crown would be
liable if it were a private person of full age and capacity.
Section 4(2) and (3) read as follows:
4. (2) No proceedings lie against the Crown by virtue of
paragraph 3(1)(a) in respect of any act or omission of a
servant of the Crown unless the act or omission would apart
from the provisions of this Act have given rise to a cause of
action in tort against that servant or his personal
representative.
(3) No proceedings lie against the Crown by virtue of
subsection 3(2) in respect of damage sustained by any
person by reason of a motor vehicle upon a highway unless
the driver of the motor vehicle or his personal representa
tive is liable for the damage so sustained.
It is necessary therefore to first establish wheth
er on the facts of this case an action would lie
against the driver Miles Kirkwood.
It is evident that defendant's vehicle was pro
ceeding through the intersection on the yellow,
if not on the red. Section 46(b) of the Quebec
Highway Code 3 reads as follows:
46. At places where signal-lights are installed, drivers of
vehicles must
(b) when faced by an amber light, stop before the inter
section unless already engaged therein or so close to it
that it would be impossible to do so without danger;
There was nothing in the evidence to indicate
that defendant's vehicle was so close to the
intersection when the light went amber that it
would be impossible to stop before entering the
2 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-38.
R.S.Q. 1964, c. 231.
intersection without danger. The witness Goz-
zola, although apparently a very frank and
honest witness, had at best a hazy recollection
of the events on the evening of the accident and
merely stated that he saw that the light ahead of
them was green, then orange, then the collision
took place. He did not state, and I am satisfied
that he was not able to do so with any accuracy,
whether the light was still green when they
entered the intersection or whether it was
already amber when they became too close to it
to stop without danger. Neither is there any
satisfactory evidence as to the speed of the
vehicle.
The witness Skafidas, also an honest but
somewhat confused witness, possibly due to
language difficulties, saw that the light for traf
fic proceeding along Sherbrooke Street was red
but this was only after the collision. He first
heard the collision and instinctively turned his
head toward it and noted the colour of the
traffic light, and I am satisfied that his attention
would first have been directed to the skidding
cars before he would look at the lights so that
there would be a brief interval between the
moment of impact and the time he saw that the
light was red. This evidence, therefore, is not
very conclusive in establishing whether it had in
fact already turned red before the impact.
Finally, we have the evidence of plaintiff who
stated very categorically that as the light was
against him as he came up the hill he
approached the intersection slowly in second
gear and only entered it when it turned to green,
adding that it had been green for three or four
seconds before the collision. If the light was
green for him it would, of course, by this time
have been red for defendant's vehicle.
While there can be no doubt with respect to
the fault of Kirkwood, the driver of defendant's
vehicle, the photographs indicating the location
and nature of the damages to the two vehicles
and the nature of the terrain at the intersection
give rise to some doubt as to whether there may
not have been some contributory negligence on
the part of plaintiff. He was proceeding up an
exceptionally steep hill in second gear, going
slowly because the red light was against him and
waiting for it to change in order to enter the
intersection. Under these conditions he should
have been able to bring it to a dead stop almost
instantly without moving more than a very few
feet upon becoming aware of defendant's vehi
cle. It is normal, although perhaps reprehen
sible, for the driver of a car which is still in
motion when approaching an intersection, and
waiting for the light to turn green to enter it, to
look to the right toward the amber light warning
traffic proceeding along the intersecting street
that it is about to be stopped by a red light. A
driver under such circumstances is not making a
start into the intersection from a stopped posi
tion but is already in motion and can enter the
intersection the very instant the light turns
green for him, if in fact he does not enter it
slightly in advance. Furthermore, he is relying
entirely on the light and not looking to his left to
see if a fast moving car is approaching along the
intersecting street and giving no indication of
stopping when the light turns amber or red
against it. While there is a building on the south
west corner of the intersection of Sherbrooke
and Park, this would not have obstructed plain
tiff's view of the approaching vehicle had he
been looking in that direction. The photographs
indicate clearly that defendant's vehicle was
struck toward the middle portion of its right-
hand side by the left front portion of plaintiff's
vehicle. At the time of the impact defendant's
vehicle was more than half-way if not actually
two-thirds way across the intersection and
plaintiff's vehicle, when it struck defendant's,
was about eight feet into the intersection. Even
accepting plaintiff's version that the light was
green for him before he entered the intersection
and that therefore at the time of the collision the
light for defendant's vehicle was not merely
amber but had already turned to red, it is appar
ent that in another second or two defendant's
vehicle would have completed the crossing in
safety had plaintiff seen it approach and applied
his brakes. Evidently he placed complete reli
ance on the lights and had not looked to his left
before entering the intersection, as in the very
brief time it would take him to drive eight feet
into it defendant's vehicle could not have trav
elled so far as not to have been in sight of
plaintiff when he entered the intersection. While
a driver is entitled to rely on the traffic lights at
an intersection and to assume that drivers on
the intersecting street will do likewise, this
should not relieve him entirely of any responsi
bility for assuring himself that there are no cars
approaching rapidly with the evident intention
of proceeding through the amber or red, before
he enters the intersection himself. In other
words, even when he has a green light he should
still look to left and right before proceeding
forward. To a minor extent, therefore, I believe
that plaintiff could have avoided this accident
had he been more alert. The primary fault, how
ever, is clearly that of Kirkwood to whom I
would attribute 80 per cent of the fault with 20
per cent being attributed to plaintiff and divide
the damages accordingly, thereby reducing the
damages payable to plaintiff from the agreed
figure of $1,001.05 to $800.84.
It is now necessary to turn to the defence in
law based on the argument that defendant is not
responsible for the damages since Kirkwood
was not engaged in the performance of his
duties at the time of the accident and that the
vehicle was being used by him for an unauthor
ized purpose or without authority. Article 1054
of the Quebec Civil Code reads in part:
Masters and employers are responsible for the damage
caused by their servants and workmen in the performance
of the work for which they are employed.
but it is not necessary, in order to decide this
case, to find whether this would be applicable in
order to relieve the Crown of liability under the
provisions of section 3(1)(a) and 4(2) of the
Crown Liability Act (supra) since that Act has
special provisions when the claim results from
ownership of a motor vehicle, contained in sec
tions 3(2) and 4(3) (supra). It is only necessary
therefore to determine whether the Crown
would be liable arising out of its ownership of
the motor vehicle "if it were a private person of
full age and capacity".
In determining the question of liability arising
out of ownership of a vehicle, reference should
be made to the Quebec Highway Victims Indem
nity Act 4 since the accident took place in that
Province. Section 3(b) of that statute reads as
follows:
3. The owner of an automobile is responsible for all
damage caused by such automobile or by the use thereof,
unless he proves
(b) that at the time of the accident the automobile was
being driven by a third person who obtained possession
thereof by theft, or
It is therefore necessary to determine what is
meant by the word "theft" in this statute and
whether it is broad enough to include unauthor
ized use or use without the owner's permission
as defendant contends. "Theft" is not defined in
the statute nor in the Quebec Interpretation Act.
If we look at the Criminal Code 5 we find
"theft" defined in section 283 in part as
follows:
283. (1) Every one commits theft who fraudulently and
without colour of right takes, or fraudulently and without
colour of right converts to his use or to the use of another
person, anything whether animate or inanimate, with intent,
(a) to deprive, temporarily or absolutely, the owner of it
or a person who has a special property or interest in it, of
the thing or of his property or interest in it,
which, taken by itself, would be broad enough
to cover unauthorized use by depriving defend
ant temporarily of the vehicle. In order to lessen
the severity of this a further section in the
Criminal Code deals specifically with the
offence of taking a vehicle without consent of
the owner with intent to drive same. This sec
tion reads as follows:
295. Every one who, without the consent of the owner,
takes a motor vehicle or vessel with intent to drive, use,
navigate, or operate it or cause it to be driven, used,
navigated or operated is guilty of an offence punishable on
summary conviction.
4 R.S.Q. 1964, c. 232.
5 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 as amended.
This section has the effect of taking out of the
general definition of theft the offence of taking
a motor vehicle without the owner's consent,
where it is clear that there is no intention of
stealing it or depriving the owner of the use of it
except temporarily, which is what happened in
the present case, so if we were here dealing with
criminal proceedings the offence of theft would
not have been applicable. Defendant contends,
however, that the distinctions made in the
Criminal Code for purposes of determining what
criminal charge can be laid, have no application
in civil proceedings and that in interpreting the
meaning of the word "theft" as used in the
Highway Victims Indemnity Act a wide meaning
should be given to it so as to include, for the
purposes of these proceedings, unauthorized
use, thereby relieving defendant of responsibili
ty while the vehicle was being so used.
This question appears to have been settled
definitively in so far as Quebec law is con
cerned by a unanimous judgment of the Quebec
Court of Appeal, bearing No. 13,569, dated
December 3, 1973 in the case of Martel v.
LaForest, és-qualité and The Highway Victims
Indemnity Fund in which, after stating that there
have been two schools of jurisprudence inter
preting the meaning of the word "theft" in this
statute, and referring to the cases supporting
both schools, the judgment of Mr. Justice Tur-
geon continues at page 5:
[TRANSLATION] The purpose of the indemnity law is not to
protect motorists but rather the victims of automobile acci
dents. For this reason the law imposes a heavy responsibili
ty on the owner and on the driver. The defence of theft
foreseen in article 3 is an exception to the general rule of the
owner's responsibility. It should therefore be interpreted in
a restrictive manner in order to assure the accomplishment
of the purpose of the law and the intention of the legislature.
I am of the opinion that the Quebec legislature in using
the word "theft" in article 3 had in mind the offence of theft
defined in article 283 of the Criminal Code and not the
taking of a motor vehicle without the permission of the
owner with the intent of driving or using it. If its intention
had been different it would have added to the exception the
taking of possession without the permission of the proprie
tor or the dispossession of the owner without his knowledge.
It wished to limit the exception to theft. The same legisla
ture did not fail to express itself clearly when it wished to
lessen the burden of the owner of a motor vehicle in penal
matters. Paragraph 1, of article 69 of the Highway Code
demonstrates this. It reads as follows:
69. (1) The owner of a motor vehicle is responsible for
any violation, committed with such vehicle, of the provi
sions of this act or of any regulation made thereunder by
the Lieutenant-Governor in Council or the Transportation
Board or of any by-law contemplated by section 76 or
section 77 and enacted by a municipal council, the whole
unless he proves that at the time of the violation the
vehicle was, without his consent, in the possession of a
third person other than his chauffeur.
Again, at page 8 he states:
[TRANSLATION] It appears to me that the Quebec legisla
ture deliberately excluded the taking of possession without
the consent of the proprietor as a means of exoneration in
article 3 of the indemnity law in order to better protect the
victims of automobile accidents. It would be too easy for the
owner of an automobile to avoid responsibility by stating
that his vehicle had been taken without his permission, thus
placing the victim in an illusory situation especially when
there are family relationships between the driver and the
owner of the car. The victim would often find it impossible
to control or to rebut the version of the owner. It is for this
reason that in the Canadian provinces where the text of the
law permits an owner to exonerate himself by proving the
taking of possession without his consent, the courts insist on
proof that it was impossible for him to prevent this taking of
possession and that he committed no negligence in this
respect.
I agree entirely with this judgment and the inter
pretation given to the word "theft" as it appears
in the Highway Victims Indemnity Act. It is not
necessary under Quebec law to decide whether
defendant did prove that it was impossible to
prevent the taking of possession by Kirkwood
and that no negligence was committed in this
regard. I would note, however, that the enforce
ment of control over the use of vehicles appears
to have been extremely lax at the Longue Pointe
Base at the time or it would have been impos
sible for Kirkwood to have taken the car out of
the garage, whose doors are supposedly kept
locked, and through the gates of the Base with
out the proper documentation. Even if he had
documentation then it should have been appar
ent from the fact of his being accompanied by
two other persons, neither of whom were staff
officers, that the car was not going to be used
for an authorized purpose. I doubt, therefore,
whether defendant has in any event established
absence of negligence in connection with Kirk-
wood's taking possession of the vehicle in ques
tion. The defence in law is therefore also
rejected.
Judgment is rendered in favour of plaintiff in
the sum of $800.84, with interest and costs.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.