Judgments

Decision Information

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T-3307-90
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Alberta (Applicant)
v.
Minister of the Environment, Honourable Robert De Cotret and Environmental Assessment Panel Appointed by the Minister of the Environment to Review the Oldman River Dam Project Composed of William A. Ross, Helen Tremaine, James Glad- stone, Michael Healey, Rolf Kellerhaus and Tracy Anderson (Respondents)
INDEXED AS: ALBERTA V. CANADA (MINISTER OF THE ENVI RONMENT) (T.D.)
Trial Division, MacKay J.—Edmonton, April 25; Ottawa, May 21, 1991.
Constitutional law — Distribution of powers — Environ mental Assessment Panel established under Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order to review Oldman River dam project — Alberta seeking certiorari, prohibition and/or injunction to prevent Panel from proceeding with public review of project on grounds Panel's terms of reference unconstitutional application of Minister's power or discretion under Guidelines Order — Province's application adjourned sine die pending S.C.C. decision in Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport) as to whether EARPGO so broad as to offend, ss. 92, 92A of Constitution Act, 1867.
Environment — Oldman River dam project Environmen tal review — Environmental Assessment Panel established under EARPGO — Application to halt review process on ground Panel's terms of reference unconstitutional application of Minister's power under EARPGO — Application adjourned sine die pending S.C.C. decision on whether EARPGO uncon stitutional as encroaching on provincial jurisdiction.
Practice — Stay of proceedings — Province seeking certio- rari, prohibition and/or injunction to prevent Environmental Assessment Panel from proceeding with public review of dam construction project on ground Panel's terms of reference unconstitutional — Minister seeking stay of proceedings on ground issue before S.C.C. — Test in Association of Parents Support Groups In Ontario (Using Toughlove) Inc. v. York et al. applied: applicant for stay must establish interest of justice supports stay and outweighs respondent's right to proceed with cause of action — Stay exceptionally granted though effec-
tively postponing access to relief which party otherwise having right to pursue — Although serious issue to be tried, post ponement in public interest — Balance of convenience in Minister's favour — Just and appropriate to adjourn matter sine die pending S.C.C. decision — Interests of justice and efficacy of judicial system best served by adjourning consider ation of Province's application.
This case dealt with the environmental review of the Oldman River dam project. The federal Minister of the Environment appointed an Environmental Assessment Panel to review the project. The Province of Alberta sought to halt the review by means of certiorari, prohibition or injunction on the grounds that the terms of reference issued by the Minister were an unconstitutional application of his power or discretion under the Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order. In response thereto, the Minister moved to have the Province's application adjourned sine die pending the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on an appeal, heard in February 1991, from the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal in Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport) where the constitutional issue would be dealt with. By late April 1991, the dam was about 98% complete and the whole project, 94% complete.
Basically, the Province questioned whether the federal gov ernment could provide for such a broadly based review of environmental, socio-economic and safety concerns as to encompass matters ordinarily within provincial legislative juris diction under sections 92, 92A, 95 and 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
Held, the Province's application should be adjourned sine die.
Since the Supreme Court has declined to add the question of the validity of the terms of reference to the matters for consideration on appeal, this application, based on the argu ment that the terms of reference are an unconstitutional application of the Guidelines Order, was not "a claim ... being proceeded with in another court" within the meaning of para graph 50(1)(a) of the Federal Court Act. There is a serious issue to be tried: the validity of the Panel's terms of reference. The question is whether a stay or an adjournment should be granted, the effect of which would be to postpone resolution of the issue.
Whatever the outcome, either of the parties was likely to suffer some harm but none that would be irreparable. However, the public interest would be best served, pending the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, by assuming the validity of the terms of reference of the Panel. The appropriate test herein was that applied in Association of Parents Support Groups In Ontario (Using Toughlove) Inc. v. York et al.: the applicant for
a stay must establish that the interest of justice clearly supports a stay and outweighs the respondent's right to proceed with the cause of action.
The interests of justice, and the efficacy of the judicial system, would be best served by adjourning consideration of the Province's application because (1) the validity of the Guidelines Order will likely be commented upon in the near future by the Supreme Court; (2) even if the Supreme Court does not deal directly with the issue raised here, that issue could be more readily resolved and perhaps more definitely argued in light of the Supreme Court decision. Accordingly, it would be unrea sonable for a motions judge to decide an issue closely related to questions under consideration by the Supreme Court of Canada.
This case warranted the unusual step of adjourning a matter in circumstances which effectively postponed access to relief which a party otherwise had a right to pursue. Although there was a serious issue to be tried, postponing consideration of that issue at this stage was in the public interest. Interrupting the review process at this stage would be more disruptive and create greater harm to the process of public environmental review than continuing that process pending the decision of the Supreme Court.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.) (as am. by Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), Schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982, Item 1) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II, No. 5], ss. 91, 92, 92A (as enacted by the Constitution Act, 1982), 95, 109.
Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guide lines Order, SOR/84-467.
Federal Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7, ss. 18, 50(1). Federal Court Rules, C.R.C., c. 663, R. 323.
Government Organization Act, 1979, S.C. 1978-79, c. 13, s. 14.
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
APPLIED:
Association of Parents Support Groups In Ontario (Using Toughlove) Inc. v. York et al. (1987), 14 C.P.R. (3d) 263 (F.C.T.D.); Edmonton Friends of the North Environmental Society v. Canada (Minister of Western Economic Diversification) (1990), 69 D.L.R. (4th) 143; 75 Alta. L.R. (2d) 1; 34 F.T.R. 137 (F.C.T.D.); Little Red River Band of Indians v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), see Edmonton Friends of the North Environmental Society v. Canada (Minister of Western Economic Diversification).
DISTINGUISHED:
Manitoba (Attorney General) v. Metropolitan Stores Ltd., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110; (1987), 38 D.L.R. (4th) 321; [1987] 3 W.W.R. 1; 46 Man.R. (2d) 241; 25 Admin. L.R. 20; 87 CLLC 14,015; 18 C.P.C. (2d) 273; 73 N.R. 341.
CONSIDERED:
Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minis- ter of Transport), [1990] 1 F.C. 248; [1990] 2 W.W.R. 150; (1989), 70 Alta. L.R. (2d) 289; 4 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 137; 30 F.T.R. 108 (T.D.), revd by [1990] 2 F.C. 18; (1990), 68 D.L.R. (4th) 375 (C.A.).
REFERRED TO:
Northwestern Utilities Ltd. et al. v. City of Edmonton, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 684; (1978), 12 A.R. 449; 89 D.L.R. (3d) 161; 7 Alta. L.R. (2d) 370; 23 N.R. 565; Ferguson Bus Lines Ltd. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1374, [1990] 2 F.C. 586; (1990), 68 D.L.R. (4th) 699; 43 Admin. L.R. 18; 108 N.R. 293 (C.A.); R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401; (1988), 48 D.L.R. (4th) 161; [1988] 3 W.W.R. 385; 25 B.C.L.R. (2d) 145; 40 C.C.C. (3d) 289; 84 N.R. 1; Fowler v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 213; [1980] 5 W.W.R. 511; (1980), 113 D.L.R. (3d) 513; 53 C.C.C. (2d) 97; 9 C.E.L.R. 115; 32 N.R. 230; Northwest Falling Contrac tors Ltd. v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 292; (1980), 113 D.L.R. (3d) 1; [1981] 1 W.W.R. 681; 53 C.C.C. (2d) 353; 9 C.E.L.R. 145; 2 F.P.R. 296; 32 N.R. 541; Canadi- an National Railway v. Courtois, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 868; (1988), 15 Q.A.C. 181; 85 N.R. 260; R. v. Amway Corp., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 21; (1989), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 309; 33 C.P.C. (2d) 163; 68 C.R. (3d) 97; 37 C.R.R. 235; [1989] 1 C.T.C. 255; 91 N.R. 18; Vickery v. Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Prothonotary), No. 21598 (S.C.C), judgment dated 28/3/91, Stevenson J. not yet reported.
AUTHORS CITED
Hogg, Peter W., Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed., Toronto: Carswell Co. Ltd., 1985.
COUNSEL:
B. Zalmonawitz and G. D. Chipeur for applicant.
J. C. DePencier for respondent Minister of the Environment.
W. A. Tilleman and S. J. Hammel for respondent Environmental Assesment Panel.
M. W. Mason for intervenor Friends of the Oldman River Society.
SOLICITORS:
Milner & Steer, Edmonton, for applicant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondent Minister of the Environment. Cook, Duke, Cox, Edmonton, for respondent Environmental Assessment Panel.
Gowling, Strathy & Henderson, Ottawa, for intervenor Friends of the Oldman River Society.
The following are the reasons for orders ren dered in English by
MACKAY J.: The applicant, Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Alberta, ("the Province") by return of motion dated January 21, 1991, seeks relief originally applied for by motion dated December 17, 1990. The original motion sought both interlocutory relief by way of injunction and permanent relief in the nature of orders noted below in relation to the terms of reference issued by the respondent Minister of the Environment ("the Minister") for the respondent Environmental Assessment Panel ("the Panel") appointed by that Minister to review the Oldman River dam project.
On December 20, 1990, my colleague Mr. Jus tice Rouleau considered, and dismissed, the origi nal motion in so far as it related to interlocutory relief, an application for an injunction to preclude the Panel from conducting a public review of the project until the determination by the Supreme Court of Canada of the appeal from the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal dated March 13, 1990, in Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport).' This application seeks an order in the nature of certiorari quashing the terms of reference issued by the Minister setting out the mandate and scope of the Panel's review, and an order in the nature of prohibition,
1 [1990] 2 F.C. 18 (C.A.).
or in the alternative, an injunction, preventing the Panel from proceeding with a public review of the project. The grounds of the motion for this relief sought under section 18 of the Federal Court Acte are that the terms of reference issued by the Minister are said to be an unconstitutional application of his power or discretion under the Guidelines Order, i.e., the Environmental Assess ment and Review Process Guidelines Order.'
When this application was heard in Edmonton on April 25, 1991, there was heard at the same time a motion of the Minister, dated January 29, 1991, that the Province's application for perma nent relief be stayed or adjourned sine die, pursu ant to subsection 50(1) of the Federal Court Act, or Rule 323 of the Federal Court Rules [C.R.C., c. 663], pending the decision now anticipated fol lowing argument in February, 1991, before the Supreme Court of Canada.
When this matter was heard counsel appeared for the Province, for the Minister, for the Panel and for the Friends of the Oldman River Society ("FORS"). Counsel present at the hearing con cerning interlocutory relief in December, 1990, were agreed that the motion then made by counsel on behalf of FORS, for standing in this matter had been orally granted, and the Society was con sidered to have status as a party respondent by my colleague Mr. Justice Rouleau. The Court file contained no written record of this. With consent of counsel for the applicant and the Minister, I granted an order that FORS be added as a party respondent in this application from December 20, 1990.
Counsel for the Panel submitted in advance of the hearing a memorandum and authorities con cerning the merits of certain aspects of the application by the Province, apparently relying for
2 R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7 as amended.
3 SOR/84-467 made pursuant to subsection 6(2) of the Gov ernment Organization Act, 1979, S.C. 1978-79, c. 13, s. 14.
the basis of his participation upon Northwestern Utilities Ltd. et al. v. City of Edmonton. 4 It was indicated that he did not propose to speak to the motion of the Minister that the proceedings be adjourned sine die. I indicated that if the motion to adjourn was dismissed and argument was directed to the merits of the application by the Province, I would first resolve whether counsel for the Panel should be heard at all on one side or other of the main issue here involved in view of the Panel's creation by the Minister, its lack of exper tise in relation to the issue of the constitutional validity of its terms of reference and in view of the comments of Mr. Justice Mahoney of the Court of Appeal in Ferguson Bus Lines Ltd. v. Amal gamated Transit Union, Local 1374. 5 Since, after hearing argument on behalf of the applicant, the Minister, and FORS, I determined that the motion by the Minister should be allowed and the applica tion by the Province should be adjourned sine die, it was unnecessary on this occasion to resolve the status of the Panel as a participant in submissions and argument before the Court, and written sub missions on behalf of the Panel have not been considered for the order issued or for these reasons.
It was agreed that the Province would proceed and present its application, to be followed by presentation of the Minister's application for a stay or adjournment and of FORS in support of the motion of the Minister, and then the Province would have an opportunity to respond to the argu ment advanced for a stay or adjournment. After argument on that motion, the Court would deter mine that issue, and if that application were dis missed, counsel for the respondents would then respond to the merits of the Province's application, with opportunity thereafter for reply by counsel for the Province.
After argument on the preliminary procedural application to stay or adjourn this proceeding, I ordered that the application of the Minister be allowed and the application of the Province be adjourned sine die, without full argument on the merits of the Province's application. At that time
4 [1979] I S.C.R. 684.
5 [1990] 2 F.C. 586, at p. 591.
my reasons for doing so were outlined orally but I indicated that I would provide written reasons to follow. These are those written reasons.
Background
The applications considered herein arise follow ing considerable litigation concerning the applica tion of the Guidelines Order to the Oldman River dam project. A summary overview of that litiga tion and of the steps leading to creation of the respondent Panel and initiation of its work provide the context in which these applications are made.
The final stage in earlier proceedings, an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, was heard on an expedited basis in February, 1991, and a decision of the Court is awaited. That process began with an application to this Court for judicial review of the decision of the Minister of Transport, under the Navigable Waters Protection Act, 6 approving the project for construction of a dam on the Oldman River by the Province. That application, which sought an order that federal Ministers comply with the Guidelines Order, was dismissed by Associate Chief Justice Jerome in Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport).' That decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal which quashed the approval for the project issued by the Minister of Transport and ordered that Minister and the Minister of Fisher ies and Oceans to comply with the Guidelines Order. 8
The Province sought, and on September 13, 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada granted, leave to appeal the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal. In its application for leave the Province raised, for the first time, constitutional issues con cerning the Guidelines Order and its application to the project. On October 30, 1990, the Chief Jus tice of the Supreme Court of Canada stated a
6 R.S.C. 1985, c. N-22.
7 [1990] 1 F.C. 248 (T.D.). 8 Supra, note 1.
constitutional question to be considered in the appeal by the Province:
Is the Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guide lines Order, SOR/84-467 so broad as to offend ss. 92 and 92A of the Constitution Act, 1867 and therefore constitutionally inapplicable to the Oldman River Dam owned by the appellant, Her Majesty the Queen in right of Alberta?'
On October 25, 1990, FORS initiated applica tion for an order of mandamus requiring the Min ister of the Environment to appoint a panel to conduct a public review pursuant to the Guidelines Order. That application was set down for hearing on November 20 but was adjourned sine die when the Panel was appointed by the Minister on November 16.
Subsequently, after announcement by the Min ister of the terms of reference and constitution of the Panel for a public assessment of the Oldman River dam project pursuant to the Guidelines Order, the Province applied to the Supreme Court of Canada to have the constitutional question amended by adding a second question concerning the terms of reference of the panel, as follows:
Are the terms of reference for the Oldman River Dam Environmental Assessment Panel issued by the Minister of the Environment under the Environmental Assessment and Review Guidelines Order [sic], SOR/84-867 so broad as to offend ss. 92 and 92A of the Constitution Act and therefore constitution ally invalid?
The Supreme Court of Canada, on December 14, denied this application to amend the constitutional question already stated for the appeal but granted the Province's application, made at the same time, to introduce the Panel's terms of reference as new evidence before the Supreme Court.
The Ministers of Transport and of Fisheries and Oceans were added as appellants to the appeal in which the FORS was the respondent. The Attor neys General of six other provinces, the govern ment of the Northwest Territories, four organiza tions of native peoples and six organizations of
9 Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of Proceedings, November 2, 1990, at p. 2262.
persons concerned with environmental or public interest issues were intervenors before the Supreme Court of Canada. On an expedited basis, settled upon the application by FORS, that Court heard the appeal on February 19 and 20, 1991, when decision was reserved.
After the Supreme Court had declined to amend the constitutional question before it, in December 1990 the Province initiated this application, con sidered by Mr. Justice Rouleau on December 20 in relation to interlocutory relief sought, and now brought before this Court in relation to the perma nent relief sought, concerning the terms of refer ence of the Panel. The order of my colleague Mr. Justice Rouleau, of December 20, was appealed by notice filed December 28, 1990, though counsel for the Province advised at the hearing of this applica tion for permanent relief that notice of appeal had now been withdrawn.
Through the same period as these legal proceed ings were initiated and under way, following the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal and in accord with that Court's order, the Ministers of Transport and of Fisheries and Oceans in April 1990 referred the matter of the Oldman River dam project to the Minister of Environment for public review pursuant to the Guidelines Order. On November 16, 1990 the Minister of the Envi ronment announced the appointment of the Panel to conduct a public review under the Order, and issued its terms of reference. Those terms are referred to as "wide-sweeping" and objected to by the Province. The terms include, in part, the mandate:
to undertake a review of the potential environmental and socio-economic effects of the Oldman River Dam project. The Panel has the mandate to evaluate and make recommendations on the design and safety of the proposed dam, the significance of potential environmental and socio-economic effects of the proposed dam and its operation, and options for mitigating these effects. The Panel will submit its recommendations to the
Ministers of Environment, Transport, and Fisheries and Oceans in the form of a report. 10
The Panel commenced public information meet ings in Alberta in mid-December, after beginning review of available information and background information on the project. At the end of Decem- ber a public letter was released by the Panel describing its work to that date and its plans. In January it released to the public a statement of its operational procedures. In mid-March it issued "Newsletter No. 1", a "Compendium of Submis sions Received" as of February 11, and a state ment of "Additional Information Requirements" including perceived deficiencies in socio-economic information which the Panel seeks to remedy. The Panel has hired technical experts in a variety of fields, some of which are said by the Province to concern matters primarily within provincial competence, and for certain information deficien cies identified the Panel has indicated that a prime source to be looked to for further information will be the Province, as proponent of the project.
At the time this matter was heard in April, the Panel reportedly was planning public meetings on safety aspects of the dam in June 1991, but it did not anticipate completion of its work in relation to socio-economic aspects of the project or the com mencement of public meetings about those aspects before November 1991. Meanwhile, by late April, construction of the project was reported to be nearing completion, with the dam about 98% com plete, and the entire project some 94% complete. Diversion tunnels were closed in early April so that the reservoir behind the dam is filling and may be completely filled by the end of June with what is now anticipated as a greater than normal spring run-off from heavier than usual snow melt.
10 Terms of Reference for the Oldman River Dam Environ mental Assessment Panel, Canada, Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office, Vancouver.
Concerns of the Province
The motion for a stay or an adjournment by the Minister is here considered in the context of the concerns expressed on behalf of the Province as the basis of its application for judicial review.
The Province urges that legislation in relation to the environment is not a distinct class of subject, or a "matter", under the enumerated powers of Parliament or within its general power under sec tion 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 [30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.) (as am. by Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), Schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982, Item 1) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II, No. 5]]. Rather, regulation of the environment concerns a collection of matters, some within the legislative competence of Parliament and some within the legislative competence of the provincial legislatures." Further, the ancillary doctrine, so-called, which limits the reach and effects of federal legislative action upon areas of provincial responsibility to those matters necessarily inciden tal to the federal power, is of limited application in extending federal authority in relation to the environment. 12
It is conceded that a federal review in this case might extend to matters within the legislative competence of Parliament, e.g., navigable waters, fisheries, Indians and lands reserved for them. The Province does not concede, indeed it disputes, the competence of the federal government acting under the Guidelines Order to provide for a broad ly based review of environmental, socio-economic and safety concerns that encompass matters ordi narily within provincial legislative competence under sections 92, 92A, 95 and 109 of the Consti tution Act, 1867.
" Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, (2nd ed. 1985), at p. 598; R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, at pp. 423, 431 and 444, 445.
12 Fowler v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 213, at p. 226; Northwest Falling Contractors Ltd. v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 292.
In this case it is urged that the terms of refer ence of the Panel and the activities initiated by the Panel are not limited to matters within federal legislative competence. It is said various elements evident in the Panel's activities demonstrate the scope of its mandate, its failure to restrict its review to matters properly of federal concern, and its plans make apparent that it will consider a variety of matters ordinarily within provincial legislative competence. Thus, for example, it has already reviewed a variety of studies undertaken by the Province and provided to the Panel, which deal with many matters of concern exclusively to the Province; it has identified areas of concern as expressed at public hearings many of which areas are within provincial authority; it has developed operational procedures which provide for review of those areas of concern, for the appointment of experts many of whose areas of special interest concern matters that in this case fall within pro vincial responsibility, for the identification of fur ther information requirements sought to be ful filled by the Panel without regard to the fact that many of these concern matters within provincial, not federal, legislative competence. The proposed review and public hearings concerning safety aspects of the dam project, it is urged, would deal with matters clearly within provincial authority, and similar review and hearings on broadly based socio-economic aspects of the project would inevi tably deal with provincial matters.
The additional information requirements identi fied by the Panel and its expectation that many of these would have to be met by the Province as proponent of the project are said to indicate that the Province is expected to be involved in further studies and support for the work of the Panel, at significant costs to the Province.
Finally, it is submitted that the authority of the Panel, limited to a review and to making recom mendations to Ministers, who may then exercise decision-making powers, is no answer to the chal lenge to the constitutional validity of the Panel's
terms of reference. It is said that an investigation by a level of government must relate to a matter within the constitutional authority of that govern ment, an investigation cannot be undertaken sepa rately from the remedial action which may follow. '3 Thus the authority of the Minister does not extend to issuing terms of reference authoriz ing a panel to investigate matters beyond federal competence. Moreover, a review under the Guide lines Order has serious implications for the Prov ince; as proponent of the project section 34 of the Order imposes upon it onerous responsibilities, including the provision of information as requested by the Panel, in copies and languages the Panel decides may be needed for public discussion, and the provision of staff for explanatory purposes at public hearings. Where the matters of interest to the Panel are considered to fall within provincial legislative competence, the Province objects to the assumption that it should do as directed by the Panel. A concern also alluded to is that failure to meet the expectations of the Panel may result in recommendations to Ministers that could lead to possible imposition of difficult conditions for the Province even under valid federal regulatory powers.
As earlier noted, the concerns of the Province underlying its application for judicial review were not subjected at this hearing to counter argument, and ultimately were not considered because this Court determined on the application of the Minis ter that the Province's application be adjourned sine die.
The Application for a Stay or Adjournment
The Minister urges that proceedings in relation to the Province's application be stayed, pursuant to subsection 50(1) of the Federal Court Act, or alternatively that they be adjourned, pursuant to
' 3 Canadian National Railway Co. v. Courtois, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 868, at pp. 892-894.
Court Rule 323, pending decision by the Supreme Court of Canada on the appeal heard in February.
Subsection 50(1) of the Act provides:
50. (1) The Court may, in its discretion, stay proceedings in any cause or matter,
(a) on the ground that the claim is being proceeded with in another court or jurisdiction; or
(b) where for any other reason it is in the interest of justice that the proceedings be stayed.
Rule 323 of the Federal Court Rules is:
Rule 323. The hearing of any motion may from time to time be adjourned upon such terms, if any, as seem just.
It is submitted that paragraph 50(1) (a) of the Federal Court Act is applicable in this situation because the constitutional validity of the Panel's terms of reference has already been put to the Supreme Court in argument by the Province and this issue was also presented in argument by at least two of the other provinces who intervened through their Attorneys General in the Supreme Court hearing. Even though that Court declined to amend the constitutional question stated for the appeal to address explicitly the terms of reference of the Panel, those terms were admitted as evi dence before that Court, their validity was argued and it is conceded that they are "at the heart of application of the Guidelines Order to the project and in the circumstances of the case" before that Court. Moreover, the challenge to the validity of the Guidelines Order itself inevitably challenges the terms of reference here assigned to the Panel. In sum, it is submitted that the very issue raised by the application of the Province is already before the Supreme Court of Canada and in these cir cumstances paragraph 50(1)(a) is apt and this Court in its discretion should grant a stay of proceedings in relation to the Province's applica tion.
Counsel for the Province concedes that in argu ment before the Supreme Court the issue of the validity of the terms of reference was raised, in part, but only in part, as an illustration of per-
ceived unconstitutional application of the Guide lines Order. Counsel frankly concedes that it is hoped the Supreme Court's decision may deal directly with the validity of the terms of reference, but he points out that this issue was expressly rejected for consideration by the Court prior to the hearing.
In my view, whatever the parties may have argued, in written submissions or orally, before the Supreme Court, that Court declined to add the question of the validity of the terms of reference to the matters for consideration on appeal. Thus, whatever that Court may decide, directly or in directly bearing upon this question, I conclude that the application here, which presupposes validity of the Guidelines Order but is based on argument that the terms of reference are an unconstitutional application of that Order, is not "a claim ... being proceeded with in another court" within the terms of paragraph 50(1)(a) of the Federal Court Act.
For the Minister, it is also urged that the grant ing of a stay in these proceedings would be in the interest of justice within paragraph 50(1)(b) of the Act. It is urged, on the basis of the decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in Manitoba (Attorney General) v. Metropolitan Stores Ltd. 14 that here there is a serious question — the impact of the Supreme Court of Canada decision on the issue raised in this application. While that is a serious question indeed, I do not believe this aptly applies the Metropolitan Stores test for a stay of proceed ings. In this case the serious issue is surely the question raised by the Province concerning the validity of the Panel's terms of reference. I agree that question is a serious issue and the question before this Court is whether a stay or adjournment should be granted, the effect of which would be to postpone resolution of the issue.
It is submitted that the Minister, and the Panel, would suffer irreparable harm if the application by the Province be granted, for if the work of the
14 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110.
Panel is suspended the opportunity to recommend meaningful mitigation measures may be lost. That of course assumes that the Panel will determine there are potentially adverse environmental effects of the project, within its mandate, upon which mitigation measures should be recommended, an assumption which at this stage anticipates a par ticular outcome for which there is no evidence before me. Moreover, the submission also assumes that measures to mitigate adverse environmental effects, if any, can only be applied before the project to be reviewed has been constructed, an assumption for which there is no evidentiary base and which I do not share.
The Province asserts that its interests may suffer irreparable harm if the Panel's review continues, without resolution of its questioned constitutional basis, by its being required, as the proponent of the project, to participate at what may be substantial expense, a cost which the Minister disputes in the absence of evidence.
In my view, either of the parties here is likely to suffer some harm whatever the outcome, the Min ister and the Panel if the Province's application proceeds and the remedies sought were granted, or the Province, if the Minister's motion for a stay or adjournment be granted. But I am not persuaded that in either case the harm that is feared would be irreparable. I am, however, persuaded that the public interest is here served best, pending the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, by assuming the validity of the terms of reference of the Panel.
Counsel for the Province urged that the Met ropolitan Stores test was not applicable in this case. In oral reasons for my order at the time of the hearing I indicated I would further consider that submission. Having done so I am persuaded that that test is more apt in circumstances where the court is asked to stay or enjoin the proceedings of another body, for example, of the Panel as was sought by the Province in applying for interlocuto ry relief including an injunction restraining the
work of the Panel, an application dismissed by Mr. Justice Rouleau. The same test, of Metropolitan Stores, is not so apt in considering a motion to stay or adjourn proceedings which has the effect of postponing access to the relief ordinarily available in this Court. In these latter circumstances the more appropriate test is that applied by the Associate Chief Justice in Association of Parents Support Groups In Ontario (Using Toughlove) Inc. v. York et al., 15 that the applicant for a stay establish that the interest of justice clearly sup ports a stay and outweighs the respondent's right to proceed with its cause of action. The Court is reluctant to interfere with any litigant's right of access. 16
It is urged on behalf of the Minister that the interest of justice is here served° by granting the stay sought or adjourning proceedings in relation to the Province's motion, pending decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, and that the Province is not substantially prejudiced by a stay which will be temporary. At this stage that process protects the public interest in maintaining the law until determination by the Supreme Court of the consti tutional scope of the Guidelines Order. That deter mination will inevitably permit or prohibit the Panel's work in whole or in part. It seems likely that Court will deal with the constitutional issues before it, though as the Province notes there can be no assurance that those issues will be dealt with, particularly in view of other issues in appeal before that Court and the expressed position of the Supreme Court that it would prefer to avoid con stitutional issues which have not been dealt with by courts below, at trial and at appeal. " More over, the Province urges that a decision by this Court in relation to its application may be looked on with favour by the Supreme Court, and, more
15 (1987), 14 C.P.R. (3d) 263 (F.C.T.D.).
16 Idem, at p. 264.
" See, e.g., R. v. Amway Corp., [ 1989] 1 S.C.R. 21, per Sopinka J., at p. 42; Vickery v. Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Prothonotary), not yet reported, No. 21598, (S.C.C.) 28 March 1991, per Stevenson J. (at pp. 5-6).
important, that the Province has a right to seek relief and having been denied interlocutory relief this Court should now proceed to consider the application for final relief. Otherwise, the Province is effectively precluded from seeking relief, of the nature here sought, in the only court where that can be pursued.
On behalf of FORS, and in support of the Minister's application, it is urged that this pro ceeding is but one more step by the Province to preclude public review of the project and that this proceeding relates to essentially the same question as was involved in litigation now in its final stages awaiting determination by the Supreme Court of Canada, that is, whether the Oldman River dam project is subject to public review. Further, it is urged that the balance of convenience here favours the grant of an order staying proceedings on the Province's applications.
Finally, both for the Minister and FORS it is submitted that various factors, outlined by Associ ate Chief Justice Jerome in the transcript of his reasons orally delivered from the bench granting an adjournment of two other recent applications concerning the Daishowa project in Northern Alberta," all support the adjournment of proceed ings here, in the interests of justice. There the learned justice was dealing with applications, like that originally initiated by FORS in relation to the Oldman River dam project, to require Ministers to comply with the Guidelines Order.
"'Edmonton Friends of the North Environmental Society v. Canada (Minister of Western Economic Diversification) (Court File No. T-440-90), and Little Red River Band of Indians v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), (Court File No. T-441-90) unreported, transcript of proceedings, Nov. 30, 1990.
While it is unusual to stay or adjourn a matter in circumstances which effectively postpone access to relief which a party otherwise has a right to pursue, I am persuaded that this is a case that warrants that unusual step. The application by the Minister to adjourn further consideration of the Province's application pending the decision anticipated from the Supreme Court of Canada, should here be granted, for the following reasons.
1) In so far as the Metropolitan Stores test may provide standards in this matter, I agree that there is a serious issue to be tried, that issue being the one raised by the Province concerning constitutional validity of the terms of reference of the Panel, but postponing consideration of that issue at this stage is in the public interest. In my view, on the balance of convenience, there is a likelihood of greater inconvenience to the respondents in proceeding to consider the Province's motion while closely related issues are under consideration in the Supreme Court of Canada than there is to the Province from adjourning that consideration. Proceedings at this stage which question the Panel's process, and any order from this Court which might suspend or interrupt the review process of the Panel would be more disruptive and create greater harm to the process of public environ mental review than continuing that process pending the decision of the Supreme Court. I take judicial notice that continuing with the review will involve the Province in further work and the costs will be at the public expense of the Province the longer the review continues. Yet the decision of the Supreme Court is likely to be released within a few months. We can all hope that the decision will be rendered, as the hearing was conducted, on an expedited basis, probably well before November 1991 when the majority of matters under consideration by the Panel may be ripe for public discussion and final consideration by the Panel.
2) For the general considerations outlined by the Associate Chief Justice in the transcript of
proceedings concerning the applications refer ring to the Daishowa project, 19 it seems to me just and appropriate to adjourn consideration of the Province's application pending the deci sion of the Supreme Court. Those consider ations are more particularly applicable in this case than in the Daishowa applications for the matters now under consideration in the Supreme Court, although different from the issue here raised, are closely related to that issue and they arise from earlier proceedings concerning the project of interest in this matter, the Oldman River dam project. These considerations include the factors outlined below which tip the balance in favour of the general interests of justice when weighed against the Province's right to proceed.
3) In my view the interests of justice, and the efficacy of the judicial system, are best served by adjourning consideration of the Province's application because:
a) the constitutional validity of the Guidelines Order upon which the processes of the Panel depend, may be expected to be com mented upon in the near future by the Supreme Court. Virtually any decision on the merits of the application for final relief now before this Court is likely to be affect ed by the Supreme Court decision, which can be expected to influence the determina tion here sought by the Province.
b) Even if the Supreme Court's decision does not deal directly with the issue raised here, I have no doubt that issue may be more readily resolved, and perhaps more defini tively argued, in light of the decision of the Supreme Court, now awaited. In these cir cumstances any motions judge would be reluctant to render a decision on the Prov ince's application in advance of the Supreme Court's ruling, for such a decision might be significantly affected by the ruling and this would create additional problems for the parties. If decision of a motions judge were reserved until after it is clear
19 See note 18.
what effect the Supreme Court's decision may have, then the Province would be in the same position as if an adjournment were granted, no better but clearly no worse. As Associate Chief Justice Jerome indicated in the case of applications relating to the Dai- showa project, it would be unreasonable to expect a motions judge to render decision on an issue closely related to questions already under consideration in the Supreme Court.
c) Counsel for the Province frankly acknowl edged that, even though the Supreme Court of Canada declined to add a specific consti tutional question concerning the terms of reference of the Panel, argument before the Court in February urged that the terms of reference were unconstitutional, that they encompass matters falling within provincial legislative jurisdiction. He expressed the hope that the constitutional validity of the terms of reference of the Panel would be dealt with by the Supreme Court, the very issue raised in this application. In my view, to proceed to consider the application at this stage in these circumstances would be an inappropriate process with closely related questions before courts at different levels in the judicial system. Moreover, it would be presumptuous of this motions judge at this stage to consider and determine an issue which the applicant has urged, and hopes, to have resolved by the Supreme Court.
Thus, I conclude that the application by the Minister should be allowed and the proceedings to consider the application by the Province should be adjourned.
Counsel were invited to consider whether terms might be included in any order of adjournment. After their consideration, I was advised that no terms were agreed on. Counsel for the Province suggested consideration of an order, in addition to adjournment, that would preclude the Panel from conducting its proposed public hearings or discus sions in two stages, in June and November, thus
effectively limiting public discussions to the time foreseen for conclusion of its studies in November 1991. The involvement in proposed hearings that might well deal with matters within provincial legislative competence presented the greatest dif ficulties for the Province, and the likelihood of a decision by the Supreme Court before November was greater than before June of 1991. I declined to add such terms, which were opposed by the Minis ter and by FORS. Thus, the matter is adjourned sine die, without prejudice to the right of the Province, or any other party, to return on the usual two days notice if circumstances should change.
The matter of costs was raised by counsel for FORS which was described as a public interest group but privately supported. The Society per ceived its active role in this case, in promoting review- through litigation, as an important one but one which had proven to be expensive. Counsel suggested that at an earlier stage it had been proposed to the other parties that the two applica tions before the Court be determined separately with the motion for adjournment considered first, in which event FORS would not have appeared at the hearing of that matter. This was not agreed on. In the circumstances counsel proposed that costs be awarded to FORS on a solicitor and client basis. After consideration of this submission, and of the opposition expressed by the Province to an order for costs at this stage, I conclude, and the orders herein so provide, that costs at this stage will be costs in the cause.
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