Judgments

Decision Information

Decision Content

T-958-80
MacMillan Bloedel Limited and Kingcome Navi gation Company Limited (Plaintiffs)
v.
Pan Ocean Bulk Carrier Limited, the ship Yu Kong and A. MacKinnon (Defendants)
Trial Division, Collier J.—Vancouver, February 11; Ottawa, February 26, 1981.
Maritime law — Appointment of assessors — Application by plaintiffs for order appointing assessors pursuant to Rule 492(2) — Action for damages allegedly sustained by plaintiffs following ramming incident — Plaintiffs claim that the appointment of assessors precludes the tendering at trial of expert evidence on matters of navigation and seamanship — Order appointing two assessors made — Order not prohibiting any party from tendering expert evidence, pursuant to Rule 482, on matters of seamanship and navigation — Federal Court Rules 482, 492(2).
APPLICATION. COUNSEL:
J. R. Cunningham and Marc MacEwing for
plaintiffs.
Nils Daugulis for defendants.
SOLICITORS:
Macrae, Montgomery & Cunningham, Van- couver, for plaintiffs.
Bull, Housser & Tupper, Vancouver, for defendants.
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
COLLIER J.: The plaintiffs applied for an order, pursuant to Rule 492(2), that two assessors be appointed to assist the Court at trial on matters of navigation and seamanship.
The second plaintiff owned a tug which, at the material times, was towing a boom of logs owned by the first plaintiff. The vessel Yu Kong is alleged to have negligently rammed the log boom in the Strait of Georgia off the mouth of the north arm of the Fraser River. Action was brought for dam-
ages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiffs.
Counsel for the defendants felt assessors were not necessary in this case. Other than that, he had no serious objection to their appointment, provided the defendants were not precluded, by that appointment, from tendering at trial expert evi dence on matters of navigation and seamanship, relevant to the facts and issues in this suit.
Counsel for the plaintiffs took the view the presence of assessors prevents the proffering of expert evidence on matters of navigation and sea manship. He relied on a recent decision of my colleague, Dubé J.: Egmont Towing & Sorting Ltd. v. The "Telendos" (T - 219 - 79 — unreported, November 17, 1980), and on the cases referred to in footnote 1 to those reasons. Dubé J. said at pages 2-3:
At the outset of the trial, counsel for the plaintiff moved to strike out the affidavits of several expert witnesses to be called by the defendant on the ground that no expert evidence is to be heard on matters of seamanship and navigation when assessors are sitting.
The arguments on that point were postponed to be heard at the time each of the proposed witnesses was to be called by the defendant. In due course a full debate was held in the matter and several authorities were quoted from British as well as Canadian jurisprudence. I ruled that when the Court is assisted by nautical assessors, whose duty it is to advise on matters of nautical skills and knowledge, the evidence of witnesses ten dered for expert testimony on those very matters is not to be received.
I therefore disallowed the proposed evidence of expert wit nesses whose affidavits revealed quite clearly that their compe tence and proposed evidence lay exactly in the field of expertise of the two assessors, namely the navigation of vessels in the Port of Vancouver. As I pointed out to counsel at the time, the two captains sitting beside me have themselves taken vessels, deep-sea as well as tugs, in and out of Vancouver Harbour hundreds of times.
I did, however, allow the expert evidence of a captain whose expertise lies in the field of naval architecture, a field foreign to the two assessors.
I am unable to accept the general proposition that "no expert evidence is to be heard on matters of seamanship and navigation when assessors are sitting".
I expressed my views on this point in an appen dix to The "Sun Diamond" v. The "Erawan" (1975) 55 D.L.R. (3d) 138. I reviewed the English practice, and the former Exchequer Court prac tice, which followed the English view that expert evidence was inadmissible when assessors were sitting. Neither of those earlier practices is, in my view, binding on the Trial Division of this Court. I set out, in the Sun Diamond case, the restricted use of assessors which I felt should be made; and that their appointment should not debar expert evidence on matters of navigation and seamanship. I do not propose to repeat here my reasons. I reaffirm those views on this application.
In Nord-Deutsche Versicherungs-Gesellschaft v. The Queen [1969] 1 Ex.C.R. 117, Noël J. (later A.C.J. of the Federal Court) sat with an assessor, in a case which essentially involved maritime mat ters, including navigation and seamanship. Several expert witnesses were tendered on matters of navi gation. It was argued, on the same grounds put forward by the plaintiffs here, the evidence of the experts was inadmissible. Noël J. overruled the objection, and permitted the expert witnesses to give evidence. (See pages 144-146, 148, 155.)
The point raised here came up in a recent case in this Division: Misener Transportation Limited v. The "George N. Carleton" (T-5952-78, Mar- ceau J., unreported, May 6, 1980). A vessel, while being assisted by a tug, came into contact with the wall of a quay in Thunder Bay, Ontario. One party applied for the appointment of an assessor to assist the Court. Mahoney J. directed the appointment, but added a proviso that the appointment did not preclude the tendering of expert evidence on mat ters of navigation and seamanship. Marceau J., who heard the trial, said, at pages 8-9:
What then caused the stern of the vessel to react as it did and take a wrong direction? I was assisted during this trial by an assessor, Captain Storey, but pursuant to an order of the Court, the presence of the assessor was not to prevent the parties from calling expert evidence. The defendants called three expert witnesses, two of whom greatly impressed me by their qualifi-
cations and the way they expressed their opinions, Jack Augus- tus Potter, a former sea Captain, now a marine surveyor, and Cyril Harrison, a recently retired Captain and Great Lakes pilot. According to these experts three reasons must account for the sheering of the vessel to port.
At the conclusion of argument on this case, I said I would make an order appointing two asses sors. But the order would not prohibit any party from tendering expert evidence, pursuant to Rule 482, on matters of seamanship and navigation relevant to this action. j said, also, I would give short written reasons in case the plaintiffs might wish to appeal my order.
These are the written reasons.
The costs of this motion are in the cause.
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