A-248-80
Attorney General of Canada (Applicant)
v.
Hélène Piché (Respondent)
Court of Appeal, Pratte and Ryan JJ. and Lalande
D.J.—Montreal, November 12; Ottawa, Novem-
ber 24, 1980.
Judicial review — Unemployment insurance — Entitlement
to benefit — Respondent released on June 29, 1979, i.e. prior
to the coming into force of the new Act, July 1, 1979 — Initial
claim for benefit made on July 10, 1979 — Request by
respondent that claim be antedated to June 29, 1979, pursuant
to s. 20(4) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971 —
Application to review and set aside Umpire's decision antedat
ing said claim, as respondent fulfilled conditions of entitle
ment to benefit — Whether conditions refer exclusively to
those set forth in s. 17 of the Act or to those set forth in s. 17
and ss. 19 et seq. — Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, S.C.
1970-71-72, c. 48, ss. 17(1),(2), 19, 20(4), 23 — Unemploy
ment Insurance Regulations, SOR/71-324, s. 150(1) — Feder
al Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 28.
The respondent, who was released from her work on June 29,
1979, made on July 10, 1979 an initial claim for benefit and
requested under section 20(4) of the Unemployment Insurance
Act, 1971 that her claim be regarded as having been made
before July 1, 1979, i.e. before the new Act came into force.
The applicant now seeks to have reviewed and set aside the
decision of the Umpire that the said claim could be antedated
to June 29, 1979, as the respondent fulfilled "the conditions of
entitlement to benefit". Applicant contends that respondent
does not fulfil these conditions since that expression refers not
only to the conditions of eligibility set forth in section 17 of the
Act—as was argued by the respondent—but also to the condi
tions provided for in sections 19 et seq. of the Act. The issue
turns on the meaning of "conditions of entitlement to benefit"
of section 150 of the Unemployment Insurance Regulations.
Held, the application is dismissed. The French version of
section 150 of the Regulations and section 17 of the Act
indicates clearly that the conditions referred to in the former
section are those prescribed in the latter section. The French
version of the Regulations must prevail; if effect is given to the
English version of section 150, a meaning will be given to these
words that contradicts the general spirit of the Act. Under the
Act, the conditions of eligibility for benefit prescribed by
sections 19 et seq. have nothing to do with the right of an
insured to make a claim for benefit. If applicant's interpreta
tion prevails, then nothing would justify the existence of section
150. Moreover, the interpretation suggested by the English
wording leads to the absurd result that a claim could never be
antedated.
R. v. Compagnie Immobilière BCN Ltée [1979] 1 S.C.R.
865, referred to.
APPLICATION for judicial review.
COUNSEL:
J.-M. Aubry for applicant.
L. Lamarche for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
applicant.
Sylvestre, Brisson, Dupin, Charbonneau &
Bourdeau, Montreal, for respondent.
The following is the English version of the
reasons for judgment rendered by
PRATTE J.: This is an application under section
28 of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd
Supp.), c. 10, to review and set aside the decision
of an Umpire under Part V of the Unemployment
Insurance Act, 1971, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48.
From May 7, 1979 to Friday, June 29, 1979 the
respondent worked for the Government of Quebec.
She was released on June 29 after her normal
work-day. At that time she had been employed in
insurable employment for 12 weeks, which allowed
her under the Act then in force to make an initial
claim for benefit. The Act was amended on July 1,
1979: from that date an insured person could make
a claim for benefit only if he had been employed in
insurable employment for 20 weeks. On July 10,
1979 the respondent made an initial claim for
benefit and at the same time she requested under
subsection 20(4) of the Act that her claim for
benefit be regarded as having been made before
July 1, 1979, that is, before the new Act came into
force.
The sole issue considered by the Umpire was
whether under subsection 20(4) of the Act and
section 150 of the Unemployment Insurance
Regulations, SOR/71-324, * it was possible to
regard the respondent's claim for benefit as having
* Now section 39 of C.R.C. 1978, Vol. XVIII, c. 1576.
been made before July 1, 1979. The Umpire
answered this question in the affirmative. It is this
decision of the Umpire that is the subject of this
appeal.
The rules applicable in the case at bar are set
forth in subsection 20(4) of the Act and section
150 of the Regulations. These provisions read as
follows:
20....
(4) When a claimant makes an initial claim for benefit on a
day later than the day he was first qualified to make the claim
and shows good cause for his delay, the claim may, subject to
prescribed conditions, be regarded as having been made on a
day earlier than the day on which it was actually made.
150. (1) An initial claim for benefit may be regarded as
having been made on a day prior to the day on which it was
actually made if the claimant proves that
(a) on the prior day he fulfilled, in all respects, the conditions
of entitlement to benefit and was in a position to furnish
proof thereof, and
(b) throughout the whole period between the prior day and
the day he made the claim he had good cause for the delay in
making that claim.
It is established that throughout the period be
tween June 29 and July 10, 1979 the respondent
"had good cause for the delay in making [her]
claim." The respondent's claim for benefit could
accordingly be antedated to June 29, as was held
by the Umpire, if on that date the respondent
fulfilled "the conditions of entitlement to benefit".
According to counsel for the applicant, the
respondent fulfilled "the conditions of entitlement
to benefit" neither on June 29 nor on June 30;
under section 19, benefits are payable only for
weeks of unemployment and the week ending June
30 was clearly not a week of unemployment for the
respondent. Counsel for the applicant contended
that the expression "conditions of entitlement to
benefit" refers to all the conditions that must be
fulfilled for a claimant to be entitled to payment of
benefits. If it is necessary to give this general
meaning to the expression "conditions of entitle
ment to benefit" in section 150 of the Regulations,
it is clear that the respondent did not fulfil these
conditions on June 29 and 30, 1979.
Counsel for the respondent, however, contended
that it was necessary to give a much more restrict
ed meaning to these words. In his view, the "condi-
tions of entitlement to benefit" mentioned in sec
tion 150 of the Regulations are quite simply the
conditions of eligibility set forth in section 17 of
the Act, that is, that the insured must have been
employed in insurable employment for the
required number of weeks and that there must
have been an interruption of earnings from this
employment. As the respondent fulfilled both these
conditions on June 29, the Umpire had accordingly
correctly held that the respondent's claim for ben
efit could be regarded as having been made on that
date.'
Only one issue is accordingly raised in this
appeal: What is the meaning of the expression
"conditions of entitlement to benefit" in section
150 of the Regulations?
This question is easily answered if only the
French version of section 150 of the Regulations
and section 17 of the Act is considered. These
provisions seem to indicate clearly the conditions
referred to in section 150 are those prescribed by
section 17 of the Act. In fact, the expression
"conditions of entitlement to benefit", ["condi-
tions requises pour recevoir des prestations"],
which is used in section 150, may be found word
for word in the French version of section 17 of the
Act:
17. (1) Les prestations d'assurance-chômage sont payables,
ainsi que le prévoit la présente Partie, à un assuré qui remplit
les conditions requises pour recevoir ces prestations.
(2) Un assuré remplit les conditions requises pour recevoir
des prestations en vertu de la présente loi
In addition to conforming with the French ver
sion of the Regulations and the Act, this interpre
tation seems logical. The purpose of subsection
20(4) of the Act and section 150 of the Regula
tions seems to be to enable an insured person who
has good cause for delay in making his claim for
benefit to be placed in the same situation as if this
delay had not occurred. An insured person who
' Counsel for the applicant maintained in his factum that the
interruption of the respondent's earnings took place after June
30. He did not, however, take up this argument at the hearing,
probably because he realized that in the light of section 148 of
the Regulations, it is clear that the interruption of the respond
ent's earnings occurred on June 29 at the time she was released
by her employer.
acts without delay may make his claim for benefit
as soon as he fulfils the conditions prescribed in
section 17.
Counsel for the applicant disputed this interpre
tation by relying on the wording of the English
version of section 150 of the Regulations and
section 17 of the Act:
150. (1) An initial claim for benefit may be regarded as
having been made on a day prior to the day on which it was
actually made if the claimant proves that
(a) on the prior day he fulfilled, in all respects, the conditions
of entitlement to benefit and was in a position to furnish
proof thereof; and
(b) throughout the whole period between the prior day and
the day he made the claim he had good cause for the delay in
making that claim.
17. (1) Unemployment insurance benefits are payable as
provided in this Part to an insured person who qualifies to
receive such benefits.
(2) An insured person qualifies to receive benefits under this
Act if he
The English version of section 150 of the Regula
tions does not use the same wording as section 17
of the Act. The Regulations refer to "conditions of
entitlement to benefit", and this wording is not
found in section 17, although it is similar, on the
other hand, to the wording of several other sections
of the Act that, like sections 23 and 25, provide for
cases where "a claimant is not entitled to be paid
benefit". Counsel for the applicant concluded that
the conditions set out in section 150 of the Regula
tions are not only the conditions prescribed in
section 17 of the Act but also the conditions of
eligibility provided for in sections 19 et seq.
The applicant's arguments must, in my view, be
rejected. We are here dealing with a case in which
the French version of the Regulations must
prevail, 2 because if effect is given to the English
version of section 150 of the Regulations, a mean
ing will unavoidably be given to these words that
contradicts the general spirit of the Act. Under the
Act, the conditions of eligibility for benefit pre
scribed by sections 19 et seq. have nothing to do
with the right of an insured to make a claim for
benefit, and it is not possible to imagine a reason
that would justify the existence of section 150 of
2 See: The Queen v. Compagnie Immobilière BCN Limitée
[1979] 1 S.C.R. 865.
the Regulations if it is given the interpretation
proposed by the applicant. This is, however, not
all. If we accept the interpretation suggested by
the English wording of section 150, we reach the
absurd result that a claim for benefit could never
be antedated. In effect, a person claiming benefit
is never eligible for benefit on the very day on
which he submits his claim, and under section 23
he becomes eligible only when the waiting period
has expired:
23. A claimant is not entitled to be paid benefit in a benefit
period until following the commencement of that benefit period
he has served a two week waiting period that begins with a
week of unemployment for which benefit would otherwise be
payable.
For these reasons I would dismiss the applica
tion.
* * *
RYAN J.: I concur.
* * *
LALANDE D.J.: I concur in this judgment.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.