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A-203-74
Voyageur Inc. (Appellant) v.
Syndicat des chauffeurs de Voyageur Inc. (CNTU) (Applicant) (Respondent)
and
Union of Transport Drivers, Warehousemen and General Workers, Local 106 (Intervener)
(Mis-en-cause) and
Canada Labour Relations Board and the Attorney General of Canada (Mis -en-cause)
Court of Appeal, Jackett C.J., Pratte and Hyde JJ.—Montreal, March 25, 1975.
Judicial review—Canada Labour Relations Board ordering holding of representation vote before bargaining unit estab- lished—Whether "decision" subject to review—Federal Court Act, s. 28.
The decision of the Canada Labour Relations Board, in ordering a representation vote, is a decision of an administra tive nature not required by law to be made on a judicial or quasi-judicial basis and can be validly made without the parties having had an opportunity to be heard. Consequently the Court cannot entertain the application for judicial review under sec tion 28 of the Federal Court Act.
APPLICATION for judicial review. COUNSEL:
Guy Dancosse for Voyageur Inc.
Maurice Laplante for Syndicat des chauffeurs
de Voyageur Inc.
Gino Castiglio for Union of Transport Driv
ers, Warehousemen and General Workers.
François Mercier for Canada Labour Rela tions Board.
Bernard Caron for Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers.
SOLICITORS:
Pouliot, Mercure & Cie, Montreal, for Voya- geur Inc.
Laroche, Saint-Arnaud & Cie, Montreal, for
Syndicat des chauffeurs de Voyageur Inc.
Cutler, Langlois & Castiglio, Montreal, for Union of Transport Drivers, Warehousemen and General Workers.
Stikeman, Elliott, Tamaki, Mercier and Robb, Montreal, for Canada Labour Rela tions Board.
Caron and Boisvert, Laval, for Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and Gen eral Workers.
The following is the English version of the reasons for judgment of the Court delivered orally by
PRATTE J.: An application was made under section 28 of the Federal Court Act to set aside a decision made by the Canada Labour Relations Board. By this decision the Board, which had before it an application for certification, ordered that a representation vote be held within the bar gaining unit described in the application for certification.
This decision is challenged for the following reasons:
(1) it is alleged that in making it, the Board found unlawfully and by implication that the bargaining unit described in the application was a unit that was qualified to negotiate; and
(2) the Board's decision is unlawful so far as it should not be thus interpreted, because the Board having before it an application for certifi cation is not empowered to order a vote within the unit described in the application before establishing that this unit is qualified to negotiate.
We are all of the opinion that the Board, in ordering that a vote be held, has not found that the proposed bargaining unit was qualified to negoti ate. To the extent that the application is directed against such a decision, therefore, it must accord ingly be dismissed because it is directed against a non-existent decision.
The question remains as to whether the Board could, under the circumstances, order that a vote be held within a unit that it had not yet established as being a unit that was qualified to enter into
collective bargaining. It is not proper for us to express an opinion on this difficult problem because it seems to us that, even if the Board had exceeded its powers by ordering a vote, the application which we have before us should nonetheless be dismissed.
Thus, under section 28 of the Federal Court Act, the Court of Appeal does not have the power to review or set aside a "decision or order of an administrative nature not required by law to be made on a judicial or quasi-judicial basis". In our opinion, the decision to order a representation vote can be validly made without the parties having had an opportunity to be heard, and it does not have any of the other essential characteristics of judicial decisions. Consequently, this is a decision that does not lie within our jurisdiction under section 28.
For these reasons, this application will be dismissed.
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