Judgments

Decision Information

Decision Content

A-1934-83
Registrar of Trade Marks (Appellant) v.
Compagnie Internationale pour l'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull, Société Anonyme and Herridge, Tolmie (Respondents)
Court of Appeal, Pratte, Marceau and Hugessen JJ.—Montreal, May 1 and 2, 1985.
Trade marks — Appeal from Trial Division judgment reversing Registrar's order expunging trade mark "Bull" for non-user pursuant to s. 44 of Act — "Bull" used simultane ously with registered trade mark "CII" and unregistered trade mark "Honeywell" — Respondent owner of all marks — Marks never used separately — Whether use of composite trade mark "CII Honeywell Bull" constituting use of trade mark "Bull" — Trial Judge holding nothing in Act forbidding simultaneous use of several trade marks — Respondent not deceiving public as to origin of goods — Test applicable is comparing trade mark as used with mark as registered — Non-user if mark used so as to lose identity, rendering unrecognizable from registered trade mark — Trade mark must be used in form registered — Respondent not using trade mark "Bull" — Appeal allowed — Trade Marks Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. T-10, s. 44 (as am. by S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 47, s. 46).
COUNSEL:
Serge Frégeau for appellant.
Richard S. Uditsky for respondent, Compa- gnie Internationale pour l'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull, Société Anonyme.
No one appearing for respondent Herridge, Tolmie.
SOLICITORS:
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for appellant.
Phillips, Friedman, Kotler, Montreal, for respondent, Compagnie Internationale pour l'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull, Société Anonyme.
Herridge, Tolmie, Ottawa, for respondent (Herridge, Tolmie).
The following are the reasons for judgment of the Court delivered orally in English by
PRATTE J.: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Trial Division (Addy J.) [[1983] 2 F.C. 766] allowing an appeal made by the respondent, Compagnie Internationale pour l'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull, Société Anonyme, (hereinafter referred to as CII) from an order of the Registrar of Trade Marks expunging the registration of CII's trade mark "Bull". That order had been made under section 44 of the Trade Marks Act [R.S.C. 1970, c. T-10 (as am. by S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 47, s. 46)] on the ground that the trade mark in question was not in use in Canada.
The facts are not in dispute. CII was the regis tered owner of three trade marks: the one here in question which consists of the word "Bull", another one consisting of the initials CII and a third one which was a design representing a com puter screen and a tree. None of those marks were ever used separately. The first two were always used together in association with the word Honey- well, which is a prominent part of CII's name, so as to form the composite mark "CII Honeywell Bull".' That composite mark was sometimes used in conjunction with the design representing the screen and the tree.
The sole issue on this appeal is whether CII used its trade mark "Bull" when it used the composite mark "CII Honeywell Bull" to identify its wares. Addy J. answered that question in the affirmative. After stating that there is nothing in the law that prohibits a person from using simultaneously two or more trade marks, he added that, normally, a trade mark must nevertheless be used in the form in which it is registered; the problem in this case, as he saw it, arose from the fact that the registered trade mark, which was the word "Bull" alone, had never been used in that form but, rather, in asso ciation with other words. Considering that ques tion, he rejected the proposition, which found sup port in some authorities, that a trade mark must
1 The affidavit furnished by CII in answer to the Registrar's notice under section 44 stated that CII had used "the word 'Bull' as part of the composite trade mark `CII Honeywell Bull' "
necessarily be used in the exact form in which it is registered. He then quoted the following passage from Fox, Canadian Law of Trade Mark and Unfair Competition (3rd edition, 1972), at pages
63 and 64:
... "The question of whether or not the use of a label deviating from the specific label is such a deviation as would constitute a non-user of a specific trade mark appears to be one of fact as relating to each particular case, the principle on which such facts shall be applied being as laid down by Maclean J. in the Honey Dew case, namely, that the deviation shall not be such as to cause an injury or deception to anyone."
A deviation from or addition to a mark as registered may amount to a misleading representation and by constituting a fraud upon the public debar the plaintiff from relief. But unless an addition to or deviation from a trade mark is misleading it cannot be seen how such use can be held not to be use of the trade mark if, in the words of s. 4(1) of the Trade Marks Act, it is so associated with the wares "that notice of the association is then given to the person to whom the property or possession is transferred." This is obviously a question of fact to be decided upon the evidence and not by an arbitrary and meticulous comparison of the mark as used with the mark as registered.
Mr. Justice Addy concluded as follows:
I consider the above to be a better view of the law on the subject as it exists today.
On examining the facts in the case at bar, it seems clear that the additions to the mark "Bull" cannot be held as likely to deceive or mislead the public in any way as to the source of the equipment being sold as the two additional words are part and parcel of the name of the owner of the mark and as one of those marks is also registered in the name of the owner and the other is an unregistered mark of the owner used by it. In so far as the screen and tree design which at times is also used with the word "Bull" and the other two words, it is also a registered mark of the owner.
In these circumstances, the appeal will be allowed and the mark "Bull" will be restored to the register of Trade Marks.
We are all of the view that this judgment cannot stand.
The problem to be resolved is not whether CII deceived the public as to the origin of its goods. It clearly did not. The real and only question is whether, by identifying its goods as it did, CII
made use of its trade mark "Bull". That question must be answered in the negative unless the mark was used in such a way that the mark did not lose its identity and remained recognizable in spite of the differences between the form in which it was registered and the form in which it was used. The practical test to be applied in order to resolve a case of this nature is to compare the trade mark as it is registered with the trade mark as it is used and determine whether the differences between these two marks are so unimportant that an una ware purchaser would be likely to infer that both, in spite of their differences, identify goods having the same origin.
Viewing the problem in that light and applying that test, we cannot escape the conclusion that, in using the composite mark "CII Honeywell Bull", CII did not use its mark "Bull".
The appeal will be allowed without costs, the judgment of the Trial Division will be set aside and the order of the Registrar of Trade Marks expung ing the registration of the trade mark "Bull" will be restored.
 You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.