A-1340-92
Graham Haig, John Doe, and Jane Doe
(Appellants) (Respondents)
v.
Her Majesty the Queen (Respondent) (Applicant)
A-1363-92
Graham Haig, John Doe, and Jane Doe
(Appellants) (Applicants)
v.
Jean - Pierre Kingsley (Chief Electoral Officer)
(Respondent) (Respondent)
INDEXED AS: HAIG V. CANADA (CA.)
Federal Court of Appeal, Hugessen, Stone and
Décary H.A.—Ottawa, October 19 and 20, 1992.
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Democratic
rights — Right to vote — 1992 referendum on constitutional
reform — Federal referendum held under federal Referendum
Act rules — In Quebec, referendum subject to provincial law,
including six-month residency requirement — Former Ontario
resident unable to vote as moved to Quebec two months before
referendum — Appellant arguing combined effect of federal
and Quebec referendum rules depriving him of right to vote in
violation of Charter rights — Fact appellant unable to vote
result of provincial legislation — Court unable to give remedy
— Chief Electoral Officer can assert no historical privilege or
immunity against claims under Charter.
Elections — 1992 referendum on constitutional reform —
Federal referendum held under federal Referendum Act rules
— In Quebec, referendum subject to provincial law, including
six-month residency requirement — Former Ontario resident
unable to vote as moved to Quebec two months before referen
dum — In essence, appellant arguing Charter rights impaired
by Quebec legislation — Not matter on which Court can give
remedy — Chief Electoral Officer can assert no historical priv
ilege or immunity against claims under Charter.
Judicial review — Equitable remedies — Declarations
1992 referendum on constitutional reform — Appellant arguing
combined effect of federal and Quebec referendum rules
depriving him of right to vote in violation of Charter rights —
Chief Electoral Officer "federal board, commission or other
tribunal" within Federal Court Act, s. 18 — Chief Electoral
Officer can assert no historical privilege or immunity against
claims under Charter.
Practice — Parties — Joinder — Citizen seeking relief from
denial of right to vote in referendum on constitutional reform
— Alleging breach of Charter rights — Attorney General of
Canada properly added as respondent where case raising issue
of Charter adequacy of federal legislation or order in council
adopted thereunder.
Appellant, Haig, wanted to vote in the October 1992 refer
endum on constitutional reform based on the Charlottetown
Accord. He had moved from Ontario to Quebec in August
1992. The referendum was to be held according to federal rules
across Canada except in Quebec where a parallel referendum
was to take place according to provincial law, which included
a six-month residency requirement. Taken together, the federal
and provincial rules in effect disqualified the appellant, and
others in the same situation, from voting in the referendum.
Because of the residency requirements, he could vote neither in
Ontario nor in Quebec. The appellant contended that this
double proscription violated his Charter rights.
The first appeal is against an order striking out the Queen as
a respondent in the appellant's section 18 proceedings. The
second is against two orders dismissing the proceedings on the
merits and dismissing the appellant's application to amend by
adding the Attorney General of Canada as a respondent. The
Chief Electoral Officer cross appealed against the assumption
of jurisdiction by the Judge below.
Held (Décary J.A. dissenting), the appeal should be allowed
in part to permit the adding of the Attorney General of Canada
as a respondent both here and in the Trial Division; the appeal
against the order dismissing the proceedings on their merits
and the cross appeal as to jurisdiction should be dismissed. The
appeal against the order striking out the Queen as a respondent
should be quashed as moot.
Per Hugessen J.A. (Stone J.A. concurring): The deprivation
of the appellant's right to vote flowed exclusively from the
operation of provincial legislation. There was no constitutional
impropriety in a federal order in council requiring a referen
dum to be held in some but not all of the provinces and territo
ries. Nor was there anything constitutionally ojectionable in
the federal government agreeing to allow one province to con
duct its own referendum in accordance with its own rules. This
Court could not provide a remedy on a complaint that the
appellant's Charter rights were impaired by Quebec legislation.
The decision refusing leave to add the Attorney General of
Canada was wrong. The Chief Electoral Officer was a "federal
board, commission or other tribunal" against which the relief
sought herein is specifically authorized by section 18. The
Attorney General of Canada is likewise expressly authorized to
be made a party to such proceedings and is, in any event, a
proper respondent and necessary party where, as here, there is
a question of the Charter adequacy of federal legislation or of
an order in council adopted thereunder. Since this case could
go further, this Court should eliminate any purely procedural
roadblocks to its doing so, as the Court is allowed to do by the
recent amendments to the Federal Court Act.
The appeal from the order striking out the Queen as respon
dent had become moot and should be quashed.
This Court's decision in Canada (Human Rights Commis
sion) v. Lane made it clear that the Chief Electoral Officer
could assert no historical privilege or statutory immunity
against claims under the Canadian Human Rights Act, and that
must also be the case with regard to claims founded on the
Charter, the fundamental law of Canada.
Per Décary J.A. (dissenting): If those in the appellant's situ
ation were to be denied the right to vote in the October 26 ref
erendum, Canadian citizens would be denied their right to vote
for the sole reason that political purposes and convenience
have led the Government of Canada to hold what is truly a
national referendum in the territories and nine provinces only,
on the assumption that the tenth province, Quebec, would hold
a referendum the very same day on the very same question. It
was a truly national referendum and not a referendum where
the question is put only to the electors of one or more prov
inces. All Canadians eligible to vote under the Canada Elec
tions Act should be eligible to do so in a national referendum
held pursuant to the adopted provisions of the Canada Elec
tions Act. The Government of Canada was required to make
sure that every Canadian who would have been qualified to
vote in the national referendum—had it been held in Quebec as
everywhere else under the federal legislation—would be able
somehow and somewhere to express his preference as prom
ised by the Prime Minister in an August 28, 1992 House of
Commons address. In adopting the Referendum Act and in
issuing the Referendum Proclamation, Parliament did not
intend to deprive any Canadian citizen of the right to vote in
the upcoming national referendum.
If the appellant were denied his right to vote in the referen
dum, his freedom off expression guaranteed by paragraph 2(b)
off the Charter would be infringed, and so would his right to the
equal benefit of the law guaranteed by Charter section 15.
The source of the infringement of the appellant's rights,
would not be the Quebec legislation but the federal legislation
which would have failed to take into account, for the purposes
of a national referendum, the existing differences in provincial
legislation with respect to electors' qualifications.
The term "elector of a province" in subsection 3(1) of the
Referendum Act should be interpreted as including in a particu
lar province persons ordinarily resident of that province on
enumeration day and who do not qualify under the residency
requirements of the province, but who were ordinarily resident
in that province at any time in the six-month period prior to the
referendum. The Chief Electoral Officer should be ordered to
exercise his duties accordingly and within his powers under
Canada Elections Act, subsection 9(1), "to adopt any of the
provisions of the Act ... to such extent as he considers neces
sary to meet the exigencies of the situation".
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS JUDICIALLY
CONSIDERED
Canada Elections Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. E-2, ss. 9(1), 50,
54, 55(2).
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I
of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act
1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II,
No. 44], ss. 2, 3, 15.
Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6.
Federal Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7, ss. 17 (as am. by
S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 3), 18 (as am. idem, s. 4), 18.4(2) (as
enacted idem, s. 5), 48.
Proclamation Directing a Referendum Relating to the
Constitution of Canada, Sl/92-180.
Referendum Act, S.C. 1992, c. 30, s. 3(1).
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
APPLIED:
Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Lane, [1990] 2
F.C. 327; (1990), 67 D.L.R. (4th) 745; 13 C.H.R.R.
D/568; 107 N.R. 124 (C.A.).
REFERRED TO:
Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code
(Man.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123; [1990] 4 W.W.R. 481;
(1990), 68 Man. R. (2d) 1; 56 C.C.C. (3d) 65; 77 C.R.
(3d) 1; 109 N.R. 81; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney
General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927; (1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th)
577; 25 C.P.R. (3d) 417; 94 N.R. 167; Native Women's
Assn. of Canada v. Canada, [1992] 3 F.C. 192 (C.A.); R.
v. S.(S.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 254; (1990), 57 C.C.C. (3d) 115;
77 C.R. (3d) 273; 49 C.R.R. 79; 110 N.R. 321; 41 O.A.C.
81; R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296; (1989), 48 C.C.C.
(3d) 8; 69 C.R. (3d) 97; 96 N.R. 115.
AUTHORS CITED
Canada. House of Commons Debates, Vol. 132, 3rd Sess.,
34th Parl., 8 September 1992, at page 12732.
APPEALS from orders ([1992] 3 F.C. 602 and
[1992] 3 F.C. D-32) denying the appellant relief from
deprivation of the right to vote in the October 26,
1992 referendum on constitutional reform based on
the Charlottetown Accord. Appeal allowed in part, to
permit addition of the Attorney General of Canada as
a respondent both here and in the Trial Division; the
appeal against the order dismissing the proceedings
on their merits and the cross appeal on the question
of jurisdiction are dismissed. The appeal against the
order striking out the Queen as a respondent is
quashed as moot.
COUNSEL:
Philippa E. Lawson for appellants.
J. M. Aubry, Q. C. and R. Morneau for respon
dent Her Majesty the Queen.
Nicol J. Schultz and Holly McManus for respon
dent Jean-Pierre Kingsley, Chief Electoral
Officer.
SOLICITORS:
Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Ottawa, for
appellants.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respon
dent Her Majesty the Queen.
Fraser & Beatty, Ottawa, for respondent Jean-
Pierre Kingsley, Chief Electoral Officer.
The following are the reasons for judgment deliv
ered orally in English by
HUGESSEN J.A.: We are seized with two appeals.
The first is against an order of Denault J. striking out
the Queen as a respondent in the appellant's section
18 [Federal Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7 (as am.
by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 4)] proceedings. The second is
against two orders of Joyal J. dismissing those pro
ceedings on their merits and, apparently as a conse
quence thereof, dismissing appellant's application to
amend so as to add the Attorney General of Canada
as a respondent. The respondent the Chief Electoral
Officer has cross appealed against the assumption of
jurisdiction over the matter by Joyal J.
The appellant is a Canadian citizen over the age of
18 and not subject to any legal disability. In August
of this year he moved from Ottawa, Ontario to Hull,
Quebec, just across the river. Because he is no longer
a resident of Ontario he cannot vote in that province
in the federal referendum to be held on October 26 in
nine provinces and two territories. Because he has
not resided in Quebec for six months he cannot vote
in the provincial referendum to be held in that prov
ince on the same date and on the same question. He
seeks declaratory and other relief against the Chief
Electoral Officer (and by amendment, as indicated,
against the Attorney General of Canada) by way of
section 18 proceedings.
I am of the view that Joyal J. clearly reached the
right conclusion on the merits. To the extent that the
appellant's rights under sections 2, 3 and 15 of the
Charter [Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule
B, Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C.,
1985, Appendix II, No. 44]] may have been denied to
him by depriving him as a citizen of Canada and a
resident of Quebec of the right to vote in the forth
coming referendum, such denial and such deprivation
in my view flow exclusively from the operation of
provincial legislation. While it is no doubt true that it
is the federal order in council [Proclamation
Directing a Referendum Relating to the Constitution
of Canada, SI/92-180] restricting the federal referen
dum to all provinces and territories other than Que-
bec which has created the background for the appel
lant's present situation, it remains that it is the
Quebec legislation alone which is at the root of his
complaint. He does not now reside in any province in
which the federal referendum is being held and the
federal legislation does not affect him one way or the
other. As a resident of Quebec he is subject to that
province's referendum legislation and it is solely that
legislation which denies him the right to vote. To put
the matter more precisely, he cannot dispute the fact
that as a resident of Quebec the federal legislation
does not permit him to vote in some other province;
rather, his complaint is that he cannot vote in his
province of residence which is Quebec. The fact is
that this is the result of provincial legislation alone.
Under the Referendum Act' the Governor in Coun
cil may order the holding of a referendum to obtain
the opinion of "the electors of Canada or of one or
more provinces" on a "question relating to the Con
1 S.C. 1992, c. 30.
stitution of Canada" (subsection 3(1)). The Act estab
lishes a scheme for voting on the question which is
based on and adapted from the Canada Elections
Act. 2 That scheme, like that for holding federal elec
tions, is very largely based on considerations of geog
raphy: provinces are divided into electoral districts
which are in turn divided into polling divisions. To
be entitled to vote at an election, an elector, besides
being qualified, must have his or her name included
on the list of electors in the polling division in which
he or she resides. That is so for a referendum as well:
one votes in the province, electoral district and pol
ling division of one's residence.
Furthermore, because a referendum is limited to
constitutional questions, and because the amending
formula (and indeed the Constitution itself) envisages
processes and substantive rules which may differ
according to the province or number of provinces
involved, it is entirely normal that different questions
may be put to the electors in one or more provinces
or that a question may be put to the electors in some
provinces but not others. 3 Moreover, there is nothing
in the federal legislation which gives binding effect
to the majority answer to any question; that fact,
however, does not prevent a province or territory, by
appropriate provincial action, agreeing to be bound
by such answer (as we were told has actually hap
pened in British Columbia and Alberta).
In such circumstances, and against this back
ground, there is no constitutional impropriety in a
federal order in council requiring a referendum to be
held in some but not all of the provinces. By the same
token there is nothing constitutionally objectionable
in the federal government agreeing to allow one or
more provinces to conduct their own referendums in
accordance with their own rules. That is what has
happened here.
2 R.S.C., 1985, c. E-2.
3 The Constitution of Canada may and does contain different
provisions regarding different provinces; the provinces them
selves may and do have different constitutions which they
alone can amend; the Constitution of Canada itself may be
amended by Parliament acting together with one or several or
all of the legislatures depending on the circumstances.
At bottom, the appellant's complaint is that his
Charter rights have been impaired by the Quebec leg
islation; that is not a matter on which this Court can
give him a remedy. The application for judicial
review was accordingly properly dismissed.
As far as concerns that part of Joyal J.'s decision
refusing leave to add the Attorney General of Canada
I think, with respect, that he was wrong. The Chief
Electoral Officer falls within the definition of "fed-
eral board, commission or other tribunal" and declar-
atory and other relief of the type here sought against
him is specifically authorized by section 18. The
complaint is that he has failed or neglected to exer
cise the power and jurisdiction which are his to apply
and adapt the law so as to allow persons in the appel
lant's position to vote in a referendum which is not
being held in their province of residence. That allega
tion is a proper ground of section 18 relief. The
Attorney General of Canada is likewise expressly
authorized to be made a party to such proceedings
and is, in any event, a proper respondent and neces
sary party where, as here, there is a question of the
Charter adequacy of federal legislation or of an order
in council adopted thereunder. Whether or not the
application is well founded as against either respon
dent is of course nothing to the point on the question
of jurisdiction.
Subsection 18(3) effects a change in the law which
existed prior to February 1, 1992 and makes it plain
that declaratory relief of this type is henceforward to
be obtained only on an application for judicial
review. Subsection 18.4(2) [as enacted idem, s. 5]
allows the Court, in an appropriate case, to order that
the application proceed as an action. That provision,
which has not been invoked in this case, is a legisla
tive response to the concerns expressed in some of
the cases arising prior to February 1, 1992 to the
effect that an application for judicial review did not
provide appropriate procedural safeguards where
declaratory relief was sought. Since this case may go
further, we should eliminate any purely procedural
roadblocks to its doing so.
If the appeal from Joyal J.'s order on the procedu
ral point is allowed, however, the appeal from
Denault J.'s order on the earlier related point
becomes moot and should be quashed.
As far as concerns the Chief Electoral Officer's
cross appeal, this Court's decision in Lane 4 makes it
clear that he can assert no historical privilege or stat
utory immunity against claims under the Canadian
Human Rights Act. 5 A fortiori must this be the case
with regard to claims which are founded in the Char
ter, the fundamental law of Canada. For reasons of
convenience, practicality and necessity courts have
traditionally acted with restraint in matters relating to
the conduct of elections and we will continue to do
so. This, however, is a matter of the judicious exer
cise of discretion in the fashioning (and even in the
granting) of certain remedies. It does not and cannot
restrict the Court's jurisdiction, power and duty to
take cognizance of alleged denials of constitutional
rights at election time. The cross appeal should
accordingly fail.
I would allow the appeal in part and permit the
adding of the Attorney General of Canada as a
respondent both here and in the Trial Division; I
would otherwise dismiss the appeal and cross appeal
against the order of Joyal J. and would quash as moot
the appeal against the order of Denault J. I would
make no order as to costs.
STONE J.A.: I agree.
* * *
The following are the reasons for judgment deliv
ered orally in English by
DECARY J.A. (dissenting): I agree with my brother
Hugessen that the Federal Court has jurisdiction and
that both the Attorney General of Canada and the
Chief Electoral Officer are proper parties to these
4 Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Lane, [1990] 2
F.C. 327.
5 R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6.
proceedings. I cannot, however, share his views on
the merits of the case.
The fact, simply put, if the appellant is to be
denied his right to vote in the October 26 referendum,
is that Canadian citizens would be denied their right
to vote for the sole reason that political purposes and
convenience have led the Government of Canada to
hold what is truly a national referendum in nine prov
inces only, on the assumption and certitude that the
tenth province, i.e. Quebec, would hold a referendum
the very same day on the very same question. I
believe I can take judicial notice of the political reali
ties that have dictated that line of conduct and I have
no quarrels with these political realities inasmuch as
they do not translate into legislation or orders in
council that violate a citizen's right to vote in such a
referendum.
That the referendum is truly a national referendum
and that it deals with a major and vital issue con
fronting all Canadians in whatever province they
reside is illustrated by these words spoken by the
Prime Minister of Canada in the House of Commons,
on September 8, 1992 (page 12732) when putting
before the House the document entitled Consensus
Report on the Constitution, Charlottetown, August
28, 1992:
This constitutional package provides a framework within
which we are able to move ahead as a united nation, diverse
and different it is true, yet one nation. And now the referendum
ensures that every person of voting age in Canada will have an
opportunity to express his or her preference.
The question is deeper and more profound and more impor
tant than that. Basically, the referendum relates to an apprecia
tion of what it means to be a Canadian, ...
It is now time for all of us to find it in our hearts and in our
souls to say without hesitation or doubt ...
A rose by any other name would smell as sweet
and not to treat this referendum as a national referen
dum is, in my respectful view, to refuse to call a
spade a spade. It cannot be this kind of referendum
Parliament had in mind, in adopting the Referendum
Act (the Act), S.C. 1992, c. 30 in June, 1992, when it
provided in subsection 3(1) that the question could be
put only to "the electors of one or more provinces".
This is not a referendum of the kind alluded to by my
brother Hugessen in his reasons.
One might be expected to assume that all Canadi-
ans eligible to vote under the Canada Elections Act,
R.S.C., 1985, c. E-2 would be eligible to vote in a
national referendum held pursuant to the adopted pro
visions of the Canada Elections Act. This is particu
larly so when the Referendum Act has adopted with
out any modifications the elector's qualifications set
out in sections 50 and following of the Canada Elec
tions Act.
Assuming that the Government of Canada can con
sider a referendum held in a given province organ
ized by that province according to the laws of that
province as a part of its national referendum, I do not
believe it can do so without making sure that all
Canadians who would have been qualified to vote in
the national referendum had it been held in that prov
ince as everywhere else under the federal legislation,
would be able somehow and somewhere to register
their vote.
It is clear, in my view, that Parliament, in adopting
the Referendum Act, and the Governor in Council, in
issuing the proclamation under subsection 3(1) of the
Act on September 17, 1992, did not intend to deprive
any Canadian citizen of his right to vote in the
upcoming national referendum. Yet, if the Chief
Electoral Officer's interpretation is to be retained,
this is exactly what will happen to the appellant.
If the appellant is denied his right to vote in the
referendum, his freedom of expression guaranteed by
paragraph 2(b) of the Charter would be infringed (see
Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal
Code (Man.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, at pages 1185-
1186; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General),
[ 1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at page 976, where Dickson C.J.
stated that freedom of expression encourages "partic-
ipation in social and political decision-making";
Native Women's Assn. of Canada v. Canada, [1992]
3 F.C. 192 (C.A.), where Mahoney J.A., for the
Court, held, at page 211, that "communicating one's
constitutional views to the public and to governments
is unquestionably an expressive activity protected by
paragraph 2(b)". The appellant's right to the equal
benefit of the law guaranteed by section 15 of the
Charter would also be infringed. In R. v. S.(S.),
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 254, at page 289, Dickson C.J.
expressly agreed with a statement by Wilson J. in R.
v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, at page 1333, that in
some circumstances a person's province of residence
could be a personal characteristic of the individual or
group capable of constituting a ground of discrimina
tion. The circumstances, here, warrant such a finding.
I take issue with the view that the appellant's rights
have been infringed by the Quebec legislation. Elec
tors' qualifications in a Quebec referendum had been
defined for a long time and must have been known to
Parliament when, in June 1992, it adopted its own
legislation. The existing Quebec legislation is at first
glance perfectly valid legislation and I doubt very
much whether the appellant could have had any suc
cess had he chosen to challenge that legislation in
Quebec courts.
The source of the infringement, should the appel
lant be denied his rights, would not be the Quebec
legislation but, rather, the federal legislation which
would have failed to take into account for the pur
poses of a national referendum the existing differ
ences in provincial legislation with respect to elec
tors' qualifications.
Parliament and the Governor in Council being pre
sumed to act in conformity with the Charter, and it
being a rule that courts will only make findings of
unconstitutionality where there is no other alterna
tive, I am of the view that the statutory interpretation
suggested by the appellant is a convoluted yet appro
priate way to resolve this difficult issue without put
ting in jeopardy the holding of the referendum.
The term "elector of a province" has not been
defined in subsection 3(1) of the Referendum Act, nor
in the order in council. Considering that pursuant to
subsection 55(2) of the Canada Elections Act, the
rules respecting the residence of electors "shall be
determined by reference to all the facts of the case"
and considering that the Canada Elections Act, at
section 50 gives the right to vote to all Canadian citi
zens who have attained the age of eighteen years, it is
open to the Court, in my view, where a national refer
endum is held in the ten provinces but where the Fed
eral Government has agreed to allow a given prov
ince's legislation to supersede its own, to interpret
the term "elector" of a province as used in section 3
of the Referendum Act, as including in a particular
province electors who are ordinarily resident of that
given province on enumeration date and who do not
qualify under the residency requirements of the latter,
but who were ordinarily resident in that particular
province at any time in the six-month period prior to
the referendum, provided, of course, as is made clear
in section 54 of the Canada Elections Act, that no
elector may be an elector in more than one province.
I realize that this interpretation is somewhat stretched
but it is the only one, in my view, that is possible in
the circumstances if the referendum is to be validly
held and if the appellant is to be allowed to cast his
vote. This Court is the next-to-last resort of Canadian
citizens who desperately seek a way to participate in
a national referendum of great concern to them and to
the Canadian population. I have no hesitation to
stretch the law to a permissible extent in order to
accommodate them.
I would therefore grant the declaration in the way
stated above as against the Attorney General of
Canada.
I would also order the Chief Electoral Officer to
exercise his duties in conformity with the above dec
laration and to take the appropriate steps, if time per
mits, pursuant to the powers given to him in subsec
tion 9(1) of the Canada Elections Act, to "adapt any
of the provisions of the Act to the execution of its
intent, to such extent as he considers necessary to
meet the exigencies of the situation". I appreciate the
practical difficulties associated with this order and
this is why the order is expressly made subject to
time constraints. The appellant by his own admission
does not seek to delay or to prevent the holding of the
referendum and what I am ordering the Chief Electo-
ral Officer to do, is to do what he can reasonably do
in the little time remaining to allow the appellant and
those in a like situation to exercise their right to vote
in the October 26, 1992 referendum.
I would allow the appeal from Joyal J. and grant
costs throughout to the appellant as against the Attor
ney General of Canada.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.