Judgments

Decision Information

Decision Content

T-189-81
A/S Omen (Plaintiff) v.
The Owners and all others interested in the Ship Duteous, The Queen, National Harbours Board, Charterers, Managers, Operators and Agents of the Vessel Duteous, namely, Clipper Maritime Co. Ltd., Dancan Line Limited, Armada Shipping APS, Armada Lines Ltd. and Protos Shipping Ltd. (Defendants)
and
National Harbours Board and The Queen (Third Parties)
T-160-81
St. Lawrence Stevedoring Company Limited and Royal Insurance Company of Canada (Plaintiffs)
v.
The Owners and all other Interested Parties in the Ship Duteous, The Queen, National Harbours Board, Clipper Maritime Company Limited, Dancan Limited, Armada Shipping APS and Protos Shipping Ltd. (Defendants)
and
National Harbours Board and The Queen (Third Parties)
T-545-81
Compagnia de Navegacion Duteous, S.A. (Plain- tiff)
v.
The Queen and National Harbours Board (Defendants)
INDEXED AS: A/S ORNEN V. DUTEOUS (THE)
Trial Division, Dubé J. — Montréal, February 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, March 4, 5, 6; Ottawa, April 25, 1986.
Maritime law — Torts — Inevitable accident — Ship drifting down-river in heavy ice and colliding with another ship and shore cranes — Onus on defendants to show exercised reasonable care and skill — Action for damages allowed against owners of ship — Possibility of debacle foreseeable —
Collisions avoidable by moving vessel to safer berth — Onus not discharged — Duteous negligent on six counts — No negligence on part of other defendants — Charts and Publica tions Regulations, C.R.C., c. 1415 — Pilotage Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 52, s. 31 — Berthage, Buoyage and Anchorage Charges Tariff By-law, C.R.C., c. 1061, s. 8 — Civil Code of Lower Canada, art. 1056C— Federal Court Rules, C.R.C., c. 663, RR. 420, 457.
Maritime law — Harbours — Action for damages — Ship breaking moorings in heavy ice, drifting down-river and col liding with another vessel and shore cranes — National Har bours Board not negligent — Duty of Board to exercise reasonable care to ensure harbour safe for navigation in light of circumstances — No enactment requiring Board to guaran tee safety of moored vessels — Common law duty to warn of concealed dangers constituted by harbour facilities — Ice conditions not concealed dangers — Conditions not created by harbour facilities, but by nature.
This is an action for damages against the ship, the Duteous, which broke her moorings, drifted downstream in heavy ice and collided with another ship and then with two shore cranes. Because of ice conditions on the St. Lawrence River the Duteous was ordered not to leave port from day to day. On January 11, the charterer's agent warned the Chinese captain of the Duteous of rising water levels and that extra moorings should be put out. The ice-breaker Pierre Radisson cleared the jam in the harbour on January 12 up to where the Duteous was berthed. On January 13 the ice-breaker broke the key lodge- ment of the front, thus releasing the jam. Thereupon the whole mass of ice and water retained upstream started to move. On January 12, the ship broke all her mooring lines and drifted out into the river. She was moored again with her stern against the pier and her bow approximately 50 feet out into the river. When the ice jam broke the next day, it caused the Duteous to drift down-river, and to collide with another ship and the shore cranes.
Held, the action should be allowed.
A collision is the result of inevitable accident if it could not have been prevented by "the exercise of ordinary care, caution and maritime skill." Where a vessel runs into another one lawfully moored in port, the onus is on her to show that the collision was inevitable. In order to do that, she must demon strate that the occurrence of the accident was consistent with the exercise on her part of reasonable care and skill, and that she did in fact exercise reasonable care and skill. A review of the case law indicates that this has not changed. The questions to be answered are the foreseeability of the debacle, the advisa bility of shifting to a safer berth before the debacle and the suitability of the manoeuvres taken by the Master of the Duteous during the down-river drift. The collisions could have been avoided. The possibility of a debacle was foreseeable. The progression of the ice front was published daily. Communica tions from the Canadian Coast Guard broadcast sufficient information to alert anyone prudent enough to tune in, to listen
and to act. All berths in the port of Montréal are safe under normal conditions, but in a debacle situation, vessels tied alongside the channel are exposed to awesome pressure of ice and water coming down the current. However there were several protected berths still vacant. The collision could have been averted by moving the Duteous to a safer berth before it was too late to do so. The onus is on the Duteous and her owners to show that her Master kept himself informed as to ice and water conditions, that he took all the necessary precautions before the vessel broke her moorings, that he carried out all manoeuvres expected of a skillful master so as to avoid colli sions as the Duteous was drifting down-river. They did not discharge that burden of proof.
The Duteous was negligent on six counts: 1. The Master, knowing that he was entering an ice-bound port, failed to properly acquaint himself with the perils and requirements of winter navigation. 2. The Master did not keep abreast of essential and available information about ice conditions prevail ing in the port of Montréal and did not make proper use of the ship's wireless equipment. 3. The Master did not foresee the possibility of a debacle and did not seek a safer berth before the freeze-up of the harbour. 4. The Master did not moor the Duteous securely before the first break of the moorings. 5. The Master was remiss in his duty in not keeping a pilot on board. 6. The Master did not exercise reasonable care and skill in the navigation of his vessel.
The charterers are not negligent in any respect for these collisions. As the actual navigation of the ship came under the responsibility of the Master and the crew, any alleged negli gence against the charterers would have to lie somewhere else. There is no merit to the allegation that the charterers ought not to have directed the Duteous to the port of Montréal in winter as she was not an ice-class vessel. The charterparty permitted the charterers to send the Duteous anywhere in the world. Navigation in the port of Montréal is not restricted to ice-class vessels. There is no conclusive evidence that any inherent disability on the part of the Duteous caused the collisions. The second allegation was that the charterers should not have berthed the Duteous at a "dangerous berth." It was not estab lished that section 41 is a dangerous berth. In any event section 41 was not selected by the charterers.
The charterers' agent, Protos Shipping Limited, and its employee Mr. Megin, were not negligent. The charterers' agent had little knowledge of navigation. The services he provided were mostly of the variety fulfilled by a "water clerk". Neither his employer not the charterers expected him to make any contribution in the field of navigation. It was not established that there was a breach of a duty to exercise care.
The ice-breaker, the Coast Guard, the Department of Trans port and the Queen were not negligent. It is alleged that the
Harbour Master was grossly negligent in failing to shift the Duteous to a safer berth, and in failing to properly warn the Duteous of the imminent peril arising from the ice conditions in the port. The charge against the Crown is that the ice-breaker broke up the ice jam without any consideration for the security of the Duteous. The duty of the National Harbours Board is to exercise reasonable care to see that the harbour was safe for navigation, but the duty must be looked at in the light of the existing circumstances: Owners of the Steamship "Panagiotis Th. Coumantaros" v. National Harbours Board. There is no enactment imposing on thy Board a duty to guarantee the safety of ships moored in harbours placed under its control: Angeliki Compania Maritima S.A. v. BP Oil Limited. How ever there is at common law a duty upon the Board to inform all vessels in port of any "concealed danger which may be constituted by harbour facilities." The ice conditions and the ensuing debacle in the port of Montréal were not concealed dangers as they could have been apprehended by any interested party who kept abreast of the events. Moreover those conditions were not constituted by the harbour facilities but created by nature and beyond the control of the Harbour Master. The Harbour Master's position was that the ships had all the information available and it was up to their masters to take the necessary precautions. Under the law, he came under no obliga tion to do more than he did. Neither the Board nor the Harbour Master was guilty of negligence. The payment of tolls and wharfage does not create a contract which was breached: The King v. Canada Steamship Lines Ltd. It was alleged that the Coast Guard was negligent for breaking the ice jam front while the Duteous was moored in such a precarious position. No enactment would compel ice-breakers to keep vessels informed of their progress on the St. Lawrence River. Those on board the Duteous were aware of the presence of the ice-break er, which they could see some 500 feet from their own vessel. Any seaman who does not know the role of an ice-breaker in a Canadian winter ought to inform himself before entering our waters. The Canadian pilot on board the Duteous on January 12 was aware of the ice-breaker's manoeuvres, but he felt that the Duteous was safely moored. If there was negligence on the part of the pilot, it became the negligence of the shipowner under section 31 of the Pilotage Act.
The plaintiffs are not contributorily negligent. There was no conclusive evidence that the Thor I was improperly moored, nor that the Thor I would have broken her moorings had she not been run into by the Duteous. Finally, the Thor I was lawfully positioned.
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
APPLIED:
Irish Shipping Ltd. v. The Queen, [1977] 1 F.C. 485 (T.D.); Dumurra (The) v. Maritime Telegraph and Tele phone Co. Ltd., [1977] 2 F.C. 679 (C.A.); Owners of the Steamship "Panagiotis Th. Coumantaros" v. National Harbours Board, [1942] S.C.R. 450; Angeliki Compania Maritima S.A. v. BP Oil Limited, judgment dated April 16, 1973, Federal Court, Trial Division, T-4159-71, not reported.
CONSIDERED:
The Merchant Prince (1892), 7 ASP. M.L.C. 208 (C.A.); Bell Telephone Co. v. The Mar-Tirenno, [1974] 1 F.C. 294 (T.D.); Letnik v. Toronto (Municipality), judgment dated March 27, 1985, Federal Court, Trial Division, T-3456-81, not reported; "City of Peking" (The) v. Com- pagnie des Messageries Maritimes (1888), 14 App. Cas. 40 (P.C.); Wake-Walker v. SS. Colin W. Ltd., [1937] 2 D.L.R. 753 (P.C.); Blandy Brothers & Co., Lda. v. Nello Simoni, Ltd., [1963] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 24 (Q.B.); affirmed 393 (C.A.); Sparrows Point v. Greater Vancouver Water District, [1951] S.C.R. 396; Nord- Deutsche Versicherungs-Gesellschaft et al v. The Queen et al, [1969] 1 Ex.C.R. 117; Warwick Shipping Limited v. R., [1982] 2 F.C. 147 (T.D.); affirmed (1983), 48 N.R. 378 (F.C.A.).
REFERRED TO:
The Europa (1850), 14 Jur. 627 (Adm.); The "Marpesia" (1872), L.R. 4 P.C. 212; Bank Shipping Co'y v. "City of Seattle" (1903), 9 Ex.C.R. 146; Beauchemin, Gerard v. The King, [1947] Ex.C.R. 102; The "Velox", [1955] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 376 (Adm.); The Barge "T-429", [1957] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 135 (Trinidad and Tobago S.C.); Canadian National Railway Co. v. The "Temple Inn", judgment dated February 19, 1979, Fed eral Court, Trial Division, T-1474-76, not reported; The King v. Hochelaga Shipping & Towing Co. Ltd., [1940] S.C.R. 153; Grossman et al. v. The King, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 571; Workington Harbour and Dock Board v. Towerfield (Owners), [1951] A.C. 112 (H.L.); The King v. Canada Steamship Lines Ltd., [ 1927] S.C.R. 68.
COUNSEL:
A. S. Hyndman, Q.C. and N. J. Spillane for plaintiff A/S Omen.
Edouard Baudry for plaintiff Royal Insur ance Company of Canada.
Martin J. Edwards for plaintiff St. Lawrence Stevedoring Company Limited.
Trevor H. Bishop and Robert Cypihot for plaintiff Compagnia de Navegacion Duteous, S.A. and for defendant ship Duteous.
W. David Angus, Q.C. and Laurent Fortier for defendants Clipper Maritime Co. Ltd., Dancan Line Limited, Armada Lines Lim ited, Armada Shipping APS and Protos Ship ping Ltd.
J.-C. Ruelland, A. Bluteau and P. H. Vanasse for defendant and third party Na tional Harbours Board.
J.-C. Ruelland and A. Bluteau for defendant and third party the Queen.
SOLICITORS:
McMaster Meighen, Montréal, for plaintiff A/S Omen.
Lavery, O'Brien, Montréal, for plaintiff Royal Insurance Company of Canada.
Gagnon, de Billy, Cantin, Martin, Beaudoin, Lesage & Associés, Québec City, for plaintiff St. Lawrence Stevedoring Company Limited.
Brisset, Bishop, Davidson & Davis, Montréal, for plaintiff Compagnia de Navegacion Dute
ous, S.A. and for defendant ship Duteous.
Stikeman, Elliott, Montréal, for defendants Clipper Maritime Co. Ltd., Dancan Line Limited, Armada Lines Ltd., Armada Ship ping APS and Protos Shipping Ltd.
Ports Canada, Montréal, for defendant and third party National Harbours Board.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for defendant and third party the Queen.
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
DUBÉ J.: The trial of these three actions in admiralty was heard on common evidence at Mon- tréal, Que., and lasted 21 days. Seventeen factual witnesses and twelve experts were heard. Ten other witnesses testified on commission evidence or at discovery. A total of 173 documents were filed. Eleven lawyers represented the several parties involved either as plaintiffs, defendants or third parties. These reasons for judgment will apply mutatis mutandis to the three actions.
On January 13, 1981, the M.V. Duteous while berthed at section 43 in the port of Montréal broke her moorings, was carried downstream in heavy ice and collided with the M.V. Thor I at section 52, and then with two shore cranes, the property of a stevedoring firm, located at sections 71 and 72. The collisions caused heavy damage to the two vessels and the cranes, resulting in these three actions involving the owners of the M.V. Duteous (Compagnia de Navegacion Duteous, S.A.), the owners of the M.V. Thor I (A/S Omen), the owners of the cranes (St. Lawrence Stevedoring Company Limited), the insurers of the cranes
(Royal Insurance Company of Canada), the chart- erers of the M.V. Duteous (Clipper Maritime Company Limited, Dancan Line Limited, Armada Shipping APS, Armada Lines Limited), the agent of the charterers (Protos Shipping Ltd.), the Na tional Harbours Board as responsible for the port of Montréal, and Her Majesty the Queen for the Department of Transport, itself responsible for the Canadian Coast Guard and the ice-breaker Pierre Radisson. (The ice-breaker was working in the St. Lawrence River and the Harbour of Montréal during the time material to these actions.)
1. The facts
The material facts leading to the collisions may be reconstructed as follows.
The M.V. Duteous is a standard design, general cargo, Freedom-type vessel, built in Japan in 1977, with four holds equipped with tween-decks. Bridge and machinery are located aft. Propulsion is by a twelve-cylinder Pielstick diesel engine developing 5,130 b.h.p. through reduction gearing onto a single screw. Her capacity is 8,767 gross registered tonnes. She has an overall length of 143.41 metres, a beam of 19.82 metres and a moulded depth of 12.35 metres. During the relevant period she was mastered by a Chinese captain from Hong Kong and manned by a crew from Hong Kong and Taiwan.
The M.V. Duteous was fixed for the Montréal voyage by a sailing telegram dated December 4, 1980, from the charterer Armada Shipping APS. She crossed the Atlantic, stopped at Gros Cacou- na, a lower St. Lawrence port, then at Québec City. She arrived in the port of Montréal on December 31, 1980, and berthed at section 102 where she took on bunkers, then moved to section 41 where she berthed at 11:00 hours on January 1, 1981. She commenced loading on January 3, 1981, and completed loading on January 7, 1981, at 14:15 hours with a total general cargo of 8,605.643 tonnes. The drafts were: forward 26'07", aft 27'03". Departure time was set for 08:00 hours the next day, January 8, 1981.
Because of ice conditions on the St. Lawrence River, the vessel was ordered not to leave port from day to day and thus remained at the same berth awaiting clearance until January 12, 1981.
On Sunday, January 11, 1981, Mr. Thomas Megin, Operations Manager of the Montréal Office of Protos Shipping Limited, the charterers' agent, received a telephone call from the Port of Montréal's Harbour Master's office warning ships in port of rising water levels and advising that extra moorings should be put out. At about 17:00 hours on that day he boarded the M.V. Duteous to relay the information. Three additional mooring lines were put out: an additional head rope, an extra fore head spring and an after breast line.
On January 12, 1981, at 05:20 hours, the M.V. Duteous, surrounded by ice, broke all her mooring lines and drifted onto section 43, a pier that juts out diagonally into the river. She was moored again at that new position with her stern against the pier and her bow approximately 50 feet out into the river. The new mooring arrangements consisted of 13 mooring lines being run out, with both the port and starboard anchor chains secured to bollards on the pier with the assistance of a mobile crane.
Early Tuesday morning, January 13, 1981, at about 06:30 hours, the ice jam broke. All lines and anchor chains of the M.V. Duteous parted. The vessel drifted down-river with the ice. Her heading was approximately 150° to 170°, with the ice pressure against the ship from her starboard bow toward her port quarter. The Master started the engine and kept it at full ahead with the rudder hard to starboard.
At 07:04 hours, the stern of the M.V. Duteous came into contact with the port bow of the M.V. Thor I moored at section 52, scraped along her port side, hit a second time on her hull (opposite the third hatch) and continued drifting astern and partly sideways down the harbour until, at 08:07 hours, her stern collided with two of three shore cranes, emplaced at sections 71 and 72. One of the cranes (crane number 2) fell on the after-end of the vessel and remained there. The other (crane
number 3) was propelled to the end of the wharf and into the river.
At approximately 09:30 hours, the M.V. Dute ous broke clear of the heavy ice pack. At 11:26 hours, a pilot was landed on board by helicopter. At 17:35 hours, tugs came to her assistance. At 19:20 hours, cables and a crane bucket which hung close to the propeller of the M.V. Duteous were cut free. At 22:00 hours, the vessel manoeuvred back up to section 48.
2. Ice conditions in the port of Montréal
The harbour of Montréal lies downstream from the Lachine Rapids, open all winter. The rapids generate millions of tonnes of ice during the freez ing season. The ice flows through the La Prairie Basin and the St. Mary Rapids and accumulates in the harbour causing the local water level to rise.
Records show that from 1965 to 1969 the rise above the normal levels exceeded 9.1 metres. During that period, the Coast Guard was carrying out advanced practical ice-breaking research. Since 1969, a more effective control on the har bour water/ice levels was established through the use of ice-breakers which kept navigation open from Montréal down-river, allowing the ice gener ated by the Lachine Rapids to flow continuously downstream. As a result, between the years 1969 and 1981, the water levels exceeded 9.1 metres only three times: in 1971, 1976 and 1981. During those three winters the ice-breakers were unable to keep the channel open in January.
Extremely cold temperatures were prevalent during those three winters. The cold weather experienced during November and December 1980 and up to January 12, 1981, was more severe than had occurred in any of the previous forty years.
Daily bulletins published by the Canadian Coast Guard indicate the progression of the front of the ice jam moving up the St. Lawrence River in January 1981. On January 5, 1981, the front was at Portneuf some 190 kilometres downstream from Montréal. The next day, it advanced to Sorel, some 65 kilometres away from Montréal. The front remained there for a day, then moved
upstream, reached Cap Saint-Michel the next day and the entrance of the port of Montréal on Janu- ary 11, 1981.
According to F. E. Parkinson, a hydraulic con sulting engineer and expert in ice, whom I found to be learned and reliable, the front movement through the port of Montréal in January 1981 had a cover thickness of 5.4 metres in the reach be tween Cap Saint-Michel and section 101. His esti mate corresponds very closely to the 3.9 metres of ice plus 2.4 metres of slush measured by the crew of the ice-breaker Pierre Radisson at section 102 at 13:00 hours on January 12, 1981.
From the evidence of Mr. Parkinson, some time around 24:00 hours on January 11, 1981, the front would have reached section 43 and shortly thereaf ter, the faster flowing current of St. Mary Rapids. The incoming ice thickened the cover as a result of two dynamics: firstly, the fairly gentle entrainment of the loose ice under the cover already in place; secondly, the pressure of intermittent shoves com pressing the whole cover, thus thickening it and pushing it down-river.
The evidence indicates that the ice-breaker Pierre Radisson had been attacking the ice front from Portneuf all the way to the port of Montréal and had arrived at Cap Saint-Michel at midnight on January 11, 1981. The ice-breaker cleared the jam in the harbour the next day up to section 43, hard by the M.V. Duteous, at midnight January 12, 1981. At that moment the channel was clear downstream up to section 43. The ice-breaker ceased operations for the night with her nose into the front.
On the morning of January 13, 1981, the Pierre Radisson resumed her attack. At 06:00 hours she broke the key lodgement of the front, thus releas ing the jam. Thereupon the whole mass of ice and water retained upstream started to move, unleash ing a force of awesome proportion. According to Mr. Parkinson, "forces greater than six hundred tonnes could have been acting on the ship" (the M.V. Duteous).
The M.V. Duteous was not the only victim of the debacle. The M.V. Thor I upon, or shortly after the collision, also broke her moorings and went adrift. Another vessel, the M.V. Bunga Chempaka, berthed at section 55, broke her moor-
ings as well and went down-river. The M.V. Atlantic Prosper also broke some moorings at section 66 but clung safely to the wall. Two small tugs, which had been called to the rescue of the M.V. Duteous the previous day and spent the night locked in the ice, were drifting away, out of control. The Pierre Radisson, also swept away by the ice, joined the ghostly procession down the current into the sea smoke. The M.V. Duteous, however, was the only vessel to cause damage during her descent down-river.
3. Were the collisions inevitable?
A collision is said to be the result of an inevi table accident if it could not have been prevented by "the exercise of ordinary care, caution and maritime skill".' Where a vessel runs into another one lawfully moored in port, the onus is on her to show that the collision was inevitable. In order to do that, she must at least demonstrate that the occurrence of the accident was consistent with the exercise on her part of reasonable care and skill and that she did in fact exercise reasonable care and ski11. 2 In The Merchant Prince, 3 a much stricter burden was placed on the colliding ship in order to sustain the defence of inevitable accident. Fry L.J. stated, at page 211:
To sustain that the defendants must do one or the other of two things: they must either show what was the cause of the accident, and show that the result of that cause was inevitable; or they must show all the possible causes, one or other of which might produce the effect, and must further show with regard to every one of those possible causes that the result could not have been avoided.
In Bell Telephone Co. v. The Mar- Tirenno 4 the plaintiffs claim was for damages caused by the anchor of the defendant ship to its underwater telephone cables near the port of Québec. The captain of the Mar-Tirenno was advised to double his lines and maintain constant watch because Pier
' The Europa (1850), 14 Jur. 627 (Adm.), at p. 629. This definition was approved by the Privy Council in The "Marpesia" (1872), L.R. 4 P.C. 212.
2 Halsbury's Laws of England, 1983, 4th ed., vol. 43, para. 981.
3 (1892), 7 ASP. M.L.C. 208 (C.A.).
4 [1974] 1 F.C. 294 (T.D.).
18 was an extremely exposed wharf in the winter, as the tides shift ice backwards and forwards. The ship broke away and caused damages. Addy J. of this Court maintained the action, finding that the Master of the Mar-Tirenno had been negligent in not having informed himself of the location of the cables and in not assessing the possible alterna tives, including tying up at another wharf. He also found that the defendants' plea of inevitable acci dent failed because the breaking away and the resulting damage were clearly foreseeable. There was a failure to observe and to carry out any preventive action. He said, at page 300:
Where a person has actual dominion and control over an object or has a legal duty to control it and that object goes out of control and causes damage, then, it is obviously up to the person in control to explain by positive evidence the reason why the object went out of control or, at least, to establish by positive evidence that it was not due to any act or omission on his part or on the part of any other person whose actions were under his control.
In Letnik v. Toronto (Municipality), 5 Addy J. confirmed his previous statement and added, at pages 32-33:
Furthermore the burden of proof on the part of a ship which runs into another when moored or anchored in conditions of good visibility and fair weather is a very onerous one.
Of course, the conditions in the instant case were not good. The M.V. Duteous was coming down in the grips of a debacle. 6 The questions that come to mind and have to be answered are the foreseeability of the debacle, the advisability of shifting to a safer berth before the debacle and the suitability of the manoeuvres taken by the Master of the M.V. Duteous during the down-river drift.
In "City of Peking" (The) v. Compagnie des Messageries Maritimes' the Privy Council dealt with a case of a vessel running down a ship at her
5 Judgment dated March 27, 1985, Federal Court, Trial Division, T-3456-81, not reported.
6 "Debacle: a sudden breaking up of ice in a river" (The Living Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English Language).
7 (1888), 14 App. Cas. 40 (P.C.).
moorings in broad daylight, a prima facie evidence of fault. The collision was attributable to the effect of an exceptional current, known to be a possible though improbable contingency, but it was shown that the port anchor of the steamer was not in readiness. The Court held that the steamer had neglected ordinary precautions and could not be absolved from blame. 8
In Wake-Walker v. SS. Colin W. Ltd., 9 the Privy Council dealt with the plea of inevitable accident in a collision between vessels in the Mon- tréal harbour. Again, it confirmed that the onus was upon the party asserting such a defence to satisfy the Court that he was not to blame. It found that the defendant vessel had taken a course and speed which placed her in a position in which she ought not to have been and therefore had not discharged the onus.
The evidence adduced at the hearing, factual as well as expert, leads me to the inescapable conclu sion that the two collisions could have been avoid ed. The possibility of a debacle was foreseeable. The progression of the ice front was published daily in the Information Bulletins above referred to. VHF radio communications and VTM communi cations from the Canadian Coast Guard broadcast sufficient information to alert anyone who would be prudent enough to tune in, to listen and to act.
All berths in the port of Montréal are safe under normal conditions. But, in a debacle situation, vessels tied alongside the channel are obviously exposed to the awesome pressure of ice and water coming down the current. Vessels safely tucked
8 For other cases where a defendant ship was not excused from liability for a collision due to exceptional river or weather conditions, see Bank Shipping Co'y v. "City of Seattle" (1903), 9 Ex.C.R. 146; Beauchemin, Gerard v. The King, [1947] Ex.C.R. 102; The "Velox", [1955] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 376 (Adm.); The Barge "T-429", [1957] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 135 (Trinidad and Tobago S.C.); Canadian National Railway Co. v. The "Temple Inn", judgment dated February 19, 1979, Federal Court, Trial Division, T-1474-76, not reported. In the later case Collier J. said at page 19 with reference to "inevitable accident": "I doubt the concept has any place in modern tort law."
9 [1937] 2 D.L.R. 753 (P.C.).
away behind jutting piers are unexposed and secure.
A chart of all the vessels moored in the port of Montréal on Monday, January 12, 1981, was filed in Court. The chart shows a number of vessels resting safely in the protected sections of the Old Port, then an open area along the riverside without any vessels. The first vessel on a riverside berth is the M.V. Duteous, firstly shown in her original position at section 41, then in her second position at section 43. Then, four vessels nicely tucked in behind the protection of piers. The next exposed vessel is the M.V. Thor I at section 52 followed by the M.V. Bunga Chempaka exposed as well at section 55. Past section 55, seven vessels are moored safely in the sanctuary of Vickers Basin. Further down at section 66, a riverside berth, is the M.V. Atlantic Prosper which broke some moorings but stayed at the wall. The chart shows several protected berths still vacant.
The vessels brought downstream by the debacle were either already in the channel (the ice-breaker and the two tugs) or moored at riverside berths. The other vessels moored in sheltered berths were not displaced. Whether the initiative to move the M.V. Duteous to a safer berth rested with the Master of the M.V. Duteous, or with the port authorities is an issue that I will attempt to resolve later, but the collisions could manifestly have been averted by simply moving the M.V. Duteous to a safer berth before it became too late to do so.
In my view, the onus is on the M.V. Duteous and her owners to show that her Master kept himself informed as to the ice and water condi tions, that he took all the necessary precautions before the vessel broke her moorings, that he carried out all the manoeuvres expected of a skill ful master so as to avoid collisions as the M.V. Duteous was drifting down-river for more than an hour. I am not satisfied that the owners of the M.V. Duteous have discharged that onerous burden of proof.
4. The negligence of the M.V. Duteous
Unfortunately, the Master of the M.V. Duteous, Captain Chuen Kwan Cheung, did not testify at the trial. He gave his commission evidence on February 9, 10 and 11, 1981, before the departure of the M.V. Duteous from the port of Montréal. Although conversant in English, he testified with the assistance of a Chinese interpreter. So did his Chief Officer Ting Sang Tam, his Chief Engineer, Tak Chue, the Second Officer, Shien Kai Chao, the Radio Officer, Kwok Keung Lui, the Fourth Engineer, Chan Nai Wing and the Third Officer, Wan Tung Lu. Obviously, the mere reading of those long and laborious transcripts cannot be as satisfactory as the presence in Court of witnesses who are examined and cross-examined before the judge who has to decide the case.
The Master of the M.V. Duteous had only limited experience in navigation under such ice conditions as prevail on the St. Lawrence River and in the port of Montréal. He did, with the assistance of a Canadian pilot, take his vessel up the river with stops at Gros Cacouna and Québec City before arriving in the harbour of Montréal on December 31, 1980. He had a period of eleven days in Montréal during which he could and should have informed himself about local condi tions. He had on board both the British and Canadian Sailing Directions for the Gulf and the St. Lawrence River, but did not read the sections about ice conditions on the river. At the outset of his voyage, he had received the annual edition of Canadian Notices to Mariners in which the VTM system and its services are described. During that period, including his passage up the St. Lawrence River, he ought to have acquainted himself with all the information services available.
As pointed out by Captain Kai H. Boggild, a marine consultant called as an expert on behalf of the Crown, the publication Ice Navigation in Canadian Waters was not placed on board the M.V. Duteous until after the accident, despite the fact that it is referred to in the Sailing Directions and is required to be carried by the Charts and
Publications Regulations. 10 That publication pro vides useful information about ice conditions in the port of Montréal, including this warning which appears at page 25:
Vessels Moored at Riverside Berths: Shipmasters are cautioned that heavy ice floes coming down river, especially after a jam has been recently broken, may strike moored vessels and cause them to be broken out of their berth.
It appears that the Master of the M.V. Duteous relied too heavily on the ship's agent, Mr. Tom Megin, and on the port authorities (their respec tive roles and responsibilities will be discussed later) and not enough upon his own initiative. During that early period in January, especially after the M.V. Duteous had completed her load ing, prudence would have called for a shift to a safer berth. That would merely have involved a request to the port authorities and a call for the assistance of a tug. As mentioned earlier, there were several protected berths available, some way up in the Old Port, others, further down, sheltered behind jutting piers.
The evidence reveals that shortly after noon on Sunday, January 11, 1981, the agent Mr. Megin received a telephone call from the Harbour Mas ter's office warning about the rising water levels in the port and advising reinforcement of moorings. Some five hours later, Mr. Megin boarded the M.V. Duteous and transmitted the message to the Master. It is obvious that neither of the two men appreciated the full urgency of the situation. After the evening meal, the Master ordered three addi tional mooring lines to be put out, as previously described. Only the added head rope significantly improved the mooring pattern as the M.V. Dute ous was heading upstream and the force would come from that direction. The other two lines did not add significantly to the security of the vessel. That arrangement, although sufficient under normal conditions, proved to be inadequate in the face of the oncoming debacle.
The next day, Monday, January 12, 1981, at 05:20 hours, all the mooring lines parted and the
10 C.R.C., c. 1415.
vessel was carried astern. The Master placed his engine on full ahead with his helm to port so as to keep the bow off the berth. That manoeuvre allowed for heavy compact ice to come between the M.V. Duteous and the pier, causing the vessel to be beset in a field of ice and to rest in a nasty position with her starboard quarter against section 43 and her bow about 50 feet off the wharf, an extremely perilous situation.
After that first incident, all mooring lines avail able on board were secured to bollards on the wharf. Both anchor chains were also put out on the pier. That final arrangement was probably the best that could be marshalled under the circumstances. However, with the angle that the M.V. Duteous was offering to the oncoming debacle, it is the view of most experts that no mooring could withstand the irresistible impact to come.
It came very early the next day. The ice jam broke loose as the Pierre Radisson successfully open up the front which by then was almost abeam of the M.V. Duteous.
From his own evidence it appears that the Master was in bed when the break of his moorings and the full fury of the debacle woke him up at 06:20 hours. It appears in the ship's log book that at 06:30 hours, the moorings were fully broken. The engine of the M.V. Duteous was not running but at stand-by. It took a further seven to eight minutes for the officers to get on the bridge and the Chief Engineer to place the engine on full ahead. The ice movement was from the ship's starboard bow toward her port quarter. The Master ordered his rudder hard to starboard in a futile attempt to resist the ice movement, or to protect his rudder and propeller from the wharf.
Admittedly, it is easier for experts to navigate a ship from the safety of a witness box and for a judge to assess the situation from the serenity of the bench, than for a master to make the appropri ate decisions in the agony of collision. " It does, however, appear that with the angle the M.V.
" See The King v. Hochelaga Shipping & Towing Co. Ltd., [1940] S.C.R. 153.
Duteous was in, she would have had a greater measure of manoeuvrability had she moved out into the, channel and worked with the ice move ment, not against it. Had she succeeded, she would have cleared the berths, the M.V. Thor I and the cranes.
As it was, the M.V. Duteous floated down out of control for more than one hour at very close proximity to the wharves. It is to be recalled that the other vessels caught in the debacle managed to steer free from collisions and to return safely to their respective berths. After being struck by the M.V. Duteous at 07:04 hours all mooring lines on the M.V. Thor I parted, yet she managed to manoeuvre out of the drifting ice and into the shelter of Canadian Vickers at section 57. As to the M.V. Bunga Chempaka, she was swept off her berth at section 55 at 07:10 hours and carried stern first down-river. By 08:30 hours she managed to turn around and re-moor at section 48, undamaged.
It appears that the Master of the M.V. Duteous was much concerned with protecting her rudder and propeller, first against the wharf, then against the anchor chains of the M.V. Thor I. His concern is quite understandable as both are essential to the manoeuvrability of a vessel. However, the propel ler and the rudder of the M.V. Duteous are safely ensconced under the stern of the vessel. The angle of the counter of the stern provided at least a six-foot coverage, sufficient to protect the rudder and the propeller from the wharves. As to the anchor chains of the M.V. Thor I, the preponder ance of the evidence indicates that they hung in a straight, vertical, up and down, position from the M.V. Thor I and not out in the channel as the Master of the M.V. Duteous feared.
Unfamiliar as he was with the winter conditions in the port of Montréal, and faced with the obvious rise in the water level in the harbour, along with the ominous gathering of the ice, the Master ought to have kept a pilot on board, especially after the first parting of the moorings.
A pilot could not have prevented the second break of the moorings, because of the treacherous position the M.V. Duteous had drifted into, with her nose sticking out in the current and her star-
board bow bearing the impact of the rushing ice. He could, however, have been of assistance in manoeuvring the M.V. Duteous away from the berths and steering her to a safer course downstream.
Understandably, no one can control a vessel totally frozen in ice. But, there is evidence to the effect that the M.V. Duteous was not totally and constantly encased in ice. There was much sea smoke to be seen all along the channel indicating the presence of open waters. There can be sea smoke above slush, but on occasions several wit nesses saw open water at the stern of the M.V. Duteous. An alert pilot, knowledgeable of winter navigation in the port of Montréal, could have seized upon those stretches of open water to kick the engine full ahead so as to provide sufficient propulsion and control to steer clear of the berths.
Moreover, Montréal pilots know, or ought to know, that ice jams are followed by break-ups and that a break-up is imminent when the water level rises and ice-breakers are biting away at the front of an ice jam. A master, especially the master of a foreign ship with little winter navigation experi ence, would feel safer with such an experienced man on board when the time of a debacle is near.
It is the responsibility of the master of a vessel to retain or to dismiss a pilot. 12 The Master of the M.V. Duteous dismissed his pilot, Gaétan Forbes, after the final mooring arrangements had been completed in the aftern000n of January 12, 1981. If the pilot was negligent in not offering to remain on board, his negligence under section 31 of the Pilotage Act" becomes the negligence of the shipowner.
I therefore find the M.V. Duteous negligent on these six counts:
1. The Master, knowing that he was entering an ice-bound port, failed to properly acquaint himself
12 Irish Shipping Ltd. v. The Queen, [1977] 1 F.C. 485 (T.D.); Dumurra (The) v. Maritime Telegraph and Telephone Co. Ltd., [1977] 2 F.C. 679 (C.A.).
13 S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 52.
with the perils and requirements of winter navigation.
2. The Master did not keep abreast of essential and available information about ice conditions pre vailing in the port of Montréal and did not make proper use of the ship's wireless equipment.
3. The Master did not foresee the possibility of a debacle and did not seek a safer berth before the freeze-up of the harbour.
4. The Master did not moor the M.V. Duteous securely before the first break of the moorings.
5. The Master was remiss in his duty in not keeping a pilot on board.
6. The Master did not exercise reasonable care and skill in the navigation of his vessel:
a) when the mooring lines first broke on January 12th, 1981, by wrongly placing the engine on full ahead with helm to port thereby allowing heavy compact ice to come between the M.V. "Duteous" and the pier thereby allowing the ship to come to rest in a precarious position;
b) when the mooring lines broke on January 13th, 1981, by wrongly placing his rudder hard to starboard instead of work ing with the ice movement and heading out into the channel, thereby allowing the ship to drift too closely to the wharves and to strike the M.V. "Thor I" and the cranes;
c) by failing to keep his engine on a more effective stand-by.
5. No negligence on the part of the charterers
There is, of course, privity of contract between the owners and the charterers of the M.V. Dute ous. Shortly before the trial, the owners attempted to file an indemnity claim against the charterers. The application was denied by the Court because of its lateness and on the ground that the dispute between them was, pursuant to the provisions of the charterparty, placed in arbitration in London, England.
In the course of the hearing before me the Crown moved that all documents filed with these arbitration proceedings be produced. Both the owners and the charterers resisted the application. I ordered under Rule 457 [Federal Court Rules, C.R.C., c. 663] that the documents be referred in confidence to this Court to be inspected by me for
the purpose of deciding whether or not they were relevant, or privileged, in the instant proceedings.
I duly received the documents in question en titled Points of Claim, Points of Defence and Request for Particulars. I found them to be "pleadings", or allegations prepared by the London solicitors of the two parties in a private arbitration matter and, as such, to be neither useful nor relevant in the instant proceedings.
Any action which the other parties have against the charterers must be founded in tort. Negligence has to be proved against the charterers themselves. Bearing in mind that the actual navigation of the M.V. Duteous came under the responsibility of the Master and the crew, thus the responsibility of the owners, any alleged negligence against the charter- ers would have to lie somewhere else. These defendant charterers were time charterers, not bare boat nor demise charterers. As such they paid $6,700 U.S. per day for the services of the M.V. Duteous.
The first allegation of negligence against the charterers is that the charterers ought not to have directed the M.V. Duteous to the port of Montréal in the winter, on the ground that she was not an ice-class vessel and lacked the protective shell and the horse-power to deal with severe ice conditions. I find no substance to this allegation. Firstly, the charterers were entitled under the terms of the charterparty to send the M.V. Duteous anywhere in the world. Secondly, there are no regulations limiting winter navigation in the port of Montréal to ice-class vessels. Thirdly, there is no conclusive evidence that any inherent disability on the part of the M.V. Duteous caused the collisions.
The second allegation is to the effect that the charterers should not have berthed the M.V. Duteous at section 41, a "dangerous berth". The evidence indicates that section 41 is not, prima facie, a dangerous berth. It was safe when the vessel came to the port of Montréal in late Decem-
ber 1980. That berth, because of its open location alongside the channel, is more exposed to the currents and to waves crested by passing vessels. I am satisfied, however, from the evidence, that it is generally safe. Vessels have been moored at that location for years and still are, mostly without problems. Of course, it is not the best place to be when a debacle is imminent.
The responsibility for shifting a vessel lies primarily with the master of that vessel—the role of the port authorities will be discussed later. In any event, section 41 was not selected by the charterers. It is assigned on a yearly lease to Wolfe Stevedoring Ltd. who had a contract with the charterers for loading of vessels and who carry out their stevedoring operations from that section.
I therefore find the charterers not to be negli gent in any respect for these collisions.
6. No negligence on the part of the charterers' agent
As mentioned earlier, the M.V. Duteous main contact in the port of Montréal was Mr. Thomas Megin, now deceased, an employee of Protos Ship ping Limited, the agent of the charterers. It is alleged in the pleadings, and claimed by some of the witnesses, that his role was to inform and advise the Master of the M.V. Duteous, that he had no navigation experience—thus unqualified to be a ship's agent, that he failed to apprise the Master of the dangerous situation in the harbour and to properly inform him as to what precautions should be taken to protect his vessel against the impending disaster. Authorities defining the role of a "ship's agent", are not especially helpful. It therefore becomes necessary to examine the par ticular role of Protos Shipping Limited with regards to the M.V. Duteous.
A basic definition of a ship's agent is provided by Pearson L.J. in Blandy Brothers & Co., Lda. v.
Nello Simoni, Ltd. [at page 404]: 14
The ship's agent is, in the normal case, the agent of the shipowner at the particular port, and the ship's agent, there fore, at that port stands in the shoes of the shipowner; and it is reasonable to suppose that he has the authority to do whatever the shipowner has to do at that port.
Obviously, that definition applies more particu larly to a shipowner's agent. The following defini tion from an article in Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 1978 15 (at pages 601- 602) appears to set out duties more commonly applicable to any ship's agent:
3. Considering now the duties which a ship's agent has to fulfill, the examples described have shown which kind of them usually are performed (just to mention some examples): Arranging for a berth; reporting to the harbour authorities and Custom House and similar institutions; ordering of stores, fuel and repairs; caring for the crew's needs (provisions, laundry); delivering of notice of readiness to the shipper or consignee; arranging for loading, discharging (contracting with stevedores, warehouses, barges' owners); issuing of bills of lading or col lecting them; ordering of surveys for ship and/or cargo; acting as ship's husband; collecting and remitting of freight and demurrage, etc.
Protos Shipping Limited was not the agent of the owners of the vessel. The owners had no agent until they appointed one after the accidents of January 12, 1981. Protos Shipping Limited was the agent of the charterers and was appointed by contract dated May 17, 1979. The "General Agency Agreement" provides that Protos Shipping Limited shall act as "port agent". The port agent's functions, as described therein, include soliciting cargo, recommending stevedores, processing claims, collecting freights, issuing cargo docu ments, etc. The evidence at the trial indicates that Protos Shipping Limited was mainly interested in the commercial aspect of shipping, namely finding business for their clients. The services provided by Mr. Megin were mostly of the variety fulfilled by a "water clerk", so-called. He had little knowledge of navigation. Neither his employer, Protos Ship
14 [1963] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 24 (Q.B.); affirmed 393 (C.A.), as reported in British Shipping Laws, (1967), vol. 13, at p. 295.
15 Dr. Johannes Trappe, "The duties, obligations and liabili ties of the ship's agent to his principal", [1978] LMCLQ 595.
ping Limited, nor the charterers expected him to make any contribution in the field of navigation.
The role of Protos Shipping Limited is to be distinguished from the role of a "port captain". The latter is generally a master with long experi ence in navigation who may assist the master with navigational problems. The M.V. Thor I had such a port captain in Montréal who turned out to be of much assistance to her Master. The M.V. Duteous also had one who flew from Spain to assist the M.V. Duteous in Gros Cacouna, Québec City and Montréal as well. However, after the loading was completed on January 8, 1981, the port captain flew back home and was not around to assist the Master of the M.V. Duteous in times of need.
The evidence reveals that Mr. Megin did visit the M.V. Duteous on several occasions and made himself useful to the extent of his limited compe tence. When informed by the Harbour Master that water was rising and that moorings should be reinforced, he personally carried the message to the Master of the M.V. Duteous. He provided no further navigational advice and ought not to have been expected so to do. It is trite law that in order to be negligent there must first be a duty to exercise care. It has not been established that there was such a breach of duty by the agent towards the M.V. Duteous and even less so towards the other parties. He fulfilled the minor role he was expected to play.
I therefore find no negligence on the part of Protos Shipping Limited.
7. No negligence on the part of the Harbour Master or the Queen
For the purposes of this hearing, the National Harbours Board, the port of Montréal, the Canadian Coast Guard, the Department of Trans port, the Pierre Radisson and Her Majesty the Queen were considered as one party and these reasons will apply accordingly.
In a nutshell, the charges against the National Harbours Board are that the Harbour Master of the port of Montréal, Captain Dea Hassib, was grossly negligent in failing to assign or shift the M.V. Duteous to a safer berth and in failing to properly warn those on board the M.V. Duteous of the imminent peril arising from the ice conditions in the port. The charge against the Crown is that the Master of the Pierre Radisson broke up the ice jam without any consideration for the security of the M.V. Duteous, perilously moored abeam her starboard.
The first question to be answered is the extent of the legal responsibilities of the Harbour Master towards the vessels moored in the port of Mon- tréal. The second is whether or not he fulfilled his responsibilities towards the M.V. Duteous.
The first question arose before the Supreme Court of Canada in Owners of the Steamship "Panagiotis Th. Coumantaros" v. National Har bours Board, 16 on appeal from the Exchequer Court of Canada, Quebec Admiralty District. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the National Harbours Board had an obligation to exercise reasonable care to see that the harbour was safe for navigation but that the duty must be looked at in the light of the existing circumstances. The Board was not obliged to drag or sweep in order to ascertain that proper dredging had been carried out by the Department of Marine. It held that only where the Board knew or should have known that the danger existed must steps be taken by it to remove such danger or suitable warning be given in respect of it. Bond J. said, at page 458:
The cases cited on behalf of the appellants establish clearly a duty upon the harbour authorities to take reasonable care that those who choose to navigate the harbour may do so without danger to their lives or property.
In Sparrows Point v. Greater Vancouver Water District,' 7 on appeal from the Exchequer Court of Canada, British Columbia Admiralty District, the
16 [1942] S.C.R. 450.
17 [1951] S.C.R. 396.
Supreme Court of Canada held that the National Harbours Board was negligent in its signalling of the M.V. Sparrows Point causing it to anchor in an area occupied by mains. Kellock J. (Rinfret C.J. and Taschereau J. concurring) said, at page 401:
In my opinion, there was a duty on the Board not to do or omit to do anything which might unnecessarily result in damage to the water mains. In the present instance, I think there was a breach of that duty.
He found the National Harbours Board to be liable for damage done to only one of the mains; liability for damage to the other mains was found to be precluded by an Order in Council. Rand J. said, at pages 409-410:
Since it had full knowledge of the existence and the placement of the pipes, that responsibility would extend to foreseeing that negligence in signalling might in the ordinary course of things bring about emergency action in the channel by which property of various kinds might be affected. There was, thus, a direct obligation on the Commission toward the Water District to avoid bringing that situation about negligently.
He found the National Harbours Board to be liable for damage to all of the mains. The M.V. Sparrows Point was also found liable for the damage.
In Nord-Deutsche Versicherungs-Gesellschaft et al v. The Queen et a1, 18 Noël J. of the Exche quer Court noted the reluctance of courts to hold the Crown liable, particularly where non-repair of public works or non-feasance was at issue. How ever, he cited The King v. Hochelaga Shipping & Towing Co. Ltd., 19 Grossman et al. v. The King 20 and Workington Harbour and Dock Board v. Towerfleld (Owners) 21 as exceptions to this reluc tance. Following these cases, Noël J. also found the Crown to be liable in tort under paragraphs 3(1)(a) and (b) of the Crown Liability Act 22 both by the common law and by the civil law of Quebec because Department of Transport officials had failed in their obligation to ensure that a pier had not been displaced by ice action or to give warning
18 [1969] 1 Ex.C.R. 117.
19 Supra.
20 [1952] 1 S.C.R. 571.
21 [1951] A.C. 112 (H.L.).
22 S.C. 1952-53, c. 30.
of the misalignment of the lights. In that respect the decision was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada (which allowed the appeal on other grounds). 23 The liability was apportioned at 50 per cent against the Crown, 30 per cent against one vessel and 20 per cent against the other vessel.
In Angeliki Compania Maritima S.A. v. BP Oil Limited, 24 the ship Angeliki was ravaged by fire on June 3, 1966, while berthed in the port of Montréal. The owners alleged three counts of neg ligence against the National Harbours Board. Firstly, for assigning a dangerous berth to the Angeliki (next to an oil tanker); secondly, for not having laid down specific safety procedures; third ly, for not warning the Angeliki of the danger (hydrocarbon escaping on the water). At the outset, Pratte J. made these two observations at page 6:
(a) I was referred to no enactment, and could find none, imposing on the National Harbours Board or its employees a duty to guarantee the safety of ships that tie up in the Port of Montreal.
(b) While the Board does not have a duty to guarantee the safety of ships moored in harbours placed under its control, it does have a duty to inform those using the harbours of con cealed dangers which may be constituted by harbour facilities.
And further on at page 7:
The Board's empl gees have not, I repeat, a duty to ensure the safety of ships mooring in their harbours.
It is well established that, apart from exceptional cases in which the law imposes a duty to act otherwise, a person is not guilty of negligence in not acting to help another avoid a danger which he himself has no part in creating. [My emphasis.]
The damage to the Angeliki arose from fire which a welder on board set by dropping molten metal on the hydrocarbon discharged from the nearby oil tanker. An appeal by the other defen-
23 [1971] S.C.R. 849.
24 Judgment dated April 16, 1973, Federal Court, Trial Division, T-4159-71, not reported.
dants was dismissed by the Court of Appeal, 25 and a further appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Canada. 26
In Warwick Shipping Limited v. R., 27 Addy J. held that there was no requirement of the Crown to maintain natural channels open and no duty to sweep away obstructions therein, unless there has been some representation to the effect that the duty has been assumed in some manner. That decision was confirmed by the Court of Appeal. 28 Pratte J. (now with the Court of Appeal), said at page 389:
Before considering that argument, it must be kept in mind that the respondent had no duty to place any buoy in that area. In fact, it seems to me that the Crown could lawfully decide to remove all buoys from Canadian waters: it would thereby render navigation more difficult but would no incur any liability.
As quoted earlier from the Angeliki decision, there is no enactment imposing on the National Harbours Board or on the Harbour Master any obligation to guarantee the safety of vessels moored in the port of Montréal. There is a by-law dealing with the berthage of vessels, but it affords no assistance to the claimants against the National Harbours Board. To the contrary, section 8 of the Berthage, Buoyage and Anchorage Charges Tariff By-law 29 provides as follows:
8. Every vessel moored or anchored in a harbour shall be so moored or anchored entirely at the risk of the owner of that vessel.
In view of my findings, it will not be necessary to deal with the immunity that such a by-law would or would not afford to the National Har bours Board against the negligence or gross negli gence of one of its employees.
However, the jurisprudence aforementioned has clearly established that there is at common law a duty upon the National Harbours Board, and more precisely upon the Harbour Master, to inform all vessels in port of any "concealed danger which may be constituted by harbour facilities".
25 (1975), 6 N.R. 216 (F.C.A.).
26 (1976), 8 N.R. 196 (S.C.C.).
27 [1982] 2 F.C. 147 (T.D.).
28 (1983), 48 N.R. 378 (F.C.A.).
29 C.R.C., c. 1061.
It appears to me that the ice conditions and the ensuing debacle in the port of Montréal were not concealed dangers, as they could have been apprehended, as mentioned earlier, by any inter ested party who kept abreast of the events. More over, those conditions were not constituted by the harbour facilities but created by nature and obvi ously beyond the control of the Harbour Master.
Much was said at the trial about the role and the attitude of the Harbour Master towards the vessels moored in the port of Montréal in January 1981. His stand as a witness was described as "one of injured innocence". He did indeed appear to me to have been somewhat cavalier and not as forth coming as he could have been. In his view, all berths in the Port of Montréal were safe; all information he had as to the ice conditions and the water level was available to the masters of the vessels: it was really up to them to ask for more information if they needed more, or to ask for a shift of berth if they felt uncomfortable at their respective locations.
The evidence shows that on Sunday, January 11, 1981, the Harbour Master, was at home when the man on duty at the office, Léon English, called at 09:00 hours to inform him that the water was rising. At 15:00 hours, Mr. English called again to inform him that the ice front had reached section 66, abeam the M.V. Atlantic Prosper, and that the Ro Ro Ramp of a local agency had fallen on the ice. The Harbour Master then called all the ships' agents advising them to reinforce their moorings. He also asked Mr. English to tell the Harbour Police to inform all the vessels of the above condi tions. By mistake, the police only informed the Canadian vessels.
The next day, Monday, January 12, 1981, around 07:00 hours, Captain Hassib was called again and informed that the M.V. Duteous had broken her moorings. He thereafter made a per sonal round of the vessels in the port and visited some of them. When he saw the M.V. Duteous precariously moored at section 43, he did not go on board because the vessel was not accessible from
the wharf. According to his own evidence, he said to himself "if there is a break-up, that vessel will not be able to do very much". He felt that there was nothing that could be done for that vessel because "it was too late". He made no further attempt in the course of the day to contact the Master of the M.V. Duteous. He knew there had been a pilot on board, but was not aware whether the pilot had stayed there or had left.
In Court, Captain Hassib did not appear to recall if he knew at the time that those on board the M.V. Duteous were foreign mariners with little knowledge of winter conditions. His position was that the ice-breakers would eventually open up the ice jam and free the port of Montréal; as to the vessels, they had all the information available and it was up to their masters to take the necessary precautions. That attitude may not reflect the philosophy of the Good Samaritan, but under the law the Harbour Master came under no obligation to do more than he did.
Under the circumstances I cannot find the Har bour Master or the National Harbours Board guilty of any negligence in this matter.
An argument was made that a contract had been struck between the National Harbours Board and the M.V. Duteous on the ground that vessels entering the port of Montréal have to pay wharf- age and other tolls so as to occupy a safe berth and that there had been a breach of that contract. The jurisprudence is clearly to the effect that the pay ment of tolls does not create such a contract (see The King v. Canada Steamship Lines Ltd.). 30
I now turn to the allegation that the Canadian Coast Guard was negligent for breaking the ice jam front while the M.V. Duteous was moored in such a precarious position.
The raison d'être for the Canadian Coast Guard is its responsibility for navigation, including the opening of the St. Lawrence River in the winter and the breaking of ice jams where necessary. The evidence clearly indicates that all available ice
3 ° [1927] S.C.R. 68.
breakers applied themselves diligently to that task in January 1981 and were successful in breaking up all successive fronts forming above the port of Québec City up to the port of Montréal.
The ice-breakers most certainly cannot be fault ed for lack of effort. The main charge against the Pierre Radisson is that she did not provide suffi cient warning or advice to the M.V. Duteous before resuming her attack on the front the morn ing of the debacle.
I find no sustenance, either legal or factual, to support such an allegation. Firstly, I know of no enactment, and was referred to none, that would compel ice-breakers to keep vessels informed of their progress on the St. Lawrence River. Second ly, those on board the M.V. Duteous were very much aware of the presence of the Pierre Radisson which they could see some 500 feet abeam from their own vessel. Any seaman who does not know the role of an ice-breaker in a Canadian winter ought to inform himself before entering our waters.
In fact, the Canadian pilot on board the M.V. Duteous on early Monday afternoon, January 12, 1981, Gaétan Forbes, spoke to the Pierre Radisson and was perfectly aware of her manoeuvres. As an experienced pilot in the port of Montréal, he knew or ought to have known that an ice break-up was bound to happen. Yet, he felt that the M.V. Dute ous was so safely moored that she would never move. "She could have spent her life there", he said. Had he stayed on board, he would have been perfectly aware of the position of the Pierre Radisson which remained overnight abeam the M.V. Duteous and resumed her operations in early morning. If there be negligence on the part of the pilot, it becomes the negligence of the shipowner under section 31 of the Pilotage Act.
I cannot therefore find the Pierre Radisson nor the Canadian Coast Guard, the Department of Transport nor the Queen, negligent in this matter.
In the course of the arguments the plaintiffs moved to file amendments to their statements of claim to add interest in their claims against the Queen and the National Harbours Board at the legal rate together with the additional indemnity provided by article 1056c of the Quebec Civil Code, as well before judgment as after. Both defendants resisted that motion. The parties filed written arguments in the matter. Under Rule 420 I am allowing the amendments to be filed, but in view of my findings it becomes unnecessary to deal with the legal entitlement to interest against the Crown in this matter.
8. No contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiffs
It was alleged that the M.V. Thor I should somehow be found to be partly responsible for having been hit. The argument, if I understand it correctly, is to the effect that if the M.V. Duteous was negligent in not mooring herself adequately and in not shifting berth, then so was the M.V. Thor I. Firstly, there is no conclusive evidence that the M.V. Thor I was improperly moored. Second ly, it has not been established that the M.V. Thor I would have broken her moorings had she not been run into by the M.V. Duteous. Thirdly, the M.V. Thor I was lawfully positioned where she was and did not contribute to the collision more than a car legally parked along the highway should be responsible for having been hit by a negligent driver.
There were allegations as well that St. Lawrence Stevedoring Company Limited ought to have fore seen the debacle and ought to have moved its cranes as soon as the M.V. Duteous was seen approaching the wharf. This allegation is even more far-fetched than the previous one against the M.V. Thor I. The three huge cranes are emplaced on tracks laid out along the quay, as provided by the port authorities. The cranes were lawfully positioned according to the lease between the port of Montréal and their owners. On that morning there happened to be an employee of St. Lawrence Stevedoring Company Limited who saw the M.V. Duteous appearing through the sea smoke shortly before the impact. The proposition that he should have moved quickly, climbed up the ladders lead ing to the cabins of the three cranes, started their
engines and moved them away along the tracks ahead of the M.V. Duteous, is too outlandish to deserve serious consideration.
Conclusions
1. Judgment therefore against the owners of the M.V. Duteous, Compagnia de Navegacion Dute ous, S.A., with damages and interest against it in favour of all claimants.
2. Costs of the three actions payable by Com- pagnia de Navegacion Duteous, S.A. in the form of a Bullock type order.
3. The claimants are agreed on the quantum of some of the damages but are still negotiating on others. If all damages are not agreed to, there shall be a reference as requested by the parties.
4. The formal judgment shall be prepared by counsel for A/S Omen and submitted to counsel for all other parties for approval. Should there be no agreement on the proposed judgment draft, then counsel for A/S Omen shall move the Court for a time and place for a hearing in the matter.
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