Judgments

Decision Information

Decision Content

A-705-79
Attorney General of Canada (Appellant) (Inter- venor)
v.
Québec Ready Mix Inc., Lévis Ready Mix Inc., Pierre Viger, Dominion Ready Mix Inc., Jean Desjardins, Marc Crépin, Verreault Frontenac Ready Mix Inc., Claude Ferland, Michel Bérubé, Pierre Legault, Pilote Ready Mix Inc., and Gaston Pilote (Respondents) (Defendants)
and
Rocois Construction Inc. (Mise- en-cause) (Plain- tiff)
and
Attorney General of the Province of Quebec (Mis- en- cause) (Intervenor)
Court of Appeal, Pratte, Ryan and MacGuigan JJ.—Quebec City, October 3; Ottawa, November 21, 1985.
Constitutional law — Distribution of powers — Trade and commerce — Appeal from Trial judgment holding s. 31.1(1)(a) of Combines Investigation Act ultra vires — S. 31.1 giving civil right of action to person suffering damage resulting from offence in relation to competition — Whether s. 31.1 valid legislation under trade and commerce power — Appeal allowed — Regulation of trade and commerce including gen eral regulation of trade affecting whole dominion: Citizens Insurance Company of Canada v. Parsons (1881), 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C.) — Argument civil remedy based on another head of power subject to limitations on civil remedies within criminal process, establishing civil remedy given under s. 31.1(1)(a) not supportable on basis of federal criminal jurisdiction — Princi ple of paramount authority of s. 91 over s. 92 where federal jurisdiction strictly relates to subject enumerated in s. 91, or where matters necessarily incidental to effective legislation applied — Supreme Court of Canada not upholding legisla tion under trade and commerce power where not connected with general regulatory scheme (MacDonald et al. v. Vapor Canada Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134) or for lack of generality of regulation (Labatt Breweries of Canada Ltd. v. Attorney Gen eral of Canada, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 914) — Of five indicia under "general regulation of trade" described in Attorney General of Canada v. Canadian National Transportation, Ltd. et al., [1983] 2 S.C.R. 206, only "oversight of national regulatory agency" less complete as supplemented by initiatory rights of private complainants — S. 31.1 relating "strictly" to subject of legislation expressly enumerated in s. 91 — Even if validity considered under "necessarily incidental" proposition, necessi ty well expressed by notion of "rational, functional connec tion" with overall plan of supervision (Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon et al., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161) — Balance of gov ernmental regulation and private enforcement policy matter —
S. 31.1 infra vires as having rational functional connection with overall federal economic plan manifested in Act in rela tion to competition - Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, ss. 31.1 (as enacted by S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 76, s. 12), 31.2, 31.3, 31.4, 31.5, 31.6, 31.7, 31.8, 31.9, 32(1) (as am. by S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 76, s. 14), 34(1)(c) (as am. by S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 76, s. 16) - Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.) [R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II, No. 5] (as am. by Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), Schedule to the Consti tution Act, 1982, Item 1), ss. 91(2),(26),(27), 92(13),(16) Trade Marks Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. T-10, s. 7(e) - Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-32, ss. 100.4 (as enacted by R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 10, s. 7), 100.5.
Combines - Constitutional validity of s. 31.1(1) of Com bines Investigation Act giving civil remedy for breach of prohi bition in s. 32(1) - Appeal from Trial judgment finding impugned legislation ultra vires - Historical examination of treatment of anti-combines legislation as criminal legislation - Conflicting case law since Trial judgment re constitutional validity of s. 31.1 - Examination of case law relating to trade and commerce power, criminal law power, paramountcy of authority - S. 31.1 relating strictly to trade and commerce power - S. 31.1 infra vires as having rational, functional connection with overall federal economic plan manifested in Act in relation to competition - Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, s. 31.1 (as enacted by S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 76, s. 12).
Jurisdiction - Federal Court - Trial Division - Validity of s. 31.1(3) of Combines Investigation Act giving jurisdiction to Federal Court over action brought under s. 31.1(1) - Cause of action provided by s. 31.1(1) existing and applicable federal law supporting proceedings before Federal Court - McNamara Construction (Western) Ltd. et al. v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 654 and Quebec North Shore Paper Co. et al. v. Canadian Pacific Limited et al., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054 applied - No jurisdiction over part of claim relating to art. 1053 of Civil Code - Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, s. 31.1(1) (as enacted by S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 76, s. 12), (3) (as enacted idem) - Civil Code of Lower Canada, art. 1053.
Appeal from a preliminary ruling of the Trial Division holding paragraph 31.1(1)(a) and subsection 31.1(3) of the Combines Investigation Act ultra vires the federal Parliament. The action was a claim for damages by the plaintiff, Rocois Construction Inc., resulting from an agreement which the defendants concluded among themselves in breach of prohibi tions contained in the Act. Section 31.1 gives any person who has suffered injury as a result of the commission of an offence in relation to competition the right to institute, independently of any criminal proceedings, an action in the Federal Court for compensation against the perpetrators of any such act. In the Trial Division, the exercise of federal legislative power was defended on the basis of the general power in section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Canada, and also on the basis of the trade and commerce power (91(2)) and the criminal law power (91(27)). The claim for federal jurisdiction was resisted on the basis of the provincial powers over property and civil rights (92(13)) and matters of a merely local or private nature in the province (92(16)). Before this Court the appellant relied solely on the trade and commerce power to support federal jurisdiction.
Held, the appeal should be allowed.
Per Pratte J.: Since the judgment in BBM Bureau of Meas urement v. Director of Investigation and Research, [1985] 1 F.C. 173; (1984), 52 N.R. 137 (C.A.), where Dickson J.'s opinion in Attorney General of Canada v. Canadian National Transportation, Ltd. et al., [1983] 2 S.C.R. 206 was adopted, it has been established that the prohibitions established in subsection 32(1) were validly enacted pursuant to the trade and commerce power. Thus, the only question is whether section 31.1 was validly enacted. When the Constitution gives Parlia ment the power to enact a prohibition it impliedly also gives it the power to determine the consequences of that prohibition, whether those consequences be of a civil or penal nature. That principle does not apply when a legislative power is conferred in terms such as to exclude its application. The power to legislate with respect to criminal law does not include the power to regulate the civil consequences of criminal acts because, by definition, criminal law does not include that kind of regula tion. The power to regulate trade and commerce is not subject to the same limitation. The decisions in R. v. Zelensky, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 940 and MacDonald et al. v. Vapor Canada Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134 do not apply. Zelensky dealt with the power of Parliament to determine the civil effects of criminal offences. As indicated, the limits that circumscribe the criminal law power do not apply to the "trade and commerce" power. The Vapor Canada case, which dealt with the constitutionality of the prohibition in paragraph 7(e) of the Trade Marks Act is relevant in discussing whether the prohibitions in subsection 32(1) were valid, but not in a discussion on the constitutionality of subsection 31.1(1).
Per Ryan J.: Urie J. in the BBM Bureau of Measurement case applied the tests applied by Dickson J. in the Canadian National Transportation case. His reasons support a holding
that paragraph 32(1)(c) has a constitutional foundation in subsection 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
The question whether Parliament can give a civil remedy for damage caused by conduct in breach of a statutory provision validly enacted under section 91 was raised in Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon et al., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161. Dickson J. referred to a submission that Parliament could not constitution ally enact section 100.4 of the Canada Corporations Act because it confers a civil cause of action and thus would fall within exclusive provincial jurisdiction. He held that sections 100.4 and 100.5 were intro vires having a "rational, functional connection" with company law. The civil remedy provided by section 31.1 has a "rational, functional connection" with sub section 32(1). These two statutory provisions are linked by the express reference in section 31.1 to Part V. The civil remedy made available by section 31.1 to persons injured by conduct proscribed by subsection 32(1) would provide a motive for avoiding the prohibited conduct, and a means of redressing some of the harmful consequences resulting from the proscribed conduct. This link is enough to warrant concluding that section 31.1 is at least incidental to the regulation of trade and commerce. This conclusion is supported by Laskin J.'s state ment in Papp v. Papp, [1970] 1 O.R. 331 (C.A.) that "where there is admitted competence ... to legislate to a certain point the question of limits ... is best answered by asking whether there is a rational, functional connection between what is admittedly good and what is challenged". It would be more appropriate in view of this link to characterize section 31.1 as legislation coming "squarely under" subsection 91(2), as legis lation directly related to the regulation of trade and commerce: Nykorak v. The Attorney General of Canada, [1962] S.C.R. 331. A broader base for the constitutional validity of section 31.1 would be found in the circumstance that section 31.1 fits comfortably within what is an elaborate legislative scheme established by the Act, the purpose of which is the general regulation of trade affecting the whole dominion. The present case is distinguishable from Vapor Canada where paragraph 7(e) of the Trade Marks Act was held to be an isolated provision lacking any rational or functional link to provisions of the Act relating to trade marks or their regulation.
Per MacGuigan J.: Historically Canadian anti-combines legislation was treated as criminal legislation. However, there has been increasing support for the decriminalization of anti- combines legislation. The 1975 amendments to the legislation were made in the aftermath of a report by the Economic Council of Canada, recommending that competition policy be on a civil rather than a criminal base and that a specialized tribunal be created. Certain features of criminal law and procedure, such as the onus of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the handling of charges by ordinary courts in ways that do not permit a full exploration of economic facts and analyses, are ill-suited to the effective treatment of some situations and practices relevant to competition policy.
Since the Trial Division decision, the issue of the constitu tional validity of section 31.1 has been litigated in two other cases. In Henuset Bros. Ltd. v. Syncrude Canada Ltd. et al. (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 300 (Alta. Q.B.), section 31.1 was found to form an integral part of an overall legislative and regulatory scheme for the general regulation of trade and commerce throughout Canada. In City National Leasing Ltd. v. Genera! Motors of Canada Ltd. (1984), 47 O.R. (2d) 653 (H.C.), it was held that section 31.1 was ultra vires as it was not really necessary for the Combines Investigation Act to be effective.
In R. v. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. (Nos. I & 2) (1981), 125 D.L.R. (3d) 607 (Ont. C.A.), paragraph 34(1 )(c) of the Com bines Investigation Act was upheld under the trade and com merce power. In the Canadian National Transportation case, Dickson J. upheld paragraph 32(1)(c) under both the criminal law power and the trade and commerce power. Beets and Lamer JJ. agreed that the legislation was validly enacted under the criminal law power. Finally, in BBM Bureau of Measure ment, section 31.4 was upheld under the trade and commerce power. Urie J. stated that the federal trade and commerce power and the provincial power over property and civil rights do not erode each other, but are complementary.
The starting point for analysis is Citizens Insurance Com pany of Canada v. Parsons (1881), 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C.), where it was held that "regulation of trade and commerce ... include[s] general regulation of trade affecting the whole dominion".
The respondents argued that even a civil remedy based on another head of power must be subject to the limitations on civil remedies within the criminal process, as defined by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Zelensky, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 940. It was argued that a similar point of view emerged from the Vapor Canada case. The effect of the respondents' interpre tation of the criminal law power does not go further than to establish that the kind of civil remedy given by paragraph 31.1(1)(a) cannot be supported on the basis of federal criminal jurisdiction. There is no reason to accept a criminal law inter pretation of the independent trade and commerce power. The respondents' interpretation is based on a contention that the civil remedy authorized by the Act is a civil right which falls under exclusive provincial competence through subsections 92(13) and 92(16). In other words, this exclusivity is based on the priority of section 92 over section 91. However, in Attor- ney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for British Columbia, [1930] A.C. 111 (P.C.), it was held that the legisla tion of the federal Parliament so long as it strictly relates to subjects of legislation expressly enumerated in section 91, is of paramount authority, even though it trenches upon matters assigned to the provincial legislatures by section 92. Further more, Parliament can provide for matters, which though other wise within provincial competence are necessarily incidental to effective legislation upon a subject enumerated in section 91. If there is a point of difficulty in the Vapor Canada case for the
appellants, it is the Court's unwillingness to ground federal jurisdiction on subsection 91(2) for reasons other than its lack of a tie-in to the criminal sentencing process. The impugned legislation failed because, despite its nation-wide application, it was a detached provision unconnected with any general regula tory scheme. Since the result in Vapor Canada was a negative one and the Court did not reflect generally on justifying a civil remedy under the trade and commerce power beyond the point to which it was necessary for a decision in that case, it is difficult to establish a general theory of the trade and com merce power based on Vapor Canada.
There was a similar negative result in Labatt Breweries of Canada Ltd. v. Attorney General of Canada, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 914. That case concerned labelling of alcoholic content of "light beer". The judgment was based upon the lack of general ity of the regulation, resulting from the peculiarly local produc tion for a local market. There is no larger delineation of the law to serve as a guide for other cases.
Dickson J. in the Canadian National Transportation case enumerated possible indicia of validity under the "general regulation of trade" branch of the trade and commerce power. These were summarized in the BBM case as: 1) the presence of a national regulatory scheme; 2) the oversight of a regulatory agency; 3) a concern with trade in general, rather than with an aspect of a particular business; 4) the provinces jointly and severally would be constitutionally incapable of passing such an enactment; and 5) the failure to include one or more provinces or localities would jeopardize successful operation in other parts of the country.
With respect to section 31.1, four of the five indicia are present. The only difference between the legislation upheld in the Canadian National Transportation and BBM cases, and that in section 31.1, is with respect to the oversight of the regulatory agency, which here is less complete in that it is supplemented by the initiatory rights of private complainants.
Section 31.1 relates "strictly" to a subject of legislation expressly enumerated in section 91 (as opposed to "necessarily incidental" to effective legislation). However, even if its validity had to be assessed on the basis of whether it was "necessarily incidental" legislation, the necessity of means depends upon the character of the ends to which they are directed. The domain of trade and commerce is not fixed. What is necessary in the light of an interventionist conception of the economy will be different from what is deemed necessary in relation to a free market conception. The necessity of the means is relative to the end sought. The necessity is well expressed as a "rational functional
connection" in Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon et al., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161.
A civil remedy must be genuinely and bona fide integral with the overall plan of supervision. The precise balance of govern mental regulation and private enforcement is a matter of policy for Parliament. Within the reasonable limits indicated, Parlia ment must be free to adopt and even to experiment with various approaches to the regulation of the economy.
Paragraph 31.1(1)(a) is thus within the jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada as having a rational, functional connec tion with the overall federal economic plan manifested in the Act in relation to competition, which plan also satisfies all the criteria of validity under the federal trade and commerce power.
Since the cause of action provided for by section 31.1 consti tutes existing and applicable federal law which can be invoked to support proceedings before the Court, subsection 31.1(3) is valid.
The Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the part of the plaintiffs claim relating to article 1053 of the Civil Code.
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
APPLIED:
Attorney General of Canada v. Canadian National Transportation, Ltd. et al., [1983] 2 S.C.R. 206; Attor- ney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for British Columbia, [1930] A.C. 111 (P.C.); Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon et al., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161; McNamara Construction (Western) Ltd. et al. v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 654; Quebec North Shore Paper Co. et al. v. Canadian Pacific Limited et al., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054.
DISTINGUISHED:
MacDonald et al. v. Vapor Canada Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134; Labatt Breweries of Canada Ltd. v. Attorney Gener al of Canada, [ 1980] 1 S.C.R. 914; R. v. Zelensky, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 940.
CONSIDERED:
Henuset Bros. Ltd. v. Syncrude Canada Ltd. et al. (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 300 (Alta. Q.B.); City National Leasing Ltd. v. General Motors of Canada Ltd. (1984), 47 O.R. (2d) 653 (H.C.); R. v. Hoffman- LaRoche Ltd. (Nos. 1 & 2) (1981), 125 D.L.R. (3d) 607 (Ont. C.A.); BBM Bureau of Measurement v. Director of Investiga tion and Research, [1985] 1 F.C. 173; (1984), 52 N.R. 137 (C.A.); Citizens Insurance Company of Canada v. Parsons (1881), 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C.); Papp v. Papp, [1970] 1 O.R. 331 (C.A.).
REFERRED TO:
Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. Attorney-Gen eral for Canada, [1931] A.C. 310 (P.C.); Goodyear Tire
and Rubber Company of Canada Limited v. The Queen, [1956] S.C.R. 303; R. v. Campbell (Note) (1966), 58 D.L.R. (2d) 673 (S.C.C.); Re: Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373; Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney- General for Alberta, [1916] 1 A.C. 588 (P.C.); In re Board of Commerce Act, 1919, and Combines and Fair Prices Act, 1919, [1922] I A.C. 191 (P.C.); Nykorak v. The Attorney General of Canada, [1962] S.C.R. 331.
COUNSEL:
Gaspard Côté, Q.C. for appellant.
Gérald Tremblay and Jean-Pierre Bel - humeur for respondents Dominion Ready Mix Inc., Jean Desjardins and Marc Crépin.
Henri-Louis Fortin for respondents Québec Ready Mix Inc., Lévis Ready Mix Inc., Pierre Viger, Verreault Frontenac Ready Mix Inc., Claude Ferland, Michel Bérubé and Pierre
Legault.
Normand Gagnon for mise-en-cause Rocois Construction Inc.
Jean-François Jobin for mis -en-cause Attor ney General of the Province of Quebec.
SOLICITORS:
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for appellant.
Stikeman, Elliott, Tamaki, Mercier & Robb, Montreal, for respondents Dominion Ready Mix Inc., Jean Desjardins and Marc Crépin.
Stein, Monast, Pratte & Marseille, Quebec City, for respondents Québec Ready Mix Inc., Lévis Ready Mix Inc., Pierre Viger, Verreault Frontenac Ready Mix Inc., Claude Ferland, Michel Bérubé and Pierre Legault.
Gaudreau & St-Cyr, Quebec City, for mise- en-cause Rocois Construction Inc.
Boissonneault, Roy & Poulin, Montreal, for mis -en-cause Attorney General of the Prov ince of Quebec.
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
PRATTE J.: I agree with Mr. Justice Mac- Guigan. I only wish to add a few observations showing that the same result could, in my opinion, be reached through a shorter route.
Since the judgment in BBM Bureau of Meas urement v. Director of Investigation and Research,' where this Court adopted the opinion expressed by Mr. Justice Dickson (as he then was), Mr. Justice Beetz and Mr. Justice Lamer in Attorney General of Canada v. Canadian National Transportation, Ltd. et al., 2 I consider it to be established, at least in so far as this Court is concerned, that the prohibitions contained in sub section 32(1) of the Combines Investigation Act [R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23 (as am. by S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 76, s. 14)] were validly enacted by Parliament in the exercise of its power to regulate trade and commerce under subsection 91(2) of the Constitu tion Act, 1867 [30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.) [R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II, No. 5] (as am. by Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), Schedule to the Consti tution Act, 1982, Item 1)].
Thus, the only real problem raised by this appeal is whether Parliament had the power to enact subsection 31.1(1) [as enacted by S.C. 1974- 75-76, c. 76, s. 12] of the Combines Investigation Act, a provision which obliges persons who violated the prohibitions contained in subsection 32(1) to compensate those to whom that violation caused prejudice. I do not have any difficulty in answering that question. In my opinion, when the Constitu tion gives Parliament the power to enact a prohibi tion it impliedly also gives it, as a rule, the power to determine the consequences of the violation of that prohibition, whether those consequences be of a civil or penal nature. That principle, which appears to me to have been applied by the Supreme Court in . Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon et al.,' obviously has no application when a legislative power is conferred in terms such as to exclude its application. Thus, the power conferred on Parliament by subsection 91(27) to legislate with respect to criminal law does not include the power to regulate the civil conse quences of criminal acts 4 because, by definition, criminal law does not include that kind of regula tions. However, the power to regulate trade and
[1985] 1 F.C. 173; (1984), 52 N.R. 137 (C.A.).
2 [1983] 2 S.C.R. 206.
3 [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161, at pp. 182 and 183.
° Except inasmuch as those consequences are considered as
part of the sentences to be imposed.
commerce granted to Parliament by subsection 91(2) is not subject to the same limitation.
The two decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada that the respondents most frequently invoked in argument, namely, R. v. Zelensky, 5 and MacDonald et al. v. Vapor Canada Ltd., 6 have, in my view, no application here. What was in ques tion in Zelensky was the power of Parliament to determine the civil effects of criminal offences. As I have already said, the limits that circumscribe the criminal law power do not apply to the "trade and commerce" power. In the other case, Mac- Donald et al. v. Vapor Canada Ltd., the Supreme Court held that the prohibition contained in para graph 7(e) of the Trade Marks Act [R.S.C. 1970, c. T-10] was unconstitutional; that decision is rele vant in discussing whether or not the prohibitions contained in subsection 32(1) of the Combine. Investigation Act were validly enacted; it has no pertinence in a discussion on the constitutionality of subsection 31.1(1) of the same Act.
* * *
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
RYAN J.: I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment of Mr. Justice Pratte and Mr. Justice MacGuigan. I, too, would allow the appeal and set aside the judgment from which the appeal was taken. I would also answer the two questions in the way suggested by Mr. Justice MacGuigan. I agree there should be no order as to costs. I will state as concisely as h can my reasons for concurring.
This action was brought in the Trial Division of the Federal Court by the plaintiff, Rocois Con struction Inc., claiming damages allegedly caused it by an agreement to which the defendants were parties, an agreement allegedly prohibited by sec tion 32 of the Combines Investigation Act ("the Act"), and more particularly by paragraph 32(1)(c). The statement of claim in. the action also asserts a claim under the Quebec civil law. Two preliminary questions were set down for argument in the Trial Division, both of which were answered
5 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 940.
6 [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134.
in the negative. The learned Trial Judge held that paragraph 31.1(1) (a) of the Act, authorizing the bringing of a civil action to recover damages caused by conduct proscribed by Part V of the Act, and subsection 31.1(3), conferring jurisdic tion on the Federal Court to entertain such an action, are unconstitutional, and that, therefore, the Federal Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this action. I agree with Mr. Justice MacGuigan that the central issue is whether Parliament has constitutional jurisdiction, under its power to legis late in relation to the regulation of trade and commerce, to provide a civil right of action to a person claiming to have been damaged by conduct constituting an offence under Part V of the Act, and more particularly conduct proscribed by sub section 32(1) of the Act.
Mr. Justice MacGuigan has quoted the relevant provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867, including among others subsections 91(2), 92(13) and (16), and the relevant sections of the Act, including section 31.1 and subsection 32(1). He has also analyzed leading cases, particularly more modern cases, on the trade and commerce clause. I will try to avoid repetition.
In Attorney General of Canada v. Canadian National Transportation, Ltd. et al., [1983] 2 S.C.R. 206, the right of the Attorney General of Canada to prosecute an alleged offence under subsection 32(1) of the Combines Investigation Act was challenged. The majority of the Court held that the Attorney General has power to prose cute even assuming that the, Act, for constitutional purposes, rests solely on the criminal law power conferred by subsection 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Mr. Justice Dickson (as he then was) agreed in the result, but based his agreement on his holding that the Act also has a constitutional basis in subsection 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the power of Parliament to legislate in rela tion to the regulation of trade and commerce. Mr. Justice Beetz and Mr. Justice Lamer agreed in substance with this holding.
This Court, in BBM Bureau of Measurement v. Director of Investigation and Research, [1985] 1 F.C. 173; (1984), 52 N.R. 137 (C.A.), a case involving the constitutional validity of section 31.4 (the "tied selling" provision) of the Act, held that the section is valid by virtue of the power of Parliament to legislate in relation to the regulation of trade and commerce. Mr. Justice Urie, speaking for the Court, applied the tests that were applied by Mr. Justice Dickson in the Canadian National Transportation case. As I read Mr. Justice Urie's reasons, they would not only support the holding that section 31.4 of the Act is constitutionally based on subsection 91(2), but would also support a holding that paragraph 32(1)(c) has a constitu tional foundation in subsection 91(2) of the Con stitution Act, 1867. I do not, at any rate, hesitate so to hold; I would, with respect, follow Mr. Justice Dickson's reasons in Canadian National Transportation.
I recognize that subsection 31.1(1) of the Act was not directly involved in either Canadian Na tional Transportation or in BBM Bureau of Measurement. The question whether Parliament can give a civil remedy for damage caused by conduct in breach of a statutory provision validly enacted under section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, was, however, raised and resolved in Multi ple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon et al., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161. In that case there was an issue wheth er sections 100.4 and 100.5 of the Canada Corpo rations Act [R.S.C. 1970, c. C-32 (as am. by R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 10, s. 7)] are constitu tionally valid. These sections have as their purpose the protection of companies and shareholders against injurious insider practices. Subsection 100.4(1) makes insiders of a company liable to compensate a person for direct loss suffered as a result of a transaction relating to the securities of the company where the insider makes use of confi dential information in connection with the transac tion. The subsection also makes the insider accountable to the company for any direct benefit he may have received as a result of the transaction. Section 100.5 provides a procedure for causing an
action to be brought by the Director of the Corpo rations Branch where there are reasonable grounds for believing that a company has a cause of action under section 100.4, but has refused or failed to commence an action or has failed to prosecute diligently an action it has commenced.
Mr. Justice Dickson (as he then was) held, for a majority of the Court, that sections 100.4 and 100.5 are valid by virtue of the authority of Parlia ment to legislate, under the opening words of section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, for the peace, order and good government of Canada. He examined the sections in their context within Part I of the statute. He held that the sections are valid as legislation in relation to companies with other than provincial objects. He described them as "company law". He said (at page 176): "They fit properly and comfortably into Part I of the Canada Corporations Act.... Their enactment by Parliament is in the discharge of its company law power."
Mr. Justice Dickson referred in his reasons to a submission that Parliament could not constitution ally enact section 100.4 because it confers a civil cause of action and thus would fall within exclu sive provincial jurisdiction. He said at pages 182 and 183:
One reservation with respect to the impugned sections of the federal act may be in the imposition of civil liability in s. 100.4(1). Does this imposition of civil liability in a federal statute so invade the provincial domain as to render the sections imposing liability ultra vires? This, in essence, was the argu ment of the appellants. But as Professors Anisman and Hogg point out: "Judicial decisions concerning a number of disparate matters such as federal elections, railways, federal corporations and even divorce have upheld Parliament's jurisdiction to pro vide civil relief in order to effectuate its legislative policies" ("Constitutional Aspects of Federal Securities Legislation" in Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada (1979), vol. 3, chap. III, at p. 192). In my opinion, ss. 100.4 and 100.5 have a general corporate purpose and a "rational, functional connec tion" with company law. The sections in my view are intra vires the Parliament of Canada.
The civil remedy provided by section 31.1 of the Act has in my view "a rational, functional connec-
tion" with subsection 32(1). These two statutory provisions are linked by the express reference in section 31.1 to Part V. And the civil remedy made available by section 31.1 to persons injured by conduct proscribed by subsection 32(1) would pro vide a motive for avoiding the prohibited conduct, a motive in addition to that provided by the pre scribed penalty. It would also provide a means of redressing at least some of the harmful conse quences resulting from the proscribed conduct. This link between the remedial section 31.1 and the substantive subsection 32(1), the subsection describing the prohibited conduct, is in my opinion enough to warrant concluding that section 31.1 is at the very least incidental to the regulation of trade and commerce. Given the nature of the remedy provided by section 31.1, problems might, I suppose, have arisen had constitutionality been based solely on the criminal law power: see R. v. Zelensky, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 940. Limitations that might have resulted from a criminal law base are not present, however, where, as here, there is a constitutional base in subsection 91(2).
I would add that in Papp v. Papp, [1970] 1 O.R. 331 (C.A.), it was held that custody provisions of the Divorce Act [R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8] were validly enacted under subsection 91(26) of the Constitu tion Act, 1867. Mr. Justice Laskin (as he then was), speaking as a member of the Ontario Court of Appeal, said at pages 335 and 336:
The Constitution is a working instrument addressed to legisla tive bodies, and its implementation in legislation must be seen as a social assessment by the enacting body of the scope of the power which is invoked in any particular case. Where there is admitted competence, as there is here, to legislate to a certain point, the question of limits (where that point is passed) is best answered by asking whether there is a rational, functional connection between what is admittedly good and what is challenged.
I have stated my view (a view in accordance with the decision of this Court in BBM Bureau of Measurement) that subsection 32(1) of the Com bines Investigation Act is constitutionally valid
under subsection 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and I have also concluded that there is a rational and functional link between subsection 32(1) and section 31.1. My conclusion that section 31.1 is constitutionally valid thus finds support in the quotation from Mr. Justice Laskin's judgment, as I read the quotation.
I would also add this. I have stated that section 31.1 of the Act can be considered as being at the very least incidental to the regulation of trade and commerce because of the rational and functional link between section 31.1 and subsection 32(1). It would, however, really be more appropriate, in view of this link, to characterize section 31.1 as legislation coming "squarely under" subsection 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867, as legislation directly related to the regulation of trade and commerce: see Mr. Justice Judson in Nykorak v. The Attorney General of Canada, [1962] S.C.R. 331, at page 335.
I would observe more generally that even were it necessary to seek a broader base than the link between section 31.1 and subsection 32(1) of the Act in support of a holding that section 31.1 is constitutionally valid, it would seem to me that such a base could well be found in the circum stance that, to adopt Mr. Justice Dickson's words in Multiple Access, section 31.1 fits comfortably within what is an elaborate legislative scheme established by the Act, a scheme including penal sanctions, administrative processes, and civil reme dies, the purpose of which is "general regulation of trade affecting the whole dominion": see Citizens Insurance Company of Canada v. Parsons (1881), 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C.), at page 113. As I see it, section 31.1 is an integral part of a "trade regula tion" statute: the section is federal "trade regula tion" law in much the same way as sections 100.4 and 100.5 of the Canada Corporations Act [R.S.C. 1970, c. C-32 (as am. by R.S.C. (1st Supp.), c. 10, s. 7)] are federal "company law".
I may say that I agree with Mr. Justice Pratte and Mr. Justice MacGuigan that the present case is distinguishable from MacDonald et al. v. Vapor Canada Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134. Paragraph 7(e) of the Trade Marks Act, the statutory provision at issue in Vapor, was held to be an isolated provision lacking any rational or functional link to provi sions of that Act relating to trade marks or their regulation.
I stated at the outset that I agree that the "second question", the question concerning the jurisdiction of the Federal Court under subsection 31.1(3) of the Act, should be answered as Mr. Justice MacGuigan proposes: I adopt his reasons for answering the question in this way.
* * *
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
MACGUIGAN J.: The principal question for decision in this case is whether the Parliament of Canada has the constitutional power under its jurisdiction respecting the regulation of trade and commerce to give a civil right of action to a person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of an offence in relation to competition.
I
This is a long-delayed appeal from a preliminary ruling of the Trial Division on December 4, 1979, holding paragraph 31.1(1)(a) and subsection 31.1(3) of the Combines Investigation Act ("the Act") ultra vires the federal Parliament: reported as Rocois Construction Inc. v. Quebec Ready Mix Inc., [ 1980] 1 F.C. 184. The action brought by the plaintiff, Rocois Construction Inc., was a claim for damages resulting from an agreement which the defendants concluded among themselves in breach of prohibitions contained in the Act. The exact terms of the questions before the Trial Division on the preliminary ruling were as follows (supra, at page 186):
1. the constitutionality of paragraph 31.1(1)(a) and subsec tion 31.1(3) of the Combines Investigation Act, (R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, as amended; and
2. the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to hear the claim of plaintiff-respondent.
The legislation in question is as follows:
31.1 (I) Any person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of
(a) conduct that is contrary to any provision of Part V, or
(b) the failure of any person to comply with an order of the Commission or a court under this Act,
may, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue for and recover from the person who engaged in the conduct or failed to comply with the order an amount equal to the loss or damage proved to have been suffered by him, together with any additional amount that the court may allow not exceeding the full cost to him of any investigation in connection with the matter and of proceedings under this section.
(2) In any action under subsection (1) against a person, the record of proceedings in any court in which that person was convicted of an offence under Part V or convicted of or punished for failure to comply with an order of the Commission or a court under this Act is, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, proof that the person against whom the action is brought engaged in conduct that was contrary to a provision of Part V or failed to comply with an order of the Commission or a court under this Act, as the case may be, and any evidence given in those proceedings as to the effect of such acts or omissions on the person bringing the action is evidence thereof in the action.
(3) For the purposes of any action under subsection (1), the Federal Court of Canada is a court of competent jurisdiction.
(4) No action may be brought under subsection (1),
(a) in the case of an action based on conduct that is contrary to any provision of Part V, after two years from
(i) a day on which the conduct was engaged in, or
(ii) the day on which any criminal proceedings relating thereto were finally disposed of,
whichever is the later; and
(b) in the case of an action based on the failure of any person to comply with an order of the Commission or a court, after two years from
(i) a day on which the order of the Commission or court was violated, or
(ii) the day on which any criminal proceedings relating thereto were finally disposed of,
whichever is the later.
This section gives any person who has suffered injury as a result of the commission of an act proscribed by Part V the right to institute, independently of any criminal proceedings, an action in the Federal Court for compensation against the perpetrators of any such act. Part V is entitled "Offences in Relation to Competition" and creates as offences such actions as: conspiracy or combination to lessen unduly competition in certain respects; bid-rigging; conspiracy relating to professional sport; the creation of monopolies; dis criminatory sales; misleading advertising; double ticketing; pyramid selling; referral selling; selling at bargain prices without having enough items to sell; selling above the advertised price; certain practices in promotional contests. Subsection 32(1) deals specifically with acts of the kind with which the defendants were charged:
32. (1) Every one who conspires, combines, agrees or arranges with another person
(a) to limit unduly the facilities for transporting, producing, manufacturing, supplying, storing or dealing in any product,
(b) to prevent, limit or lessen, unduly, the manufacture or production of a product, or to enhance unreasonably the price thereof,
(c) to prevent, or lessen, unduly, competition in the produc tion, manufacture, purchase, barter, sale, storage, rental, transportation or supply of a product, or in the price of insurance upon persons or property,
(d) to otherwise restrain or injure competition unduly,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for five years or a fine of one million dollars or to both.
The Trial Judge's answers to the questions were as follows (supra, at page 211):
To the first question, I would answer no. Paragraph 31.1(1)(a) and subsection 31.1(3) of the Combines Investiga tion Act are not valid because they are ultra vires the powers of Parliament.
Consequently, I would also answer no to the second question. Subsection 31.1(3) being devoid of effect, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim made by the action instituted.
I do not dispose of the action itself and make no ruling as to costs, since no request was submitted in that regard.
Before the Trial Division the exercise of federal legislative power in paragraph 31.1(1)(a) was defended on the basis of the general power in section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Canada, and also on the basis of the trade and commerce power (91(2)) and the criminal law power (91(27)). This claim for federal jurisdiction was resisted on the basis of the provincial powers in subsections 92(13) and 92(16). These provisions of the 1867 Act are as follows:
91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next herein-after enumerated; that is to say,-
2. The Regulation of Trade and Commerce.
27. The Criminal Law, except the Constitution of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Crimi nal Matters.
And any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this Section shall not be deemed to come within the Class of Matters of a local or private Nature comprised in the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces.
92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next herein-after enumerated; that is to say,-
13. Property and Civil Rights in the Province.
16. Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province.
Before this Court counsel for the appellant, the Attorney General of Canada, who was an interven- or before the Trial Division, although not aban doning his other arguments under section 91, addressed his oral argument entirely to federal jurisdiction based on the regulation of trade and commerce, and it was understood by the parties that that was the only basis on which the matter would be decided by this Court.
II
In its origin (1889) [An Act for the Prevention and Suppression of Combinations formed in restraint of Trade, 1889 S.C., c. 41] Canadian anti-combines legislation was criminal law pure and simple, and in fact in 1892 it was incorporated into the Criminal Code [The Criminal Code, 1892, 1892 S.C., c. 29], where it wholly remained until 1910. Since 1910 it has existed as distinctive legis lation in the Combines Investigation Act but it nevertheless was upheld by the Privy Council as criminal legislation: Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1931] A.C. 310 (P.C.). Various additions to fed eral anti-combines law were subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada as criminal legislation: Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company of Canada Limited v. The Queen, [ 1956] S.C.R. 303; R. v. Campbell (Note) (1966), 58 D.L.R. (2d) 673 (S.C.C.). Over the years, however, there has been increasing support for a decriminalization of anti-combines legislation so as to permit more selective prohibition of undesirable business activi ties. This led the Government to request a study by the Economic Council of Canada, which in its 1969 Interim Report on Competition Policy (Ottawa, The Queen's Printer) recommended a competition policy supportive of competitive market forces. Its view of the fundamental purpose of competition policy was set out in a passage that I read as both descriptive and prescriptive (at pages 8-9):
The institution and maintenance of a competition policy such as presently exists in Canada may be taken to reflect a belief that, over the greater part of the economy, competitive market forces are potentially capable of allocating resources better and more cheaply, with a less cumbersome administrative overhead, than any alternative arrangement such as wholesale public owner ship and control, detailed governmental regulation of enter prise, or self-regulation by large industrial units within a corporate state.. ..Thus the market does the job, and the government's main responsibility, so far as efficiency in resource allocation is concerned, is to see that the market is free to do the best job of which it is capable. Competition is relied on as the prime mechanism of social control ....
On this basis the Council recommended (at pages 195-196):
To put at least some flesh on the bones of these principles, we have recommended that an important part of Canada's compe tition policy legislation be on a civil rather than a criminal base, and that a specialized tribunal be created. Uppermost in our minds in suggesting these changes is the view that certain features of criminal law and procedure, such as the onus of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the handling of charges by ordinary courts in ways that do not permit a full exploration of economic facts and analyses, are ill-suited to the effective treatment of some situations and practices relevant for competi tion policy. For this reason, it is suggested that only five business practices should continue to be regarded as criminal offences, and that the language of the statute invest the defini tion of these offences with a greater degree of certainty and fair warning than is now the case. For the rest, we have made the assumption that it would prove constitutionally possible for the federal government to establish a civil tribunal, perhaps under the power to regulate trade and commerce. This tribunal would address itself to mergers, business practices and export and specialization agreements. Unlike the five instances where criminal law still appears to be a valid approach, most of the practices to be referred to the tribunal are capable in some circumstances of working to the public advantage, but the distinction between likely good and bad effects may require a difficult weighing of relevant economic circumstances and probabilities, and therefore a kind of expertise that only a body of mixed professional disciplines could provide. The tribunal would be armed with injunctive remedies, with the power to recommend other remedies, and with a power of general inquiry.
It is somewhat unfortunate that, despite an invi tation to him to do so, counsel for the appellant took no pains, on the model of the extrinsic ma terial accepted in Re: Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, to bring to the Court's attention the "evil" to which the extensive 1975 amendments to the Combines Investigation Act were directed, but we can take judicial notice of the fact that the 1975 amendments were made in the general after math of the Economic Council report. These amendments added to the statute a new civil juris diction, making use principally of the existing Restrictive Trade Practices Commission ("RTPC" or "the Commission") equipped with a new quasi- judicial function. Moreover, by section 31.1 the civil remedy newly available to an injured person is not limited to cases where there has been a convic tion for an offence under Part V of the Act. By subsection (2) a conviction is prima facie proof
that conduct contrary to the provisions of Part V has taken place, but civil actions under subsection (1) are not limited to situations of proved liability under Part V. The civil remedy under subsection 31.1(1) does not depend upon the previous invoca tion of Part V or on any action by the RTPC. It is a power of self-help, which is argued by the respondents to exist independently of the federal regulatory scheme—and by the appellant that such self-help is itself an integral part of the federal regulatory plan.
In the six years since the decision by the Trial Division there has been a considerable develop ment of the law. First of all, the identical issue has been litigated in two other cases. In Henuset Bros. Ltd. v. Syncrude Canada Ltd. et al. (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 300 (Alta. Q.B.), at page 308, Row- botham J. held as follows: 7
When s. 31.1 is read in context with the other provisions of the Combines Investigation Act, as amended, it forms an integral part of an overall legislative and regulatory scheme or tapestry for the general regulation of trade and commerce throughout Canada, and, although it affects to some degree property and civil rights in the Provinces, it is within the legislative competence of the Parliament of Canada pursuant to s. 91(2) of the British North America Act, 1867.
In City National Leasing Ltd. v. General Motors of Canada Ltd. (1984), 47 O.R. (2d) 653 (H.C.), at page 662, however, Rosenberg J. in Ontario held the contrary:
It is clear that s. 31.1 is not part of the complex scheme set up by the Act. It is not dependent on any finding by the Director or the Commission. For some 75 years the Act oper ated without such a provision. It cannot be justified as a necessary part of an administrative scheme set up by the Act.
7 The hearing in Henuset took place September 4-7, 1979, a month before that in the Trial Division in this case, but the decision was not given for six months after the decision in the present case. Apparently, the Alberta Court did not have the Federal Court decision drawn to its attention during this lengthy period.
The only possible justification for s. 31.1 is as legislation "necessarily incidental" or "truly ancillary" to other provisions in the Act or the regulation of trade and commerce.
In Regional Municipality of Peel v. MacKenzie et al., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 9, 139 D.L.R. (3d) 14, 42 N.R. 572 (S.C.C.), Mr. Justice Martland was dealing with s. 20(2) of the Juvenile Delinquents Act. The section provided that upon finding that the child was a juvenile delinquent, the judge can order the child to be placed in a particular situation or foster home and the section provided that the judge could determine who is to pay for support. The statute itself had been held valid many years before and it was argued that s. 20(2) was necessarily incidental because the judge hearing the case had to be sure that if he ordered the juvenile delinquent into a group home the costs would be paid. Mr. Justice Martland said at p. 22 S.C.R., pp. 24-5 D.L.R., p. 585 N.R.:
This is not legislation in relation to criminal law or criminal procedure, and it was not truly necessary for the effective exercise of Parliament's legislative authority in these fields
. It could not be justified in the absence of a direct link with federal legislative power under s. 91(27). There is no direct link between the municipality "to which the child belongs" and the issue of the child's criminality. The obliga tion sought to be imposed on the municipality arises only after the criminal proceedings have been completed and sentence has been imposed. (Emphasis added.)
I am of the view that the Peel v. MacKenzie case applies to the case at bar. The right of a private individual to sue is not truly necessary for the Combines Investigation Act to be effec tive. Section 31.1 is accordingly ultra vires the Parliament of Canada.
We were informed that this case is presently under appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal.
In R. v. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. (Nos. I & 2) (1981), 125 D.L.R. (3d) 607, at page 649 the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a conviction for substantially lessening competition under para graph 34(1)(c) of the Combines Investigation Act. In the words of Martin J.A. for the Court:
... it is not material to the constitutional question here raised that a particular offence created by the enactment may proper ly be characterized as criminal law, or could have been enacted under the criminal law power. The learned trial Judge conclud ed, rightly in my view, that the Combines Investigation Act could also be supported under the trade and commerce power
as well as under s. 91(27). He said (at pp. 191-2 O.R., pp. 28-9 C.C.C., pp. 32-3 D.L.R., p. 175 C.P.R.):
... I am of the view that s. 34(1)(c) can also be constitution ally supported on the basis of s. 91(2). It is part of a legislative scheme aimed at deterring a wide range of unfair competitive practices that affect trade and commerce gener ally across Canada, and is not limited to a single industry, commodity or area. The conduct being prohibited is general ly of national and of international scope. The presence or absence of healthy competition may affect the welfare of the economy of the entire nation. It is, therefore, within the sphere of the federal Parliament to seek to regulate such competition in the interest of all Canadians. (It would likely be otherwise, however, if the competition being regulated was merely of a local nature, in which case, the matter might not fall within the federal trade and commerce power.)
In Attorney General of Canada v. Canadian National Transportation, Ltd. et al., [1983] 2 S.C.R. 206, at pages 277-278, Dickson J. (as he then was) in a concurring judgment upheld para graph 32(1)(c) of the Combines Investigation Act as valid federal legislation under both the criminal law power and the trade and commerce power, and in the course of his reasons for judgment reflected adversely on the concern of the Trial Judge in the present case that this kind of interpretation of the trade and commerce power might erode the local autonomy in economic regulation contemplated by the Constitution. (This is a point to which I shall return). Beetz and Lamer JJ. agreed with Dickson J. that the legislation was validly enacted under subsection 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
Finally, in BBM Bureau of Measurement v. Director of Investigation and Research, [1985] 1 F.C. 173; (1984), 52 N.R. 137 (C.A.), this Court upheld section 31.4 of the Act dealing with tied selling. Urie J. wrote for the Court (at pages 188-189 F.C.; at page 147 N.R.):
I am of the opinion that section 31.4 meets all of the criteria above referred to and is, without more, valid federal legislation under subsection 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Read in context with the other provisions of the Act, it is clearly part of
a complex regulatory scheme, not aimed at a particular busi ness or industry but at the general regulation of trade and commerce throughout Canada for the benefit of Canadians in general. Inevitably individual businesses will be affected and touched by its application. But, if that were to be determinative of its validity and meant that it was invalid the obvious necessity for its existence for the betterment of Canadians generally would be meaningless—it would be a toothless tiger. By the same token, its valid existence does not encroach upon the authority of the provinces to enact legislation (as many have done) to regulate the business practices of those very businesses, for the protection of the citizens of those provinces as matters of property and civil rights. The authority provided by subsection 91(2) and by subsection 92(13) are, as I see them in this context, complementary. One does not erode the other. Resort may be had to each for the purpose of ensuring that (a) competition remains fair and keeps open for buyers throughout the county adequate, real options, on the one hand, and (b) on the other, that those buyers are protected from sharp, unethical business practices in their dealings with individual businesses or industries.
In all of the recent decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada on the trade and commerce power it appears to be common ground that the starting point for analysis is Citizens Insurance Company of Canada v. Parsons (1881), 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C.) and that the authority of such Privy Council decisions written by Viscount Haldane as the Insurance Reference case of 1916, Attorney- General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Alberta, [ 1916] 1 A.C. 588 (P.C.), and In re Board of Commerce Act, 1919, and Combines and Fair Prices Act, 1919, [1922] 1 A.C. 191 (P.C.)
has been greatly diminished. Laskin C.J. says plainly in MacDonald et al. v. Vapor Canada Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134, at page 163 that the trunca tion of the federal trade and commerce power "was arrested" in Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. Attorney-General for Canada, supra, and Estey J. in Labatt Breweries of Canada Ltd. v. Attorney General of Canada, [ 1980] 1 S.C.R. 914, at page 942 says that "the trade and commerce power has been rescued from near oblivion". I propose generally to rely, therefore, on the recent decisions of the Supreme Court in the belief that what remains relevant of the Haldane approach is incorporated in them. Nevertheless, the words of Sir Montague Smith in the Citizens Insurance case (supra, at page 113) provide what Laskin C.J. referred to in Vapor Canada (supra, at page 164) as "the guide or lead to the issue of validity". For this reason those words remain important:
Construing therefore the words "regulation of trade and commerce" by the various aids to their interpretation above suggested, they would include political arrangements in regard to trade requiring the sanction of parliament, regulation of trade in matters of inter-provincial concern, and it may be that they would include general regulation of trade affecting the whole dominion. Their Lordships abstain on the present occa sion from any attempt to define the limits of the authority of the dominion parliament in this direction. It is enough for the decision of the present case to say that, in their view, its authority to legislate for the regulation of trade and commerce does not comprehend the power to regulate by legislation the contracts of a particular business or trade, such as the business of fire insurance in a single province, and therefore that its legislative authority does not in the present case conflict or compete with the power over property and civil rights assigned to the legislature of Ontario by No. 13 of sect. 92. [Emphasis added.]
The emphasized words are often referred to as the "second branch" of the Citizens Insurance descrip tion of trade and commerce.
III
Parliament possesses no explicit power to establish civil remedies like its jurisdiction to create crimi nal offences under subsection 91(27). If not assimilated in some way to the general power over peace, order and good government, such a legisla tive exercise as that under consideration is defen sible only on the basis of another head of federal power. In this instance the appellant urges subsec tion 91(2), the trade and commerce power, as the source of constitutional jurisdiction.
All of the respondents nevertheless strongly pressed on us a criminal law analogy, that is, that even a civil remedy based on another head of power must be subject to the limitations on civil remedies within the criminal process, as defined by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Zelensky, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 940 in particular. In the Zelensky
case a compensation order in favour of the accused's employer under section 653 of the Criminal Code [R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34] was upheld on a 6-3 division of the Court.
It was contended before us that the reasons for judgment of the majority in Zelensky, as expressed by Laskin C.J., restricted valid civil remedies to those which are "part of the sen tencing process" (at page 960) and that the Chief Justice specifically warned that "It would be wrong ... to relax in any way the requirement that the application for compensation be directly associated with the sentence imposed as the public reprobation of the offence" (ibid.).
It was argued before us that a similar point of view emerges from the Supreme Court decision in the Vapor Canada case, unanimously rejecting a civil remedy provided for by the Trade Marks Act [R.S.C. 1970, c. T-10], as most clearly expressed by Laskin C.J. (at pages 145-146):
Assuming that s. 7(e) (as, indeed, the other subparagraphs of s. 7) proscribe anti-social business practices, and are thus enforceable under the general criminal sanction of s. 115 of the Criminal Code respecting disobedience of a federal statute, the attempt to mount the civil remedy of s. 53 of the Trade Marks Act on the back of the Criminal Code proves too much, certainly in this case. The principle which would arise from such a result would provide an easy passage to valid federal legislation to provide and govern civil relief in respect of numerous sections of the Criminal Code and would, in the light of the wide scope of the federal criminal law power, debilitate provincial legislative authority and the jurisdiction of provincial Courts so as to transform our constitutional arrangements on legislative power beyond recognition. It is surely unnecessary to go into detail on such an extravagant posture. This Court's judgment in Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. of Canada Ltd. v. The Queen, upholding the validity of federal legislation author izing the issue of prohibitory order in connection with a convic tion of a combines offence, illustrates the preventive side of the federal criminal law power to make a conviction effective. It introduced a supporting sanction in connection with the pros ecution of an offence. It does not, in any way, give any encouragement to federal legislation which, in a situation unrelated to any criminal proceedings, would authorize independent civil proceedings for damages and an injunction.
I point out also that s. 115 of the Criminal Code is, so to speak, a "default" provision, coming alive when no "penalty or punishment" is expressly provided, and I cannot subscribe to the proposition that s. 115 can be a base upon which to support
the validity, under the federal criminal law power, of a com pletely independent civil remedy, which lies only at the behest of private parties claiming some private injury.
Even if I accept the interpretation of the crimi nal law power urged by the respondents, I cannot see that its effect goes further than to establish that the kind of civil remedy given by paragraph 31.1(1)(a) of the Act could not be supported on the basis of federal criminal jurisdiction. There is no reason to accept a criminal law interpretation of the independent trade and commerce power.
Such an interpretation is, I believe, based on the primary contention of all the respondents in their memoranda, viz., that the civil remedy authorized by the Act is a civil right which falls under exclu sive provincial competence through subsections 92(13) and 92(16). The contention is, in other words, that this exclusivity is based on the priority of section 92 of the 1867 Act over section 91.
That this is the wrong way around when it is a question of an enumerated power in section 91 was established by the Privy Council even in its period of restrictive interpretation of federal powers, as the classic words of Lord Tomlin in the Fish Canneries case, Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for British Columbia, [1930] A.C. 111 (P.C.), at page 118, make clear:
Questions of conflict between the jurisdiction of the Parlia ment of the Dominion and provincial jurisdiction have fre quently come before their Lordships' Board, and as the result of the decisions of the Board the following propositions may be stated:—
(1.) The legislation of the Parliament of the Dominion, so long as it strictly relates to subjects of legislation expressly enumerated in s. 91, is of paramount authority, even though it trenches upon matters assigned to the provincial legislatures by s. 92: see Tennant v. Union Bank of Canada ([1894] A.C. 31).
(2.) The general power of legislation conferred upon the Parliament of the Dominion by s. 91 of the Act in supplement of the power to legislate upon the subjects expressly enumer ated must be strictly confined to such matters as are unques tionably of national interest and importance, and must not trench on any of the subjects enumerated in s. 92 as within the scope of provincial legislation, unless these matters have attained such dimensions as to affect the body politic of the Dominion: see Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-Gen eral for the Dominion ([1896] A.C. 348).
(3.) It is within the competence of the Dominion Parliament to provide for matters which, though otherwise within the legislative competence of the provincial legislature, are neces sarily incidental to effective legislation by the Parliament of the Dominion upon a subject of legislation expressly enumerated in s. 91: see Attorney-General of Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominion ([1894] A.C. 189); and Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominion ([1896] A.C. 348).
(4.) There can be a domain in which provincial and Domin ion legislation may overlap, in which case neither legislation will be ultra vires if the field is clear, but if the field is not clear and the two legislations meet the Dominion legislation must prevail: see Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada v. Attorney-General of Canada ([1907] A.C. 65).
Of course, the question of what is "necessarily incidental" has been a fertile ground of litigation, as is indicated by the dissenting judgment of Pigeon J. in the Zelensky case (at pages 979-984):
As to the nature of the enactment, it obviously deals with a matter that is prima facie within provincial jurisdiction "satis- faction or compensation for loss of or damage to property". "Property and Civil Rights" is one of the most important heads of provincial jurisdiction enumerated in s. 92 of the B.N.A. Act....
Unlike practically every other procedural provision of the Criminal Code, the remedy contemplated in s. 653 has the characteristics of a civil remedy. It is available only "upon the application of a person aggrieved". It is not sanctioned by a penalty but it is "enforceable ... as ... a judgment rendered ... in civil proceedings". In short the substance of s. 653 is that it enables a person who has suffered loss of or damage to property by the commission of an indictable offence, to obtain from the court of criminal jurisdiction a civil judgment against the offender ....
I cannot find anything which would make it possible for me to consider subss. (1) and (2) of s. 653 of the Criminal Code as necessarily incidental to the full exercise by Parliament of its authority over criminal law and criminal procedure.
However, not only did this approach not commend itself to the majority of the Court, but Laskin C.J. expressly rejected the notion of the fixed domain of criminal jurisprudence, which could accommo date a fixed field of provincial competence (at page 951):
We cannot ... approach the validity of s. 653 as if the fields of criminal law and criminal procedure and the modes of sentenc ing have been frozen as of some particular time. New apprecia tions thrown up by new social conditions, or re-assessments of old appreciations which new or altered social conditions induce make it appropriate for this Court to re-examine courses of decision on the scope of legislative power when fresh issues are presented to it, always remembering, of course, that it is
entrusted with a very delicate role in maintaining the integrity of the constitutional limits imposed by the British North America Act.
It is also clear from the reasons for judgment of Dickson J. in the Canadian National Transporta tion case (supra), which I shall shortly turn to, that the trade and commerce power is not to be interpreted through the federal criminal law jurisdiction.
If there is a point of difficulty for the appellant in the Vapor Canada case, it is not the rejection of the federal argument under subsection 91(27) but rather the Court's unwillingness to ground federal jurisdiction on subsection 91(2) for reasons other than its lack of a tie-in to the criminal sentencing process. Laskin C.J. expressed his views on the application of the trade and commerce power this way (at pages 156, 164-165):
Overall, whether s. 7(e) be taken alone or, more properly, as part of a limited scheme reflected by s. 7 as a whole, the net result is that the Parliament of Canada has, by statute, either overlaid or extended known civil causes of action, cognizable in the provincial courts and reflecting issues falling within provin cial legislative competence. In the absence of any regulatory administration to oversee the prescriptions of s. 7 (and without coming to any conclusion on whether such an administration would in itself be either sufficient or necessary to effect a change in constitutional result), I cannot find any basis in federal power to sustain the unqualified validity of s. 7 as a whole or s. 7(e) taken alone. It is not a sufficient peg on which to support the legislation that it applies throughout Canada when there is nothing more to give it validity.
The plain fact is that s. 7(e) is not a regulation, nor is it concerned with trade as a whole nor with general trade and commerce. In a loose sense every legal prescription is regulato ry, even the prescriptions of the Criminal Code, but I do not read s. 91(2) as in itself authorizing federal legislation that merely creates a statutory tort, enforceable by private action, and applicable, as here, to the entire range of business relation ships in any activity, whether the activity be itself within or beyond federal legislative authority. If there have been cases which appeared to go too far in diminution of the federal trade and commerce power, an affirmative conclusion here would, in my opinion, go even farther in the opposite direction.
What is evident here is that the Parliament of Canada has simply extended or intensified existing common and civil law delictual liability by statute which at the same time has pre-
scribed the usual civil remedies open to an aggrieved person. The Parliament of Canada can no more acquire legislative jurisdiction by supplementing existing tort liability, cognizable in provincial Courts as reflective of provincial competence, than the provincial legislatures can acquire legislative jurisdiction by supplementing the federal criminal law: see Johnson v. Attor- ney-General of Alberta.
One looks in vain for any regulatory scheme in s. 7, let alone s. 7(e). Its enforcement is left to the chance of private redress without public monitoring by the continuing oversight of a regulatory agency which would at least lend some colour to the alleged national or Canada-wide sweep of s. 7(e). The provision is not directed to trade but to the ethical conduct of persons engaged in trade or in business, and, in my view, such a detached provision cannot survive alone unconnected to a gen eral regulatory scheme to govern trading relations going beyond merely local concern. Even on the footing of being concerned with practices in the conduct of trade, its private enforcement by civil action gives it a local cast because it is as applicable in its terms to local or intraprovincial competitors as it is to competitors in interprovincial trade.
Evidently, the impugned legislation failed because, despite its nation-wide application, it was a detached provision unconnected with any general regulatory scheme, and was considered to be directed not to trade at all but to the ethical conduct of persons engaged in trade or in business.
Since the result Vapor Canada was a negative one, and the Court did not find it necessary to reflect generally on justifying a civil remedy under the trade and commerce power beyond the point to which it was necessary for decision in that case, it would be hard to establish a general theory of the trade and commerce power based on Vapor Canada. There was a similar negative result in Labbatt Breweries of Canada Ltd. v. Attorney General of Canada, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 914, pub lished just after Trial judgment here, where a divided Court found ultra vires federal labelling provisions as to the alcoholic contents of "light beer". The principal judgment may fairly be said to be that of Estey J., who put the trade and commerce issue in the case this way (at pages 939, 943-944):
The impugned regulations in and under the Food and Drugs Act are not concerned with the control and guidance of the flow of articles of commerce through the distribution channels, but rather with the production and local sale of the specified products of the brewing industry. There is no demonstration by the proponent of these isolated provisions in the Food and Drugs Act and its regulations of any interprovincial aspect of this industry. The labels in the record reveal that the appellant produces these beverages in all provinces but Quebec and Prince Edward Island. From the nature of the beverage, it is apparent, without demonstration, that transportation to distant markets would be expensive, and hence the local nature of the production operation. This distinction between the flow of commerce, and production and local sale, if I may say so with respect, is pointedly made by Pigeon J. in Reference Re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, at p. 1293:
In my view, the control of production, whether agricultural or industrial, is prima facie a local matter, a matter of provincial jurisdiction. Egg farms, if I may use this expres sion to designate the kind of factories in which feed is converted into eggs and fowl, are local undertakings subject to provincial jurisdiction under section 92(10) B.N.A. Act...
and at p. 1296
"Marketing" does not include production and, therefore, provincial control of production is prima facie valid.
In the end, the effort of the respondent here is simply to build into these regulations a validity essentially founded upon the embryonic definition of the application of the trade and commerce heading in the Citizens Insurance case, supra. That observation and the subsequent references thereto are all predi cated upon the requirement that the purported trade and commerce legislation affected industry and commerce at large or in a sweeping, general sense. In the context of the Food and Drugs Acts, it follows that even if this statute were to cover a substantial portion of Canadian economic activity, one industry or trade at a time, by a varying array of regulations or trade codes applicable to each individual sector, there would not, in the result, be at law a regulation of trade and commerce in the sweeping general sense contemplated in the Citizens Insurance case, supra. That, in my view, is the heart and core of the problem confronting the respondent in this appeal. Thus the provisions regulating malt liquors relate either to a single industry or a sector thereof, while other regulations appear to concern themselves in a similar way with other individual industries; the former being condemned by the Citizens Insur ance case, supra, and the latter does not rescue the malt liquor regulations by reason of the Board of Commerce case, supra.
I conclude, therefore, in this part, that the impugned sections as they relate to malt liquors cannot be founded in the trade and commerce head of jurisdiction.
Clearly it was the lack of generality of the regula tion, resulting from the peculiarly local production for a local market, that determined the result for Estey J. and the three judges concurring with him. But, again, there is no larger delineation of the law which could serve as a sure guide in other cases.
Fortunately, we now have in the reasons for judgment of Dickson J. in the Canadian National Transportation case (supra), a fuller analysis than was hitherto available. This Court has already in the BBM case (supra) endorsed and applied the reasoning of Dickson J. in upholding the tied-sell ing provisions in section 31.4 of the Combines Investigation Act.
In the Canadian National Transportation case (supra) the Supreme Court upheld, inter alia, charges of unlawful conspiracy to lessen competi tion in interprovincial transport under paragraph 32(1)(c) of the Combines Investigation Act. The majority of the Court did so on the basis of subsection 91(27), but Dickson J. upheld the legis lation under both subsection 91(27) and subsection 91(2). Beetz and Lamer JJ., while rejecting validi ty on the basis of the criminal law, concurred with Dickson J. with respect to validity based on the trade and commerce power. Given that the stated questions for the Court referred in terms only to subsection 91(27), the Chief Justice in the princi pal judgment found it unnecessary to deal with validity under the trade and commerce power.
Dickson J. concluded his extensive survey of the law with an enumeration of possible indicia of validity under the "general regulation of trade" branch of the trade and commerce power (at pages 266-268):
Every general enactment will necessarily have some local impact, and if it is true that an overly literal conception of "general interest" will endanger the very idea of the local, there are equal dangers in swinging the telescope the other way around. The forest is no less a forest for being made up of
individual trees. Whatever the constitutional flaws in The Board of Commerce Act and The Combines and Fair Prices Act, 1919, they cannot be attributed, as Duff J. seems to contend, to the fact that any individual order made by the Board would have its effect on a business or trade in the province. Were that the test then no economic legislation could ever qualify under the general trade and commerce power. Such a conception is merely the obverse of the equally unac ceptable proposition that economic legislation qualifies under the general trade and commerce rubric merely because it applies equally and uniformly throughout the country.
The reason why the regulation of a single trade or business in the province cannot be a question of general interest through out the Dominion, is that it lies at the very heart of the local autonomy envisaged in the Constitution Act, 1867. That a federal enactment purports to carry out such regulation in the same way in all the provinces or in association with other regulatory codes dealing with other trades or businesses does not change the fact that what is being created is an exact overlapping and hence a nullification of a jurisdiction conceded to the provinces by the Constitution. A different situation obtains, however, when what is at issue is general legislation aimed at the economy as a single integrated national unit rather than as a collection of separate local enterprises. Such legislation is qualitatively different from anything that could practically or constitutionally be enacted by the individual provinces either separately or in combination. The focus of such legislation is on the general, though its results will obviously be manifested in particular local effects any one of which may touch upon "Property and Civil Rights in the Province". Never theless, in pith and substance such legislation will be addressed to questions of general interest throughout the Dominion. The line of demarcation is clear between measures validly directed at a general regulation of the national economy and those merely aimed at centralized control over a large number of local economic entities. The regulations in the Labatt's case were probably close to the line. It may also well be that, given the state of the economy in 1920 and the actual mechanics of the legislation, The Board of Commerce Act and The Combines and Fair Prices Act, 1919, amounted simply to an attempt to authorize the issuance of an uncoordinated series of local orders and prohibitions.
In approaching this difficult problem of characterization it is useful to note the remarks of the Chief Justice in MacDonald v. Vapor Canada Ltd., supra, at p. 165, in which he cites as possible indicia for a valid exercise of the general trade and commerce power the presence of a national regulatory scheme, the oversight of a regulatory agency and a concern with trade in general rather than with an aspect of a particular business. To this list I would add what to my mind would be even stronger indications of valid general regulation of trade and commerce, namely (i) that the provinces jointly or severally would be constitutionally incapable of passing such an enact ment and (ii) that failure to include one or more provinces or localities would jeopardize successful operation in other parts of the country.
The above does not purport to be an exhaustive list, nor is the presence of any or all of these indicia necessarily decisive. The proper approach to the characterization is still the one suggest ed in Parsons, a careful case by case assessment. Nevertheless, the presence of such factors does at least make it far more probable that what is being addressed in a federal enactment is genuinely a national economic concern and not just a collection of local ones.
These indicia of validity were summarized as fol lows by Urie J. for this Court in the BBM case (at pages 187-188 F.C.; at page 147 N.R.):
(a) The presence of a national regulatory scheme;
(b) the oversight of a regulatory agency;
(c) a concern with trade in general rather than with an aspect of a particular business;
(d) the provinces jointly and severally would be constitution ally incapable of passing such an enactment; and
(e) the failure to include one or more provinces or localities would jeopardize successful operation in other parts of the country.
I do not read Dickson J. as intending to add the additional factor of constitutional balance as a final test of validity when he says (at pages 277-279):
... it is still necessary even in the face of all these factors to consider the issue of constitutional balance, and whether a finding of validity under the trade and commerce power might not erode the local autonomy in economic regulation contem plated by the Constitution. This was the fear voiced by Mar- ceau J. in Rocois Construction Inc. v. Quebec Ready Mix Inc., [1980] 1 F.C. 184 (T.D.), at p. 203:
It is because a general statute on competition as such, that is a statute regulating competition beyond the detection, prevention and penalization of disapproved and proscribed acts, may make such an encroachment [on provincial powers] possible that I do not think that it can be based on the power of Parliament over trade and commerce. As the prime mover in our system of production and exchange of goods and services, competition depends on so many factors and takes on so many aspects that it may give rise to legislation as far reaching as it is diversified. To admit that, as such, it is covered by Parliament's power pursuant to subsection (2) of section 91, would be to open the door to a potential trenching on the powers of the provinces which, in my view, the courts have definitively rejected, despite their persistent hesitation.
For the reasons cited earlier I would in any event be inclined to reject this contention. To give it heed would amount to a denial of the possibility of Parliament ever validly exercising its general trade and commerce power, a power which if properly understood and properly constrained does not erode local autonomy but rather complements it. I would also, however, mention an additional factor. A scheme aimed at the regulation of competition is in my view an example of the genre of legislation that could not practically or constitutionally be enacted by a provincial government. Given the free flow of trade across provincial borders guaranteed by s. 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867 Canada is, for economic purposes, a single huge marketplace. If competition is to be regulated at all it must be regulated federally. This fact leads to the syllogism cited by Hogg and Grover, The Constitutionality of the Com petition Bill (1977), 1 Can. Bus. L.J. 197, at p. 200:
... regulation of the competitive sector of the economy can be effectively accomplished only by federal action. If there is no federal power to enact a competition policy, then Canada cannot have a competition policy. The consequence of a denial of federal constitutional power is therefore, in practi cal effect, a gap in the distribution of legislative powers.
It has been suggested that in The King v. Eastern Terminal Elevator Co., [1925] S.C.R. 434, at p. 448, [1925] 3 D.L.R. 1, at p. 12, Duff J. endorsed the existence of such a distributive gap when he identified as a "lurking fallacy" in a federal argument the proposition "that the Dominion has such power because no single province, nor, indeed, all the provinces acting together, could put into effect such a sweeping scheme." I am of the opinion that Duff J. was in this quote speaking of logistical or financial obstacles standing in the way of provin cial action. If he intended to go beyond this and identify an area in which neither the federal nor the provincial government could constitutionally legislate then, with great respect, I believe him to have been in error. The same error would deny federal constitutional competence to legislate under the general trade and commerce power.
All these considerations lead to the conclusion that s. 32(1)(c) is valid federal legislation under s. 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867 as well as s. 91(27). The Attorney General of Canada also contends that s. 32(1)(c) is valid under the peace, order and good government power, but in view of the finding of validity under s. 91(2) it is unnecessary to pursue this contention.
It seems to me that this analysis is either a statement of the fourth indicium relating to the inability of the provinces collectively to achieve the same purpose or perhaps a summation of all the considerations invoked, rather than constituting an additional hurdle. In any event, Dickson J.'s treat ment of the issue indicates that it is resolved by the same type of considerations as those already con tained in his five indicia. Of course, as he insists,
the list is neither exhaustive nor is the presence of any particular sign or indication decisive.
I must therefore do what this Court has already done in the BBM case (supra) and turn to an analysis of the statutory provision in question in the light of these indicia. In doing so it will be necessary to keep in mind the counsel of Dickson J. in the Canadian National Transportation case (supra, at pages 270-271):
It is obvious at the outset that a constitutionally invalid provision will not be saved by being put into an otherwise valid statute, even if the statute comprises a regulatory scheme under the general trade and commerce branch of s. 91(2). The correct approach, where there is some doubt that the impugned provi sion has the same constitutional characterization as the Act in which it is found, is to start with the challenged section rather than with a demonstration of the validity of the statute as a whole. I do not think, however, this means that the section in question must be read in isolation. If the claim to constitutional validity is based on the contention that the impugned provision is part of the regulatory scheme it would seem necessary to read it in its context. If it can in fact be seen as part of such a scheme, attention will then shift to the constitutionality of the scheme as a whole. This is essentially the approach suggested by the Chief Justice in his examination of the constitutionality of the then s. 7(e) of the Trade Marks Act in MacDonald v. Vapor Canada Ltd... .
IV
The 1975 amendments to the Act (S.C. 1974-75- 76, c. 76) included not only section 31.1, which was added to Part IV on Special Remedies, but also an entirely new Part IV.1 on Matters Review- able by Commission, comprising sections 31.2, 31.3, 31.4, 31.5, 31.6, 31.7, 31.8 and 31.9, as well as a new heading (Offences in Relation to Compe tition) and many other additions to the offences under Part V. The effect of Part IV.1 is to permit the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission to intervene directly to prohibit certain persons from carrying out activities or practices that contravene the rules of free competition. The personal remedy in damages in subsection 31.1(1) was clearly con ceived as an integral part of the overall plan, providing aggrieved persons with the possibility of a self-help remedy where the Commission has not yet acted or by way of supplement to Commission action where it has not been followed by compli-
ance by the offender. The legislative aim was evidently a more complete and more effective system of enforcement in which public and private initiative can both operate to motivate and effectu ate compliance.
The BBM case has already effectively upheld the whole of Part IV.1 as well as the offences provided for in section 32. With respect, then, to section 31.1 in particular, four of the five indicia set out by Dickson C.J. are clearly present: the presence of a national regulatory scheme; a con cern with trade in general rather than with an aspect of a particular business; the constitutional incapacity of the provinces taken jointly and sever ally; the necessity for nation-wide coverage to ensure successful operation everywhere. In fact, I would see only one possible difference between the legislation upheld in the Canadian National Transportation and the BBM cases and that in section 31.1, i.e., with respect to the oversight of the regulatory agency, which here is less complete in that it is supplemented by the initiatory rights of private complainants. Is this a sufficient differ ence to alter the characterization of this part of the regulatory plan as constituting the general regulation of trade and commerce?
Following the third proposition in the Fish Can neries case (supra), the test of validity has often been sought in whether federal legislation is "necessarily incidental to effective legislation" by Parliament under an enumerated head of section 91. In my view, the legislation in question here falls rather under the first Fish Canneries proposi tion relating "strictly" to a subject of legislation expressly enumerated in section 91. But even if its validity has to be assessed on the basis of the third proposition, I would observe that in any event the necessity of means depends on the character of the ends to which they are directed. There is no more a fixed domain of trade and commerce than there is of criminal law. What is thought necessary in
the light of an interventionist conception of the economy will be different from what is deemed necessary in relation to a free market conception. The necessity of the means is relative to the end sought. Thus understood as a relational concept, the necessity required for the third Fish Canneries proposition can be seen to be well expressed by the notion of a "rational, functional connection" endorsed by Dickson J. in Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon et al., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161, at page 183. In the Multiple Access case the relevant question for decision was whether sections 100.4 and 100.5 of the Canada Corporations Act, direct ed at protecting companies and shareholders against injurious insider trading, were ultra vires Parliament. The majority of the Court (the divi sion on this question was 6-3) held that the imposi tion of civil liability in section 100.4 has a rational functional connection with company law, and is not therefore ultra vires, Dickson J. put it this way for the majority (at pages 182-183): 8
One reservation with respect to the impugned sections of the federal act may be in the imposition of civil liability in s. 100.4(1). Does this imposition of civil liability in a federal statute so invade the provincial domain as to render the sections imposing liability ultra vires? This, in essence, was the argu ment of the appellants. But as Professors Anisman and Hogg point out: "Judicial decisions concerning a number of disparate matters such as federal elections, railways, federal corporations and even divorce have upheld Parliament's jurisdiction to pro vide civil relief in order to effectuate its legislative policies" ("Constitutional Aspects of Federal Securities Legislation" in Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada (1979), vol. 3, chap. III, at p. 192). In my opinion, ss. 100.4 and 100.5 have a general corporate purpose and a "rational, functional connec tion" with company law. The sections in my view are infra vires the Parliament of Canada.
8 Dickson J. also held (at p. 175) that "The validity of the federal legislation must be determined without heed to the Ontario legislation.", thus answering the concern of the Trial Judge in the present case that a civil remedy could not be properly ancillary to the trade and commerce power if such a remedy already existed in provincial law.
I believe this is to say that such a civil remedy must be genuinely and bona fide integral with the overall plan of supervision. The precise balance of governmental regulation and private enforcement is, then, a matter of policy for Parliament. For a Court to interfere with Parliament's legitimate discretion would be an unwarranted extension of judicial control into the political domain. That is not to say that there might not be cases where a Court could conclude that there was such a modi cum of regulation by government or a connection of so slight a character that it was not a rational, functional relationship. But that is not the present case.
Within the reasonable limits indicated, Parlia ment must be free to adopt and even to experiment with various approaches to the regulation of the economy. From their respective perspectives, both the courts and Parliament must respect those reasonable limits. That, it seems to me, is of the essence of the federal framework which defines the expression of democracy in Canada.
V
In my view paragraph 31.1(1) (a) is thus within the jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada as having a rational functional connection with the overall federal economic plan manifested in the Act in relation to competition, which plan also satisfies all the criteria of validity under the federal trade and commerce power.
With respect to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Federal Court of Canada under subsection 31.1(3) the prerequisite is that there be existing and applicable federal law which can be invoked to support proceedings before the Court: McNamara Construction (Western) Ltd. et al. v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 654; Quebec North Shore Paper Co. et al. v. Canadian Pacific Limited et al., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054. Since that prerequisite is here satisfied by the cause of action provided for by subsection 31.1(1), the validity of subsection 31.1(3) follows from that of paragraph 31.1(1)(a).
I would therefore allow the appeal and answer the first question in the affirmative.
The second question relating to the Court's jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claim has to be answered with a qualification. That claim, as stated in the statement of claim, is based in part on article 1053 of the Civil Code of the Province of Quebec. Since the Federal Court has no jurisdic tion to decide that part of the claim, I would therefore answer the second question as follows: yes, but only with respect to proceedings brought under existing and applicable federal law.
I would not make any order as to the costs of the appeal.
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