A-710-86
Toronto Volgograd Committee (Appellant)
v.
Minister of National Revenue (Respondent)
INDEXED AS: TORONTO VOLGOGRAD COMMITTEE V. M.N.R.
Court of Appeal, Mahoney, Marceau and Stone
JJ.—Ottawa, January 19 and March 3, 1988.
Income tax — Exemptions — Charities — Appeal from
refusal of registration as charitable organization — Constitut
ed objects including re-creation of link between residents of
Toronto and Volgograd — Activities including sponsoring and
organizing exchange visits and publicity — Appeal dismissed
— Whether registration requiring exclusively charitable pur
poses — Use of "activities" in s. 149.I (1)(b)(i) and 'purposes"
in s. 149.1(1) (a) — Necessary to look to both purposes and
activities — Statute not expressly barring consideration of
purposes — Law regarding purposes or activities aimed at
promoting attitude of mind as political — Outside ambit of
"advancement of education" and non-charitable — Activities
not beneficial to community in way law regards as charitable
as not within "spirit and intendment" of Statute of Elizabeth.
Charities — Appellant's purposes including promoting
understanding between residents of Toronto and Volgograd —
Activities including sponsoring and organizing exchange visits
— Registration as charitable organization refused — Whether
charitable registration requiring exclusively charitable pur
poses — Whether activities charitable as being for "advance-
ment of education" or 'for other charitable purposes" —
Trust fails as political in nature.
This was an appeal from a decision of the Minister of
National Revenue rejecting the appellant's application for
registration as a "charitable organization". The stated objects
of the appellant were to re-create the link between residents of
Toronto and Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad), create a people-
to-people relationship touching on common issues, i.e. the risk
of nuclear war, and to enhance this relationship through
exchanges to promote understanding, reduce tensions and help
the two societies find peaceful ways of living together. The
appellant's activities included sponsoring exchanges between
the residents of both cities, by paying travelling expenses,
organizing visits to ensure contacts with locals and arranging
publicity concerning the travellers' experiences abroad. The
Minister pointed out that in order to qualify for registration
under the Act an organization must be constituted and oper
ated for exclusively charitable purposes in the common law
sense. The appellant was found not to be a charity under the
head of "advancement of education or as a purpose beneficial
to the community as a whole in a way which the law regards as
charitable". The first issue was whether he erred in finding that
in order to qualify for registration an organization must be
constituted and operated "for exclusively charitable purposes",
emphasis being placed on the word "purposes". The appellant
argued that the respondent should have considered only its
actual activities and not the objects for which it was formed.
The appellant relied upon the use of "activities" in subpara-
graph 149.1(1)(6)(i) (which requires that all of an organiza
tion's resources be devoted to charitable activities carried on by
the organization itself) in contrast with the use of "purposes" in
paragraph 149.1(1)(a), (which requires a charitable foundation
be constituted and operated exclusively for charitable pur
poses). The second issue was whether the respondent erred in
ruling that the appellant's activities were not charitable as
being for "the advancement of education" or for "other chari
table purposes". Finally, did the respondent err in holding that
the information provided by the appellant was aimed at
"advocating or promoting a particular viewpoint with respect to
an issue or cause"?
Held, the appeal should be dismissed.
Per Stone J.: The first issue did not have to be decided
because the appellant conceded that the Court should look at
both purposes and activities in deciding whether it is entitled to
registration as a charitable organization. It was, however, to be
noted that although subparagraph 149.1(1)(6)(i) does not
expressly address itself to the documented purposes of a chari
table organization, it does not expressly bar consideration of an
organization's purposes. If devotion of its resources in the
manner prescribed by the Act was the only test, the Act would
be impossible to administer as the respondent would have to
constantly monitor the conduct of every registered organiza
tion. On the other hand, if the charitable nature of an organiza
tion is determined by reference to its constituting document, it
would only have to show, when required, that it did carry on
charitable activities to which it devoted all its resources.
To say that advancement of education means advancement
of education for its own sake in order that the mind may be
trained may be stating the matter too narrowly. However,
several cases were cited as establishing that purposes or activi
ties aimed at creating a particular climate of opinion and at
promoting an attitude of mind fall outside the ambit of
"advancement of education" because the law regards them as
political. The reasoning of those cases demonstrated that a trust
for the espousal of a political cause is not charitable. The
appellant's purposes and activities were non-charitable in the
sense of those cases and they did not satisfy the test of
"advancement of education".
The appellant's motives were altruistic and the community
could only benefit from this sort of exchange. However, the
activities were not beneficial to the community in a way the law
regards as charitable. The cause was not charitable, but politi
cal. Trusts to promote an attitude of mind have repeatedly been
held not to come under the fourth head of charity because they
do not come within the spirit and intendment of the Statute of
Elizabeth.
Per Mahoney J. (concurring): In both Native Communica
tions Society of B.C. v. Canada (M.N.R.) and Alberta Institute
on Mental Retardation v. Canada, the organizations were held
to be entitled to registration as charities although achievement
of the charitable purpose was an indirect result of the organiza
tion's activities. Neither organization could have met the test
proposed by Marceau J. The appeal should be dismissed for the
reasons given by Stone J.
Per Marceau J. (concurring in the result): According to the
definitions in section 149.1, a "charitable foundation" is estab
lished "for charitable purposes only", while a charitable organi
zation devotes its resources exclusively to charitable activities.
Parliament meant to distinguish between institutions which are
merely repositories of funds whose income is distributed peri
odically to help carry on the activities of others and, institutions
which join together people who intend to carry on by them
selves some specific activities. If the defined objects are deter-
minative for a foundation, it is not so for an organization.
While the classification of an activity requires that it be
considered in relation to the reason for which it is carried on, it
is not to be confused with the intention of the actor; the activity
is in the real and concrete world, not merely in the minds of
individuals.
Lord Macnaghten's judgment in Commissioners of Income
Tax v. Pemsel setting out four classes of charities, was con
cerned with trusts, and was developed to encompass all possible
objects capable of giving validity to institutions set up in an
altruistic spirit for the furtherance of some beneficial objective.
The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Guaranty Trust
Company of Canada v. Minister of National Revenue, which
applied the Pemsel case, also dealt with a trust. The classifica
tion adopted had to be elaborated liberally and with "pur-
poses", not "activities", in mind. In the context of tax law,
some adaptation was required. To be assigned to one of the four
headings, activities must be considered with respect to their
immediate result and effect, not their possible eventual conse
quence. An activity draws its charitable quality from what it
itself accomplishes not from what may be indirectly achieved
by it. The issue thus was whether the appellant's activities had
the immediate effect of relieving poverty, advancing education
or religion, or realizing something beneficial to the community
as a whole. While the appellant's activities may eventually
produce worthwhile results, immediately they merely satisfied
intellectual curiosity. None of the activities were charitable
within the spirit and intendment of the Act.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS JUDICIALLY
CONSIDERED
Charities Act, 1960 (U.K.), 8-9 Eliz. II, c. 58, s. 45(1).
Federal Court Rules, C.R.C., c. 663, R. 1312.
Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-7l-72, c. 63, ss. 110(8)(c) (as
am. by S.C. 1984, c. 45, s. 35), 149.1(1)(a) (as enacted
by S.C. 1976, c. 4, s. 60; S.C. 1984, c. 45, s. 57), (b)
(as am. by S.C. 1984, c. 45, s. 57).
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
APPLIED:
Commissioners of Income Tax v. Pemsel, [1891] A.C.
531 (H.L.); Anglo-Swedish Society v. Commissioners of
Inland Revenue (1931), 16 T.C. 34 (K.B.); Buxton and
Others v. Public Trustee and Others (1962), 41 T.C. 235
(Ch. D.); Strakosch, decd., In re. Temperley v. Attorney-
General, [1949] Ch. 529 (C.A.); In re Koeppler Will
Trusts, [1985] 3 W.L.R. 765 (C.A.).
DISTINGUISHED:
Re Laidlaw Foundation (1984), 48 O.R. (2d) 549
(H.C.).
CONSIDERED:
Native Communications Society of B.C. v. Canada
(M.N.R.), [1986] 3 F.C. 471; 86 DTC 6353 (C.A.);
Scarborough Community Legal Services v. The Queen,
[1985] 2 F.C. 555 (C.A.); Alberta Institute on Mental
Retardation v. Canada, [1987] 3 F.C. 286; 87 DTC 5306
(C.A.).
REFERRED TO:
Shaw, decd., In re. Public Trustee v. Day, [1957] 1
W.L.R. 729 (Ch.D.); Macduff, In re. Macduff v. Mac-
duff, [1896] 2 Ch. 451 (C.A.); In re Hopkins' Will
Trusts, [1965] Ch. 669; Incorporated Council of Law
Reporting for England and Wales v. Attorney-General,
[1972] Ch. 73 (C.A.); Guaranty Trust Company of
Canada v. Minister of National Revenue, [1967] S.C.R.
I 33.
AUTHORS CITED:
Ballow, H. A Treatise of Equity, Book II, London:
Strahan & Woodfall, 1793 rev. and ed. by John Fon-
blanque London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1979.
COUNSEL:
Harry B. Radomski and Graham D. Smith
for appellant.
Deen C. Olsen and Johanne D'Auray for
respondent.
SOLICITORS:
Goodman & Goodman, Toronto, for appel
lant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
respondent.
The following are the reasons for judgment
rendered in English by
MAHONEY J.: I have had the advantage of
reading in draft the reasons for judgment of my
colleagues herein and agree that the appeal should
be dismissed for the reasons given by Mr. Justice
Stone. My difficulty with the approach adopted by
Mr. Justice Marceau may be shortly illustrated by
reference to two recent decisions of this Court
which have held that the organizations in issue
were entitled to be registered as charities under the
Income Tax Act: Native Communications Society
of B.C. v. Canada (M.N.R.), [1986] 3 F.C. 471; 86
DTC 6353 (C.A.); and Alberta Institute on
Mental Retardation v. Canada, [1987] 3 F.C. 286;
87 DTC 5306 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused
January 28, 1988.
The "activities" of the first of those organiza
tions were the collection and dissemination of
information of interest and concern to the native
peoples of British Columbia. The "activities" of
the latter were solely the collection and resale, at a
profit, of used goods; the net profit was remitted to
another organization whose charitable status was
not in question.
It seems to me that, divorced from purposes
which would only indirectly be achieved, neither
organization could have met the test proposed. In
the one case, actual benefit to the mentally retard
ed could only follow the intervention of the activi
ties of a third party. In the other, the real chari
table purpose did not lie in making available
information and vehicles for its exchange but in
the expectation of their advantageous use by native
peoples; achievement of the charitable purpose was
inherently an indirect result of the organization's
activities.
• - fi
The following are the reasons for judgment
rendered in English by
MARCEAU J. (concurring in the result): I readi
ly agree with my brother Stone J. that the applica
tion of the appellant for registration as a charity
under paragraph 110(8)(c) of the Income Tax
Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, as amended [by S.C.
1984, c. 45, s. 35] (the "Act") was rightly reject
ed. However the reasoning which led me to my
conclusion is different from that adopted by my
colleague in his reasons for judgment, and in view
of the importance of the subject involved, which
surprisingly enough has only recently and on a few
rare occasions been considered by this Court,' I
think I ought to express my personal view of the
matter.
I will start with two observations which, in my
understanding, are fundamental and ought to
govern the whole approach to be adopted to resolve
the issue.
The first observation is drawn from the defini
tion of "charity" as found in the Act. Since 1976,
when Parliament proceeded to a major overhaul of
the rules governing charities for income tax pur
poses, an overhaul which was completed later,
more especially in 1984, two types of "charity" are
recognized: the charitable foundation (either
public or private) and the charitable organization.
They are defined in paragraphs 149.1(1)(a) [as
enacted by S.C. 1976, c. 4, s. 60; S.C. 1984, c. 45,
s. 57] and 149.1(1)(b) [as am. by S.C. 1984, c. 45,
s. 57] of the Act as follows:
149.1 (1) In this section, section 172 and Part V,
(a) "charitable foundation" means a corporation or trust con
stituted and operated exclusively for charitable purposes, no
part of the income of which is payable to, or is otherwise
available for, the personal benefit of any proprietor, member,
' The only decisions of this Court respecting charities which I
am aware of are: Scarborough Community Legal Services v.
The Queen, [1985] 2 F.C. 555; Native Communications Socie
ty of B.C. v. Canada (M.N.R.), [1986] 3 F.C. 471; and Alberta
Institute on Mental Retardation v. Canada, [1987] 3 F.C. 286.
shareholder, trustee or settlor thereof and that is not a chari
table organization;
(b) "charitable organization" means an organization, whether
or not incorporated,
(i) all the resources of which are devoted to charitable
activities carried on by the organization itself,
(ii) no part of the income of which is payable to, or is
otherwise available for, the personal benefit of any proprie
tor, member, shareholder, trustee or settlor thereof,
Among the several differentiating elements
which can be drawn from an analysis of these two
definitions, there is one which is immediately strik
ing. A "charitable foundation" is established and
organized "for charitable purposes only" (the cor
responding phrase in French being "Ã des fins
charitables") while a "charitable organization"
devotes its resources "exclusively to charitable
activities" (in French: "à des activités de bienfai-
sance"). And indeed, in each and every subsequent
provision establishing the rules governing each
type of charity, when dealing with a "charitable
foundation", the Act speaks of purposes; and when
dealing with a charitable organization, it speaks of
activities (see, for example, subsections 149.1(2),
(3),(6),(6.1),(6.2)). That this differentiation is
fundamental in the legislative scheme is not to be
doubted. These usual and ordinary words, which,
in both languages, refer to completely different but
quite simple concepts, were certainly used for what
they really mean since they are squarely put in
opposition to one another, it being provided that
only organizations can have activities. In fact, as it
is well known, Parliament meant to distinguish
generally between, on the one hand, institutions or
legal entities which are merely repositories of
funds and whose income is distributed periodically
with a view to helping the carrying on of activities
by others, and, on the other hand, institutions,
which do not even have to be supported by a
corporate entity, but join together people who
intend to carry by themselves some specific activi
ties. The French word for the latter, the word
"oeuvre", is quite revealing in this respect, its
meaning being "word", "action", "task".
So, while a "foundation" will be entitled to
registration as a "charity" as soon as the purposes
for the pursuit of which the administrators or
trustees are mandated and empowered to distrib
ute money from its fund are "charitable"—a fact
that can be determined only by considering the
document by which the institution was set up—,
an "organization" will be entitled to be registered
as a charity only if its activities are and remain
charitable—a condition which requires an exami
nation of what its members actually do. In other
words, if the goals, the objects, the intentions, as
defined in its constituting document, are by them
selves determinative for a "foundation", it is not so
for an "organization". It is true that the classifica
tion of an activity requires that it be considered in
relation to the reason for which it is carried on, but
nevertheless it is not to be confused with the
intention of the actor; the activity is in the real and
concrete world, not merely in the minds of the
individuals.
The second observation is suggested by the first
one, but it is specifically directed to the meaning
of the word "charitable" in the definitions of the
two types of "charity". As it is well known, in the
absence of any statutory indication as to what
exactly was meant by that word, the commentators
and the courts have turned to the common law for
guidance. The well-known judgment of Lord Mac-
naghten in Commissioners of Income Tax v.
Pemsel, [1891] A.C. 531 (H.L.) has become the
leading authority, more particularly the following
famous passage thereof [at page 583]:
How far then, it may be asked, does the popular meaning of the
word "charity" correspond with its legal meaning? "Charity"
in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for
the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education;
trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for other
purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any of
the preceding heads.
This passage, which has been seen in England as
embodying the common law test to identify chari
table trusts, was in effect given the same preemi
nence in this country following the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Guaranty Trust Company of
Canada v. Minister of National Revenue, [1967]
S.C.R. 133. There is one difficulty however with
Lord Macnaghten's judgment, a difficulty which,
in my opinion, is too often overlooked: it was a
judgment strictly concerned with charitable trusts
and was elaborated with a view to reaching all
possible objects capable of giving validity to insti
tutions set up in an altruistic spirit for the further
ance of some beneficial objective (the Guaranty
Trust Company case was similarly concerned with
the validity of a trust). The classification adopted
therein had therefore to be elaborated liberally
and with "purposes" and not "activities" in mind.
When used with respect to activities and in the
context of tax law, some adaptation will undoubt
edly be required to make it capable of identifying
those activities sufficiently beneficial to be entitled
to the very special tax treatment conferred by the
Act. For one thing, it seems to me obvious that the
vagueness of the fourth heading is particularly
troubling when applied to activities as it appears
almost totally meaningless if not somehow refor
mulated with more precise language. But the point
I really wish to make here is that, to be assigned
validly and usefully to one of the four headings of
the classification, activities must necessarily, it
seems to me, be considered with respect to their
immediate result and effect, not their possible
eventual consequence. In other words, the activity
will draw its charitable quality from what it itself
accomplishes not from what may eventually flow
from it or be somehow indirectly achieved by it.
If these basic observations I have just made are
correct, the issue raised by the appeal is quite
simple and can be dealt with quickly. The appel
lant Committee, an unincorporated organization,
had the right to be registered as a "charity",
contrary to the decision of the Minister, if, and
only if, its activities (and that is to say, it having
no legal entity, the activities of its members) have
the immediate effect of relieving poverty, advanc
ing education or religion or, possibly, realizing
something beneficial to the community as a whole.
The first step is therefore to inquire as to what
exactly the members of the Committee do in their
capacity as members. The evidence on this point is
clear: put simply, the activities of the Committee
and its members consist, as I understand it, in
sponsoring exchanges and meetings between resi
dents of Toronto, and residents of Volgograd in
Russia. In more concrete terms, the Committee
and its members select candidates of one city
interested in visiting the other city, pay for all
travelling expenses, make sure that the visitors'
stay is organized so as to encourage contacts with
local people, and finally arrange for publicity, by
way of media coverage and speaking engagements,
of the travellers' experience abroad and the
impressions they have gathered during their jour
ney. To these activities would have to be added, I
suppose, when members are themselves chosen as
candidates, this actual travelling abroad, the
actual meeting of people and the actual conveying
of impressions. So these are all the activities with
respect to which we have to ask ourselves whether
they can have, as their immediate effect, the relief
of poverty, the advancement of education and
religion, or the realization of something beneficial
to the community as a whole. In my judgment,
there is not much place for hesitation. The organi
zation or the making of trips and visits, the making
of acquaintances and the conveying of personal
impressions and experience are all activities which
may be very good and instructive, and may eventu
ally produce worthwhile results, but immediately
they can hardly have any effect beyond the satis
faction of intellectual curiosity and the acquisition
of human experiences for those who carry them on.
None, it seems to me, can be said to be charitable
within the spirit and intendment of the Act.
It is on the basis of this view of the matter that I
would dispose of this appeal as suggested by my
brother Stone J.
* * *
The following are the reasons for judgment
rendered in English by
STONE J.: This is an appeal from a decision of
the respondent dated October 23, 1986 rejecting
an application by the appellant for registration as
a "charitable organization" pursuant to the provi
sions of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148,
as amended by S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, and as
further amended (The "Act").
The appellant is an unincorporated voluntary
association formed in October 1983. At its organi
zational meeting held that month, it adopted a
constitution which sets out its objects in the follow
ing context:
WHEREAS we are deeply concerned about world tensions,
including the increasing threat of a nuclear holocaust;
AND WHEREAS we are worried about the stereotyping of peo
ples and societies that fed this tension: and whereas we believe
it is important to break down these barriers and to ,increase
understanding;
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the objects of the committee
are to:
(i) re-create the link between residents of Toronto and Volgo-
grad, a link first officially made during the Nazi siege in
1942-43;
(ii) create a people-to-people relationship touching on issues
that we as city people have in common, including the risk of
nuclear war;
(iii) enhance this relationship through exchanges to promote
understanding, reduce tensions and help our societies find
peaceful ways of living together.
The organization does not intend to acquire real property.
The organization will be carried on without purpose of gain for
its members, and any profits or other accretions shall be used to
promote the objects of the organization.
The appellant's application for registration was
submitted in November, 1985. It was accompanied
by required supporting material including a state
ment outlining its activities. In addition, letters
urging favourable consideration were received
from a number of leading residents of Toronto,
their authors expressing the view that the appli
cant's activities are "educational" in nature and
therefore charitable.
The statement of activities merits careful con
sideration. It describes in somewhat greater detail
what the appellant regards as activities entitling it
to recognition as a "charitable organization"
under the Act. Thus, we find statements of the
appellant's purposes and activities.
The Toronto Volgograd Committee was formed with a view to
benefiting the community by providing the public at large with
an opportunity to understand and experience the lifestyle and
concerns of the people of Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad). As
the Committee is deeply concerned about world tensions and
the stereotyping of peoples and societies that feed this tension,
it is felt that it is important to break down these barriers and to
increase understanding.
Therefore, the three main objectives of the Committee are as
follows:
L To benefit the community as a whole by educating the
Canadian people and increasing the understanding with respect
to the concerns and the lifestyle of the people of Volgograd. In
order to do so, the Committee will try to re-create the link
between the residents of Toronto and Volgograd, a link first
officially made during the Nazi siege in 1943-44.
2. To increase public awareness by creating a people-to-people
relationship touching on issues that we as city people have in
common, including the risk of nuclear war; and
3. To educate people by sponsoring exchanges and meetings
between the residents of Toronto and Volgograd.
(Case Material, page 64)
One method used by the Committee to further the education of
people with regards to the concerns and lifestyle of the citizens
of Volgograd is by sponsoring exchanges and meetings between
the residents of Toronto and Volgograd. To date there have
been four exchanges. In February, 1984 (the 40th anniversary
of Toronto's first twinning with Volgograd, then Stalingrad),
two people from Volgograd came to Toronto for a week. In
October, 1984, 13 delegates from Toronto spent a week in
Volgograd, first visiting Moscow and later Leningrad. In May,
1985, four people from Volgograd came to Toronto for a week.
This was followed by a visit by twelve delegates from Toronto
to Volgograd in April, 1986. Currently planned is a visit by
eight people from Volgograd in mid October, 1986.
Visits are arranged directly between the Toronto Volgograd
committee and the Mayor's office in Volgograd. Volgograd
City Hall chooses the delegates who will come to Canada. The
offices of the Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union and
the Russian embassy in Ottawa are contacted for help in
various arrangements.
Itineraries are arranged as much as possible in advance, and
include both formal and informal functions. All four exchanges
have included meetings with and receptions held by mayors in
both cities and a chance to meet leading local figures in each
city. Members of each group indicate areas of interest and the
itinerary attempts to include appropriate visits and meetings in
these areas. A considerable amount of time is set aside for
informal discussions, visiting in homes, and generally getting to
know each other on a personal level. Attached are copies of the
itineraries for the Fall 1984 trip to Volgograd and the May
1985 visit to Toronto.
Media Coverage
Significant use of the media has been made to help educate
those not otherwise familiar with the Committee's work. There
have been several newspaper articles about both visits and
impressions by return delegates and appearances on both radio
and television. The following is a partial list of radio and
television stations on which Toronto Volgograd Committee
members have had an opportunity to talk about the Commit
tee's work:
Speaking Engagements
Another method of promoting understanding is to have mem
bers give speeches to interested groups about their visits to the
Soviet Union and to have visitors from the Soviet Union speak
to groups in Toronto.
Members who have visited Volgograd are expected to arrange
lectures or speaking engagements to share their experience with
as many people as possible. In 1985 speeches were made to a
wide range of groups including Management Accountants of
Canada, criminologists and social workers, St. Philip the Apos
tle Anglican Church, teachers and students at Jarvis Collegiate,
Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Approximately
5,000 people heard members speak in 1985.
(Case Material, pages 65-66)
The record before us contains copies of several
of the appellant's newsletters, one of which
includes an account of a visit of four Soviet citi
zens to Toronto in May 1985. It reads in part:
Our four visitors, Mikhail Babushkin, Gen. Theodor Pekarsky,
Larissa Mitina and Victor Shourubov had a very busy week
here from May 23-29th. We tried to make sure they saw a lot
of Toronto, including St. Lawrence Market on a Saturday
morning, some historic sites—Old Fort York and the Marine
Museum, as well as visiting in homes all over the city and area.
We also arranged for them to meet many Torontonians during
their stay. In addition to the Steering Committee and the
membership—who joined them at a reception one evening at
the Heliconian Club—they met Rotarians, members of the
Canada/USSR Association, city administrators, teachers and
students at Jarvis Collegiate, our Mayor and some members of
Council and representatives of a number of Toronto peace
groups. They had "time off' at Niagara Falls, including a
gourmet picnic in the rain, on shopping sprees, and at a
performance of CATS.
They were well received by the media on the whole, with the
exception of one hostile session with three aldermen, invited
guests and media in a committee room at City Hall. Our
visitors endured rude and angry questions from a number of
people who relished the opportunity to vent their frustrations on
real live Russians. We and our guests survived the ordeal, the
latter retaining their composure and good humour under con
siderable pressure. Perhaps it helped them towards a larger
perspective of the wide-ranging viewpoints of Toronto citizenry,
and to understand the need for the existence of our project—an
unpleasant if necessary exercise.
(Case Material, page 91)
An undated newsletter (apparently circulated in
late 1985) contains a report on a return visit of
members of the appellant to the Soviet Union. It is
worthwhile to recite a portion of that report:
By now many of you will have heard that the Volgograd trip
was a great success. Although it was known that we were not
an official delegation we were well received both formally and
informally in Moscow and Volgograd. The Canadian ambassa
dor, Peter Roberts and wife Glenna held a large reception for
us, enabling us to meet with a range of Canadian and Soviet
officials and journalists.
Arriving in Volgograd on a gloriously sunny day, we were
greeted at the airport by Loudmila, bearing bouquets of red
roses, her boss, Mr. Shustov, and Mr. Starovatykh, the first
Deputy Mayor. Alexandre was visibly delighted to see us again,
and joined us for many of the functions to follow.
The official events included a meeting with Mayor Atopov in
his office at City Council, laying flowers at two war memorials,
formal presentation of our group at a meeting of the Volgograd
Council of Deputies in the Gorky Theatre, and a splendid boat
tour and banquet on the Volga River as guests of mayor
Atopov.
(Case Material, page 90)
The report goes on to relate how the individual
interests and requests of the members were met by
their Soviet hosts. There were, for example, visits
to a school, a factory, a day care centre, a polyclin-
ic and activity centre for youth and a discussion
with a group of Soviet citizens with professional
backgrounds who had studied and spoke English.
Some time was also spent with the local Peace
Committee where the delegation referred to con
cerns over human rights and disarmament.
In his letter of October 23, 1986 (Case Ma
terial, pages 94-96), the respondent observed that
to qualify for registration under the Act, an organ
ization "must be constituted and operated for
exclusively charitable purposes" in the common
law sense. It was his view that the appellant could
not qualify "under the advancement of education
or as a purpose beneficial to the community as a
whole in a way which the law regards as chari
table". He continued:
In the context of charity, the advancement of education has
been defined by the courts to mean the advancement of educa
tion for its own sake in order that the mind may be trained.
This does not include the provision of information as a means of
advocating or promoting a particular viewpoint with respect to
an issue or cause.
Under the fourth head, other purposes beneficial to the commu
nity as a whole in a way which the law regards as charitable,
common law has determined that an ultimate intent to educate
people and foster better understanding between residents of two
communities would not be charitable. Specifically, in Anglo-
Swedish Society v. C.L.R. (1931) T.C. 34 (K.B.D.), an organi
zation whose dominant object was "promoting a closer and
more sympathetic understanding between English and Swedish
people" was held not to be charitable.
It is our understanding that the Committee's activities are
directed toward educating Canadian people with regard to the
concerns and lifestyle of the citizens of Volgograd in an attempt
to foster better understanding between residents of Toronto and
Volgograd, to reduce tensions including the increasing threat of
a nuclear holocaust, and to help the societies find peaceful ways
of living together. In our view, this purpose is analogous to
what the courts have determined is not charitable. Therefore,
while doubtlessly laudable, we cannot conclude that the Com
mittee's activities are charitable in the common law sense of the
term.
(Case Material, page 95)
Three errors are alleged by the appellant against
this decision. First, it is said that the respondent
erred in finding that in order to qualify for regis
tration an organization must be constituted and
operated "for exclusively charitable purposes".
Second, that a further error was made in deciding
that" the appellant's activities were not charitable
as being for the "advancement of education" or for
"other charitable purposes". Finally, it is contend
ed that in refusing registration the respondent
erred by his apparent decision that the appellant
provides information "as a means of advocating or
promoting a particular viewpoint with respect to
an issue or cause".
These issues must, of course, be addressed in the
light of relevant statutory provisions and common
law principles. Paragraph 149.1(1) (b) of the Act
reads:
149.1 (I) In this section, section 172 and Part V,
(b) "charitable organization" means an organization, whether
or not incorporated,
(i) all the resources of which are devoted to charitable
activities carried on by the organization itself,
(ii) no part of the income of which is payable to, or is
otherwise available for, the personal benefit of any proprie
tor, member, shareholder, trustee or settlor thereof,
The common law principles I have in mind are
those found in the judgment of Lord Macnaghten
in Commissioners of Income Tax v. Pemsel,
[1891] A.C. 531 (H.L.). They were the subject of
comment by this Court in Native Communications
Society of B.C. v. Canada (M.N.R.), [1986] 3 F.C.
471, at pages 478-479:
The starting point for a discussion of what may or may not
constitute a good charitable purpose is the decision of the
House of Lords in the case of Commisioners of Income Tax v.
Pemsel, [1891] A.C. 531 and, in particular, the legal meaning
of the word "charity" given by Lord Macnaghten, at page 583
of the report:
How far then, it may be asked, does the popular meaning of
the word "charity" correspond with its legal meaning?
"Charity" in its legal sense comprises four principal divi
sions: trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advance
ment of education; trusts for the advancement of religion;
and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community,
not falling under any of the preceding heads.
That definition has been applied time after time in this country
and has been approved by the Supreme Court of Canada (see
Guaranty Trust Company of Canada v. Minister of National
Revenue, [1967] S.C.R. 133, at page 141). A purpose, to be a
good "charitable" one, must possess a charitable nature within
"the spirit and intendment" of the preamble to the Statute of
Elizabeth entitled "An Acte to redresse the Misemployment of
Landes Goodes and Stockes of Money heretofore given to
Charitable Uses". That statute was enacted in England in 1601
during the reign of Elizabeth I as 43 Eliz. I, c. 4. Nowadays, it
is generally known to this branch of the law simply as the
"Statute of Elizabeth". It is unnecessary to recite the whole of
that preamble and perhaps also undesirable to attempt its
reproduction in the original form and style. I prefer instead to
do as Slade J. did in McGovern v. Attorney-General, [1982]
Ch. 321, at page 332 where he put the statute's list of chari
table objects in modern English as follows:
... the relief of aged, impotent, and poor people ... mainte
nance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of
learning, free schools, and scholars in universities ... repair
of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, seabanks and
highways ... education and preferment of orphans ... relief,
stock or maintenance for houses of correction ... marriages
of poor maids ... supportation, aid and help of young
tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons decayed ... relief or
redemption of prisoners or captives, and for aid or ease of
any poor inhabitants concerning payments of fifteens, setting
out of soldiers and other taxes.
With respect to the first ground of appeal, it is
said that the respondent misdirected himself in
deciding that the appellant was not constituted and
operated "for exclusively charitable purposes",
stress being placed on the word "purposes".
According to the appellant, the respondent should
have paid more attention to its actual "activities"
and less to the objects or purposes for which it was
formed. This proposition, it is argued, becomes
clear from an examination of the very language of
subparagraph 149.1(1) (b) (i), requiring that all of
an organization's resources be devoted "to chari
table activities" carried on by the organization
itself. The appellant contrasts the word "activities"
with the word "purposes" appearing in paragraph
149.1(1)(a), requiring a charitable foundation to
be "constituted and operated exclusively for chari
table purposes", and submits that in this latter
situation regard would necessarily have to be paid
to a foundation's purposes while in the former only
the "activities" of an organization are of concern.
I agree with this analysis to the extent that
subparagraph 149.1(1) (b) (i) does not, strictly
speaking, expressly address itself to the document
ed purposes of a "charitable organization" but
rather to ensuring that the organization maintains
"charitable activities" to which it devotes all of its
resources if it is to enjoy the benefits of registra
tion. Conversely, the statute does not expressly bar
consideration of an organization's purposes as
spelled out in its constituting document, for that
document must obviously represent not only a
guide or blueprint for its future actions but also a
definition of its essential nature or character. If
devotion of its resources in the manner prescribed
by the section is to be considered the only test to
which a charitable organization is answerable, the
statute might well be found rather difficult if not
impossible to administer. Such a proposition would
enable an organization to conduct its affairs in a
manner .necessary to satisfy that test for the pur
poses of securing registration but allow it to pursue
other activities authorized by its constituting docu
ment although not charitable ones in the legal
sense. This would place the respondent in the
position of having to monitor the conduct of every
registered organization on a constant basis. If, on
the other hand, the basic charitable nature of an
organization is to be determined by reference to its
constituting document, it would have only to show,
as and when required, that it did, as well, carry on
charitable activities to which it devoted all its
resources in order to enjoy or to continue to enjoy
the benefits of the statute. Put another way, it
would have not only to speak charity, it would
have to do charity. Fortunately, I am relieved of
expressing a final view on the question because of
counsel's concession during argument that we
should, indeed, look at both purposes and activities
in deciding whether the appellant is entitled to
registration as a "charitable organization". I may
add that this position appears to accord with the
traditional English view held at a time when the
task of superintending charities was left to the
equitable jurisdiction of the old Court of Chan
cery, for that Court seems to have taken close
notice of the express purposes of a particular
charity. 2
2 Section 45(1) of the current United Kingdom statute, the
Charities Act, 1960 (U.K.), 8-9 Eliz. II, c. 58, defines "chari-
ty" as meaning inter alia "any institution, corporate or not,
which is established for charitable purposes ....", but I think
the English jurisprudence is generally applicable in determining
whether "activities" are charitable. The role of the court in
former times is discussed in Ballow's A Treatise of Equity,
Book (I, London: Strahan & Woodfall, 1793 [Rev. and ed. by
John Fonblanque, London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1979],
where we find the following in the footnote at pages 209-210:
(Continued on next page)
The second issue in fact breaks down into two
separate questions. In the first place, was an error
committed in ruling that the appellant has no
educational purpose because it was not constituted
and operated for "the advancement of education"
under the second head of charity found in Lord
Macnaghten's classification? Secondly, if the
respondent was correct in so ruling, did he never
theless err in ruling that the appellant was not
constituted and operated for "other purposes
beneficial to the community" under Lord Mac-
naghten's fourth classification? The third issue
may itself be conveniently addressed in conjunc
tion with the first of these questions, for it is there
argued that the appellant cannot qualify under the
second head, in any event, because the information
it puts out is aimed at "advocating or promoting a
particular viewpoint with respect to an issue or
cause".
In determining whether a given organization
qualifies for registration in accordance with Lord
Macnaghten's classification of charities, it is desir
able to bear in mind the following principles,
which are not intended to be exhaustive. To begin
with, as the Act does not provide a useful defini
tion of "charity", "charitable purpose" or "chari-
table activity", a court is left to supply one. That
may be contrasted, for example, with a statute that
actually does contain a definition as, for instance,
the Ontario legislation that was before the Divi-
(Continued from previous page)
(a) Sir W. Blackstone observes, that the king, as parens
patriae, has the general superintendance of all charities,
which he now exercises by the keeper of his conscience, the
Chancellor. And, therefore, whenever it is necessary, the
attorney general, at the relation of some informant, who is
usually called the relator, files ex officio an information in
the Court of Chancery, to have the charity properly estab
lished. 3 Com. 427. This proposition is too general; for,
though it be true, that where a charity is established, and
there is no charter to regulate it, as there must be somewhere
a power to regulate, the king has, in such case, a general
jurisdication; yet, if there be a charter with proper powers,
the charity must be regulated in the manner prescribed by
the charter, and there is no ground for the controling interpo
sition of the Court of Chancery. Attorney General v. Middle-
ton, 2 Vez. 328. [Emphasis added.]
sional Court in Re Laidlaw Foundation (1984), 48
O.R. (2d) 549 (H.C.) on appeal from the Surro
gate Court. That statute had adopted Lord Mac-
naghten's definition as its own, leading the Court
to interpret its language as Southey J. did at page
586, in "a more liberal" way having regard to its
statutory setting. Secondly, as was pointed out by
Mr. Justice Marceau in Scarborough Community
Legal Services v. The Queen, [ 1985] 2 F.C. 555
(C.A.), at page 571, "charities" to which the Act
applies enjoy a special status in that "not only are
they exempted from tax . .. but . .. all donations
made to them are deductible by donors in comput
ing their own taxable incomes". Finally, the result
is not to place the Court in a kind of judicial strait
jacket, prevented from making a determination of
eligibility under the Act in light of current societal
conditions bearing on the case. Pemsel's case
makes it clear that we ought not to take that
approach. That, instead, we are to have regard to
prevailing circumstances or conditions, was most
recently emphasized in the Native Communica
tions Society case where a number of the modern
English cases were discussed. Those cases furnish
yet another example of the inherent ability of the
common law to adapt to changing conditions in
society to the extent required in order to produce a
just result.
I turn first to consider the question of whether
the appellant may be regarded as for the
"advancement of education" and the related third
issue. In doing so, I must resist any temptation to
paint with a brush that is broader than necessary
to dispose of the point raised for decision. The
appellant attacks the respondent's suggestions that
advancement of education in its charitable sense
has been defined to mean "advancement of educa
tion for its own sake in order that the mind may be
trained" and that it does not include "provision of
education as a means of advocating or promoting a
particular viewpoint with respect to an issue or a
cause". The first of these positions appears to state
the meaning of advancement of education some-
what too narrowly as, indeed, the respondent
seems to concede in paragraph 15 of his written
argument where he says that this head of charity
should disclose activities concerned with "teach-
ing, education, or training" or be concerned with
activities that are directed toward "enhancing par
ticular branches of human knowledge and its
public dissemination". A number of authorities are
there relied upon, including Shaw, decd., In re.
Public Trustee v. Day, [1957] 1 W.L.R. 729 (Ch.
D.), at pages 737-738; Macduff, In re. Macduff v.
Macduff, [1896] 2 Ch. 451 (C.A.), at pages 472-
473; In re Hopkins' Will Trusts, [1965] Ch. 669,
at page 680; and Incorporated Council of Law
Reporting for England and Wales v. Attorney-
General, [1972] Ch. 73 (C.A.), at pages 92-93, per
Sachs L.J., and, at pages 100-101, per Buckley
L.J.
Several English cases are also cited by the
respondent as establishing that purposes or activi
ties aimed at creating a particular climate of opin
ion and at promoting an attitude of mind fall
outside the ambit of "advancement of education"
because the law regards them as political: Anglo-
Swedish Society v. Commissioners of Inland
Revenue (1931), 16 T.C. 34 (K.B.); Buxton and
Others v. Public Trustee and Others (1962), 41
T.C. 235 (Ch. D.); and Strakosch, decd., In re.
Temperley v. Attorney-General, [1949] Ch. 529
(C.A.). In the first of these cases, the court had to
decide whether a trust for the "promotion of a
closer and more sympathetic understanding be
tween the English and Swedish peoples" by afford
ing "opportunities for Swedish journalists to visit
the United Kingdom, and to study at first hand
British modes of thought and British National
Institutions" was a good charitable trust. In decid
ing that it was not, Rowlatt J. said, at page 38:
Now what is this? It is a trust really to promote an attitude
of mind, the view of one nation by another; that is all really
that it is. There may be many trusts to influence general
opinion the results of which influence may be very good, but
where the immediate trust is only to influence general opinion
in favour of some theory or view or aspiration, or whatever it
may be, I cannot myself see that the statute of Elizabeth is
looking to that sort of thing at all. Education and relief of
poverty and all these things seems to me to materialise, if I may
use the expression, in some fairly proximate way. Perhaps the
least one says about it the better, because, as I said this
morning, as Lord Haldane said, it is much easier to say that a
certain case does not come within the doctrine than to define
the limits of the doctrine affirmatively.
The objects before the Court in the Strakosch case
[at pages 535-536] i.e. "to strengthen the bonds of
unity between the Union of South Africa and the
Mother Country and which incidentally will con
duce to the appeasement of racial feeling between
the Dutch and English speaking sections of the
South African community", we found not to be
educational. Lord Greene M.R., speaking for the
Court of Appeal, at page 536, had this to say:
We realize the truth of the contention that the objects to which
the gift is to be devoted are matters of great public concern
both in the Union of South Africa and in the Mother Country.
In particular the appeasement of racial feeling in the Union
cannot but benefit all inhabitants of the Union, not merely the
members of the two sections of the community expressly
referred to. But the very wide and vague scope of the gift and
the unrestricted latitude of application which its language
permits make it impossible in our opinion to find that it falls
within the spirit and intendment of the preamble to the Statute
of Elizabeth.
And, later, at page 538 he added:
It is unfortunate if, as may well be, these methods were in the
testator's mind that he did not seek to constitute a trust which
might well have been valid as an educational trust notwith
standing that the education had the ultimate aim as set out in
the will. We, however, find it impossible to construe this trust
as one confined to educational purposes. These may be the best
methods but they are certainly not the only methods. The
problem of appeasing racial feeling within the community is a
political problem, perhaps primarily political. One method con
ducive to its solution might well be to support a political party
or a newspaper which had such appeasement most at heart.
This argument gains force in the present case from the other
political object, namely, the strengthening of the bonds of unity
between the Union and the Mother Country. It would also we
think be easy to think of arrangements for mutual hospitality
which would be conducive to the purposes set out but would not
be charitable.
Finally, in the Buxton case the objects claimed to
be for the advancement of education but judged to
be non-charitable instead, read [at page 37]:
"To promote and aid the improvement of international rela
tions and intercourse by (a) Educating or informing public
opinion by the methods (among others) of periodical maga
zines and papers, books and pamphlets, lectures, prizes,
scholarships and research work. (b) Encouraging or assisting
personal intercourse between the inhabitants of different
countries including the payment of travelling expenses and
maintenance. (c) Assisting any other persons or bodies
having similar objects and purposes to the above. (d) Assist
ing any persons by paying their expenses in connection with
their standing for election for Parliament or other public
Assemblies. (e) Employing or following any other methods
which in the opinion of the Trustees may conduce to the
attainment of the above-mentioned objects and purposes."
Plowman J., after referring to both the Anglo-
Swedish and the Strakosch cases, said this, at
page 240:
... I ask myself the question whether a charitable educational
purpose clearly comes within the ambit of "the improvement of
international relations and intercourse". In my judgment it
does not. I think that Mr. Stamp was right in his submission
that the objects of this trust have nothing at all to do with
charity.
And, again, at page 242 he added:
So here it seems to me that the objects of this trust are really
public utility or political. The only element of education which
might be said to be comprehended in those objects appears to
me to be education for a political cause, by the creation of a
climate of opinion and that is not, in my judgment, education of
a kind which is charitable. As Mr. Stamp said, it is really no
more than propaganda.
In my view, the reasoning of these cases is
germane. It demonstrates that a trust for the
espousal of a political cause or aspiration is not
charitable. A recent illustration of its application
may be found in the judgment of Slade L.J. in In
re Koeppler Will Trusts, [1985] 3 W.L.R. 765
(C.A.), where he said, at page 771:
Furthermore, if read by themselves, they would cover modes of
expenditure which would plainly not be charitable, simply, for
example, the espousal of the political cause of the Common
Market: compare In re Strakosch, decd. [1949] Ch 529, par
ticularly at pp. 538-539 per Lord Greene M.R.; Buxton v.
Public Trustee (1962) 41 T.C. 235 and Anglo-Swedish Society
v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1931) 16 T.C. 34.
To my mind, the appellant's purposes and activi
ties are non-charitable in the sense of these cases
and, accordingly, do not satisfy the test of
"advancement of education" as understood in this
branch of the law.
The remaining question is whether by its pur
poses and activities the appellant qualifies for
registration as a charitable organization on the
basis that it comes under Lord Macnaghten's
fourth head of charity i.e. a trust for purposes
beneficial to the community not falling within his
first three heads. As I think the trust fails because
of its essential political nature, it is not strictly
necessary to deal with this issue and I will not do
so at any length even though it was fully argued
before us. At the outset, I remind myself of what
was said about this head of charity in the Native
Communications Society case, at pages 479-480:
A review of decided cases suggests that at least the following
propositions may be stated as necessary preliminaries to a
determination whether a particular purpose can be regarded as
a charitable one falling under the fourth head found in Lord
Macnaghten's classification:
(a) the purpose must be beneficial to the community in a way
which the law regards as charitable by coming within the
"spirit and intendment" of the preamble to the Statute of
Elizabeth if not within its letter. (National Anti-Vivisection
Society v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1948] A.C. 31
(H.L.), at pages 63-64; In re Strakosch, decd. Temperley v.
Attorney-General, [1949] Ch. 529 (C.A.), at pages 537-538),
and
(b) whether a purpose would or may operate for the public
benefit is to be answered by the court on the basis of the record
before it and in exercise of its equitable jurisdiction in matters
of charity (National Anti-Vivisection Society v. Inland Reve
nue Commissioners (supra), at pages 44-45, 63).
I have already discussed the common law princi
ples which appear to govern this aspect of the
appeal. They are found in the Anglo-Swedish,
Strakosch and Buxton cases which, though not on
all fours factually, establish principles which I
think apply. The appellant's purposes and activi
ties, directed as they are by a group in Canada
toward a group in the Soviet Union, are interna
tional in their aspect. I do not question that the
motives which lay behind them are entirely altruis
tic. The very strong view is plainly held that
nothing but good can flow to the wider community
from this sort of people-to-people contact, especial
ly in times of international tensions and the threat
of nuclear war, because it serves to promote
mutual understanding and friendship between
groups in two countries professing distinct political
ideologies. The only question we are called upon to
decide, however, is whether these activities, though
laudable and worthwhile in themselves, meet the
test of "charity" in the sense that they are benefi
cial to the community in a way the law regards as
charitable. In my respectful opinion that test is not
met. The cause being pursued is not a charitable
cause but, rather, a political one in the sense
already discussed. Two of the decisions I have
mentioned, Anglo-Swedish and Strakosch, lay
down the principle that must be applied and also
illustrate why it is that trusts of this variety do not
come under the fourth head of charity. I shall
repeat what I have already recited from the judg
ment of Rowlatt J. in the first of these cases, this
time enlarging on it so as to give the full context in
which those views are found. He said this, at page
38:
There is no doubt that the people who formed the Society
acted with perfectly altruistic motives in endeavouring to
achieve what they thought would be a very useful public object;
and I dare say they are perfectly right, but I am bound to say in
this difficult matter I cannot bring myself to think that this is a
charitable trust within the analogy of the statute of Elizabeth. I
have said that I think it is a trust of public utility, whether or
not a particular person might agree with the particular applica
tion of it. That is the kind of trust it is; it is a trust to bring
about what the people who founded it think is an improvement
in public matters, and therefore it is a trust for matters of
public utility. But it is, of course, well settled that it is not every
trust for matters of public utility that is a charity. In other
words, it would not be a true definition of the words "charitable
trust" to say that it was a trust for public utility. That is very
trite law now.
Now what is this? It is a trust really to promote an attitude
of mind, the view of one nation by another; that is all really
that it is. There may be many trusts to influence general
opinion the results of which influence may be very good, but
where the immediate trust is only to influence general opinion
in favour of some theory or view or aspiration, or whatever it
may be, I cannot myself see that the statute of Elizabeth is
looking to that sort of thing at all.
Finally, I adopt the reasoning of Lord Greene M.
R., at page 537 of the Strakosch case, where he
said:
As Roxburgh J. read them the terms of the disposition
comprehend any application which in the opinion of the testa-
tor's trustees is calculated to promote or subserve what is in
truth a political cause or aspiration, viz., that of closer collabo
ration or relations between two national groups, those of the
United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa, and at the
same time closer collaboration or relations between those of
English and Dutch descent within the confines of one of those
national groups, viz., South Africa. We do not think the case is
altered if it be assumed in the appellants' favour that the
unlimited discretion given to the trustees extends only to the
first limb of the objective and not to the second. For in that
case the result is that (as Sir Cyril Radcliffe put it) the drawing
together of the two divergent races in South Africa (which on
this hypothesis is made a condition of any application of the
fund) is a part or incident of the broader aim of drawing
together two communities which form part of the politicial
organization of the British Commonwealth of Nations: and that
which is made the condition is still what we have called a
political cause or aspiration. In Williams' Trustees v. Inland
Revenue Commissioners ([1947] A.C. 447), the House of
Lords has laid down very clearly that in order to come within
Lord Macnaghten's fourth class, the gift must be not only for
the benefit of the community but beneficial in a way which the
law regards as charitable. In order to satisfy the latter it must
be within the "spirit and intendment" of the preamble of the
Statute of Elizabeth.
I would dismiss this appeal but, in the circum
stances, without costs, there appearing no "special
reasons" required by Rule 1312 of the Federal
Court Rules [C.R.C., c. 663] for making a differ
ent order.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.